Who is Responsible for the Sharp Rise in Political and Security-Related Executions Following the January 2026 Protests in Iran?

Since March 2026, Iran has witnessed a sharp escalation in executions on political and security-related charges, as 40 people were executed between March 18 and June 3.

In response to this surge, Spreading Justice examined the officials and institutions responsible for facilitating these executions. While such executions continue beyond the reporting period, this report focuses on the two months between March 18 and May 18, 2026, during which at least 32 individuals were executed following grossly unfair trials. The youngest among them, Amirhossein Hatami, was only 18 years old. Although limited in its temporal scope, the findings reflect a broader and ongoing pattern, with executions on political and security-related charges continuing at an alarming pace.

A significant number of those executed were accused of involvement in the January 2026 protests, known as the Dey Protests, which began on December 28, 2025, and rapidly spread across the country amid widespread public anger over economic collapse, corruption, and state repression. Demonstrations continued for weeks despite a violent regime crackdown involving mass arrests and the widespread use of lethal force, resulting in the deaths of at least 7,007 individuals in conduct likely amounting to crimes against humanity. The same period also saw the highest recorded number of forced confessions in recent years, surpassing 350 documented cases.

Others executed during this period were accused of involvement in the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests or alleged activity connected to the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025.

Comparatively, according to HRA documentation, between March 18 and May 18, 2025, a total of 198 individuals were executed in Iran, compared to 65 executions during the same period in 2026. However, only 8 individuals were executed on political and security-related charges in 2025, underscoring the sharp escalation in the use of executions as a tool of political repression in 2026.

Spreading Justice has identified the judicial authorities responsible for issuing these arbitrary death sentences. These individuals have long-standing records of involvement in violations of the right to life and the systematic denial of fair trial guarantees. Among them, Judge Iman Afshari has played a particularly central role. During this same period, Afshari sentenced at least eight individuals to death on political and security-related charges, including:

Afshari is also implicated in at least six additional cases outlined below that resulted in arbitrary executions.

14 Individuals Executed Between March 18 and May 18, 2026, in Connection with the January 2026 Dey Protests

Victim Individuals Involved in Violations of the Right to Life
Mehdi Ghasemi Mehdi GhasemiAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 19, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the United States; inciting people to war and murder
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Saleh Mohammadi Saleh MohammadiAge: 19
Date of Execution: March 19, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the United States; inciting people to war and murder
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Saeed Davoudi Saeed DavoudiAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 19, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the United States; inciting people to war and murder
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Amirhossein Hatami Amirhossein HatamiAge: 18
Date of Execution: April 2, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups
Abolghasem SalavatiGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Mohammad-Amin Biglari Mohammad-Amin BiglariAge: 19
Date of Execution: April 5, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups
Abolghasem SalavatiGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Shahin Vahedparast Shahin VahedparastAge: 30
Date of Execution: April 5, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups
Abolghasem SalavatiGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Ali Fahim Ali FahimAge: 23
Date of Execution: April 6, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups
Abolghasem SalavatiGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Amirali Mirjafari Amirali MirjafariAge: 24
Date of Execution: April 21, 2026
Charge: Operational action for the Israeli regime and hostile governments; collaboration with Mossad-linked networks; arson and destruction of public property
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Erfan Kiani Erfan KianiAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: April 25, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon to intimidate the public and participate in destruction of public property
Revolutionary Court of IsfahanGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Sasan Azadvar Junaqani Sasan Azadvar JunaqaniAge: 21
Date of Execution: April 30, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God)
Seyed-Mahmoud Kazem ZadehGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Mehdi Rasouli Mehdi RasouliAge: 25
Date of Execution: May 3, 2026
Charge: Operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups
Gholamreza Akbari MoghadamGhasem MazinaniGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Ebrahim Dolatabadi Ebrahim DolatabadiAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 3, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh and leading the protests
Gholamreza Akbari MoghadamGhasem MazinaniGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Mohammadreza Miri Mohammadreza MiriAge: 21
Date of Execution: May 3, 2026
Charge: Operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups
Gholamreza Akbari MoghadamGhasem MazinaniGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Mohammad Abbasi Mohammad AbbasiAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 13, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God)
Abolghasem SalavatiSeyyed Kazem Sadati FiruzabadGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad

18 Individuals Executed on Political and Security Charges Unrelated to the January 2026 Protests

During this period, 18 individuals were also executed on political and security-related charges. However, these charges were not connected to the January protests. Instead, these individuals were executed for their alleged involvement in the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests and alleged activity during the 12-day war with Israel.

Victim Individuals Involved in Violations of the Right to Life
Kourosh Keyvani Kourosh KeyvaniAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 18, 2026
Charge: Espionage for Israel
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Akbar Daneshvar-Kar Akbar Daneshvar-KarAge: 59
Date of Execution: March 30, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups
Iman AfshariGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Seyed Mohammad Taghavi-Sangdehi Seyed Mohammad Taghavi-SangdehiAge: 60
Date of Execution: March 30, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups
Iman AfshariGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Babak Alipour Babak AlipourAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 31, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups
Iman AfshariGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Pouya Ghobadi Pouya GhobadiAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 31, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups
Iman AfshariGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Abolhassan Montazer Abolhassan MontazerAge: 68
Date of Execution: April 4, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups
Iman AfshariGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Vahid Baniamerian Vahid BaniamerianAge: 34
Date of Execution: April 4, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups
Iman AfshariGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Mohammad Masoum Shahi Mohammad Masoum ShahiAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: April 20, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh, cooperation with a hostile state, assembly and collusion against national security, and membership in a group with intent to disrupt national security
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Hamed Validi Hamed ValidiAge: 45
Date of Execution: April 20, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh, cooperation with a hostile state, assembly and collusion against national security, and membership in a group with intent to disrupt national security
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Mehdi Farid Mehdi FaridAge: 55
Date of Execution: April 22, 2026
Charge: Efsad-e fel-arz (corruption on earth) through cooperation with Israel
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Soltanali Shirzadi Fakhr Soltanali Shirzadi FakhrAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: April 23, 2026
Charge: Cooperation with Israel and moharebeh
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Amer Ramesh Amer RameshAge: 22
Date of Execution: April 26, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) and membership in an armed opposition group
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Mehrab Abdollahzadeh Mehrab AbdollahzadehAge: 28
Date of Execution: May 2, 2026
Charge: Corruption on Earth
Ghorban ShahiniSeyyed Kazem Sadati FiruzabadGhasem MazinaniGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Yaghoub Karimpour Yaghoub KarimpourAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 2, 2026
Charge: Distributing information and images of military sites; manufacturing sound bombs; and field cooperation with Mossad officers
Sajjad DoostiGhasem MazinaniGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Naser Bekrzadeh Naser BekrzadehAge: 26
Date of Execution: May 2, 2026
Charge: Espionage for Israel
Ghorban ShahiniSeyyed Kazem Sadati FiruzabadGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Erfan Shakourzadeh Erfan ShakourzadehAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 11, 2026
Charge: Spying for CIA and the Mossad
Abolghasem SalavatiGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Abdoljalil Shahbakhsh Abdoljalil ShahbakhshAge: 24
Date of Execution: May 12, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through armed attacks on law enforcement facilities and membership in the insurgent group Ansar al-Furqan
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad
Ehsan Afrashteh Ehsan AfrashtehAge: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 13, 2026
Charge: Spying for Israel
Abolghasem SalavatiSeyyed Kazem Sadati FiruzabadGhasem MazinaniSheykh Abbasali Alizade BaygiGholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’iMohammad-Jafar MontazeriMohammad Movahediazad

Engines of Abuse: A Five Part Series V

This report is the final article in a five-part series published by Spreading Justice, a project of Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA). The purpose of this series is to expose individuals within the Iranian regime who facilitate and support serious human rights violations and breaches of international law.

Currently, the Spreading Justice database contains profiles of over a thousand individuals and entities implicated in such violations. This series of articles has not only introduced these individuals but also analyzed the positions they occupy, positions that perpetuate the institutionalized cycle of repression and human rights violations, and examines how and why these roles contribute to the reproduction of such abuses.

Under Iranian law, the general duties of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran[1] are defined clearly. Although the law does not detail the specific responsibilities of a “County Law Enforcement Commander,” one can infer these duties based on the mandates of county governors and local security authorities.

According to Iranian law, the general mission and duties of the force include:

  1. Establishing order and security and ensuring public and individual peace.

  2. Confronting and continuously combating all forms of sabotage, terrorism, uprisings, and actions that disrupt national security, in cooperation with the Ministry of Intelligence.

This can be understood to include securing the environment for legal and authorized gatherings, organizations, demonstrations, and activities, as well as preventing and confronting unauthorized gatherings and protests and dealing with unrest, disorder, and illegal activities.

While the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for obtaining news and intelligence within its jurisdiction and cooperating with other intelligence bodies, it is required to immediately submit any political or security-related information encountered in the course of its duties to the Ministry of Intelligence after such information is gathered and compiled.

In addition, the Law Enforcement Command must, upon request, provide the necessary personnel to support the Ministry of Intelligence’s intelligence-gathering missions. These personnel are placed under the Ministry’s operational control, thereby directly linking the Law Enforcement Command to the activities of the Ministry of Intelligence.

Article 15 of the same law further provides that cooperation with other armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the Basij Resistance Forces, may take place when necessary and subject to coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Accordingly, given the role of the County Law Enforcement Commander and their institutional links to the County Security Council[2], the County Governor, and other security and law enforcement bodies, directing local forces to carry out these responsibilities falls within the scope of the commander’s duties.

The County Law Enforcement Commander is also a member of the County Security Council, which may convene extraordinary sessions in urgent situations.

Case Study: Role of the County Law Enforcement Commander in Human Rights Violations

During the nationwide protests of 2022, at least three citizens were killed in the city of Sari alone. Dozens of other protesters were injured or arrested by security and law enforcement forces. Abdollah Hassanzadeh Moghaddam[3], serving as the Law Enforcement Commander of Sari County and a member of the County Security Council, played a fundamental role in the violations of citizens’ rights committed by law enforcement forces in Sari.

Investigations by HRA at the time confirmed that law enforcement forces used pellet guns during the crackdown.

For example, Mohammad Javad Zahedi Saravi[4] was killed in Sari during the suppression of protests by the pellet gunfire of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA). According to investigations that took place at the time, HRA found that four-pellet shotgun rounds (9 pellets) struck his head and internal arteries. In this case, the use of pellet guns by law enforcement is undeniable, and the forensic medical report confirmed that his death resulted from shotgun pellet impacts (multiple high-velocity projectiles causing perforations in the lungs, liver, and spleen, as well as hemorrhagic shock due to massive bleeding).

Such firearms are typically used in hunting, sport, and sometimes in warfare or law enforcement. HRA has also reported that, based on testimonies and credible video evidence, pellet wounds were not limited to the lower body of protesters, but also appeared on various parts of the body, from the face to the upper torso. This practice was not limited to the city of Sari.

Spreading Justice’s Information on Past and Current County Law Enforcement Commanders

NameCurrent PositionWorkplaceLink
Najm al-Din SohrabiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of KhorramshahrKhorramshahrhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj41296/
Saeed Yousefi Fa’alCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ArdabilArdabilhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj87540/
Abdollah Hassanzadeh MoghaddamCounty Law Enforcement Commander of SariSarihttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj36762/
Seyed Jafar AfzaliCounty Law Enforcement Commander of MahmoudabadMahmoudabadhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj51873/
Ruhollah BigdeliCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BaviBavihttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj46442/
Amir VahabzadehCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Bandar AnzaliBandar Anzalihttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj62574/
Peyman FattahiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ShahriarShahriarhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj58671/
Habib RazdarCounty Law Enforcement Commander of KhashKhashhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj97220/
Hossein AhmadiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of NeyshaburNeyshaburhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj84105/
Shahpour FallahiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ZahedanZahedanhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj49161/
Mehdi PouraminaeiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of KermanKermanhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj19347/
Younes DehghaniCounty Law Enforcement Commander of JamJamhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj71926/
Yadollah TahmasianCounty Law Enforcement Commander of GharchakGharchakhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj46251/
Gholamhossein ArabCounty Law Enforcement Commander of DamghanDamghanhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj89871/
Akbar DarvishiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BabolsarBabolsarhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj38594/
Ali Dadash TabarCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BabolBabolhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj04724/
Mohammad TouhidiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of UrmiaUrmiahttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj14047/
Kambiz RostamniaCounty Law Enforcement Commander of QorvehQorvehhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj19486/
Amir MokhtariCounty Law Enforcement Commander of QomQomhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj25245/
Javad MaravenehCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Dasht-e AzadeganDasht-e Azadeganhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67694/
Mehdi MahdavikiaCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BorujerdBorujerdhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj90599/
Seyed Mohammad MousaviCounty Law Enforcement Commander of KohgiluyehKohgiluyehhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj35635/
Hedayat ShahbaziCounty Law Enforcement Commander of RamhormozRamhormozhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj46195/
Alireza DeliriCounty Law Enforcement Commander of KermanshahKermanshahhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj74428/
Shahram Tolabi NejadCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ArdakanArdakanhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj09038/
Eskandar JamashianiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BaghmalekBaghmalekhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj79663/
Seyed Ghasem MousaviCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ShadeganShadeganhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj52549/
Hamidreza BaharvandCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Masjed SoleymanMasjed Soleymanhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj06349/
NamePrevious PositionCurrent PositionLinkWorkplace
Mahmoud Sa’adatiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ZahedanUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj01965/Unknown
Saeed ZeinaliCounty Law Enforcement Commander of YazdHead of Preventive Police, Yazd Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj77921/Yazd
Ali Akbar KhosraviCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ChalousHead of Intelligence Police, Mazandaran Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj49046/Sari
Davoud MorsaliCounty Law Enforcement Commander of ZanjanRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj54861/
Ali TajariCounty Law Enforcement Commander of GorganUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj51991/Unknown
Yousef DarvishiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Dehgolanhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj25050/Deceased
Bijan KhodaeiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of QazvinUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj27566/Unknown
Ahmad NeghabanCounty Law Enforcement Commander of MashhadCommander of Yazd Province Law Enforcement Commandhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj80255/Yazd
Jafar Shams BiranvandCounty Law Enforcement Commander of VaraminHead of Preventive Police, East Tehran Province Commandhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj48309/Tehran
Ramazan AllahverdiyanCounty Law Enforcement Commander of TabrizUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj64438/Unknown
Alireza SayyadCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BampurUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj93992/Unknown
Mohammad TabassiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of QuchanRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj57024/
Salman HeydariCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BukanUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj24494/Unknown
Hassan Sheikh NejadCounty Law Enforcement Commander of UrmiaUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj57618/Unknown
Ali SoleimaniCounty Law Enforcement Commander of SavojbolaghDeputy of Training and Education, Alborz Province Commandhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67184/Karaj
Mehdi KhademiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of QaemshahrHead of Preventive Police, Mazandaran Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj06638/Sari
Ali SafariCounty Law Enforcement Commander of SaqqezUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj34240/Unknown
Hossein BesatiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of IsfahanDeputy Commander of Isfahan Province Law Enforcementhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj84755/Isfahan
Houshang MobarakiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Eslamabad-e GharbHead of Anti-Narcotics Police, Kermanshah Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj66155/Kermanshah
Alireza SafariCounty Law Enforcement Commander of QorvehRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj34191/
Mohammadreza KhodadoostCounty Law Enforcement Commander of IsfahanUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj68854/Unknown
Hamidreza AkbariCounty Law Enforcement Commander of IsfahanRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj47612/
Hossein BarariCounty Law Enforcement Commander of KermanshahUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj15925/Unknown
Rouhollah AsgarizadehCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Dasht-e AzadeganDeputy Commander, Ahvaz County Law Enforcementhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj81094/Ahvaz
Kazem NeisiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BehbahanUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj46908/Unknown
Akbar AghabeygiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of MashhadRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj47397/
Abbas Saremi SadatiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of MashhadRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj93335/
Hossein ZolaghiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of AhvazDeputy of Operations, Khuzestan Province Law Enforcementhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj37349/Ahvaz
Kourosh BahramiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Shahr-e KordHead of Preventive Police, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj44948/Shahr-e Kord
Mahmoud HafeziCounty Law Enforcement Commander of RashtActing Head of Criminal Investigation Police, Fars Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj21389/Shiraz
Mohammad AziziCounty Law Enforcement Commander of BehbahanRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj68154/
Farshid ZeinaliCounty Law Enforcement Commander of MarvdashtRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj70908/
Elyas TazikehCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Aliabad KatoulUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj66643/Unknown
Soleiman BayramiBorder Guard Commander in Sardasht CountyUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj40158/Unknown
Morteza TalaeiLaw Enforcement Commander of Tehran CityRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj37511/
Mahmoud AlifarCounty Law Enforcement Commander of Gonbad-e Kavus
Retired  
https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj68355/
Kioumars PakdelCounty Law Enforcement Commander of KhoyUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj73669/Unknown
Mohammad Hossein BabakalaniCounty Law Enforcement Commander of NajafabadRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj17987/
Seyed Mohsen TaghizadehCounty Law Enforcement Commander of AbadanRetiredhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj23845/
Abbas MohammadiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of AligudarzUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj38285/Unknown
Reza PapiCounty Law Enforcement Commander of MahshahrUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj05561/Unknown

[1] Law on the Duties and Structure of the National Security Council, adopted on July 17, 1990, The Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles). Available at: https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/91805

[2] Law on the Duties and Structure of the National Security Council, adopted on August 30, 1983, The Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) . Available at: https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90807

[3] Spreading Justice, “Individual Profile: Abdollah Hassanzadeh Moghaddam”: [https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj36762/](https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj36762/)

[4] HRANA News Agency, “The Case of Mohammad Javad Zahedi: Shotgun Ammunition Used by Security Forces Is Lethal” (19 October 2022), available at https://www.hra-news.org/2022/hranews/a-37331/

Engines of Abuse: A Five Part Series IV

This report marks the fourth in a series of five articles published by HRA through its Spreading Justice Project, dedicated to shedding light on the roles within Iran that enable and sustain serious human rights violations, as well as violations of international law. The Spreading Justice database currently contains over a thousand profiles of individuals implicated in such abuses. This series aims not only to highlight who these individuals are but also to examine how and why the positions they occupy perpetuate the entrenched cycle of repression and abuse.

Definition and Nature of the “Prison Warden” in the Legal System of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The administration of all facilities for holding incarcerated persons (including prisons, detention centers, juvenile correctional institutions, and camps) is vested in the Prisons and Security and Corrective Measures Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The “Head of the Penal Institution (Prison Warden)” is the highest executive authority in each facility and is entrusted with implementing laws and regulations, maintaining order and security, supervising staff, protecting prisoners’ rights, and coordinating with judicial authorities.[1]

The Role of the Prison Warden in Upholding Prisoners’ Rights

Based on the Executive Regulation of the Prisons and Security and Correctional Measures Organization (2021), the prison warden is obliged to:

  • Ensure the implementation of laws, decisions of classification and disciplinary councils, and orders of judicial authorities;
  • Supervise the behavior of staff toward prisoners and their families;
  • Safeguard the institution’s security, prevent the entry of prohibited items, and manage incidents (including death, suicide, etc.);
  • Organize welfare, healthcare, nutrition, education, employment, and rehabilitation programs;
  • Pursue the use of electronic systems to record prisoners’ status and rights (Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2021, Article 9 and relevant chapters on structure and principles).

Consequently, many of the violations of prisoners’ rights are attributable to the prison warden when: (a) the warden personally commits unlawful conduct (such as degrading or violent behavior), or (b) the warden fails to fulfill supervisory and preventive duties, and such failure results in a violation of rights.

Understanding the Role of the Prison Warden in “Carrying Out Capital Punishment and Hudud (prescribed penalties under Islamic criminal law) Penalties.”

The Regulation on the Procedure for the Execution of Sentences of Hudud, Capital Punishment, Amputation, Qisas of Life, Limb and Injury, Diyah, Flogging, Exile, Banishment, Mandatory Residence, and Prohibition of Residence in Certain Locations (Regulation No. 9000/27863/200, dated 17 June 2019, issued by the Iran Head of the Judiciary)[2] sets specific duties for the prison warden and/or deputy warden, including:

  • Article 8: The criminal enforcement judge and the prison warden or deputy are obliged, before the execution of the sentence, to verify the identity based on valid identity documents or other conclusive evidence. If such documents are not presented or accessible, identity must be confirmed through inquiry with the Civil Registration Organization and other relevant authorities, and the results must be recorded in the case file.
  • Article 35: The prison warden or deputy, acting solely in an administrative capacity, is obliged, pursuant to the order of the criminal enforcement judge, to facilitate the prisoner’s meeting with designated individuals.

Note: The meeting referred to here is the prisoner’s last meeting before execution. However, the regulation itself does not use the term ‘last meeting,’ and instead refers simply to a ‘meeting.’

  • Article 39: In cases where the place of execution is outside the prison (i.e., a public execution), the prison warden or deputy, in addition to participating in the execution of capital punishment, is obliged to verify the incarcerated person’s identity against the court judgment by reviewing identity documents or other reliable evidence, confirm it, and sign the official record.
  • Article 43: Preparation of the execution arrangements, following the notification by the Enforcement Judge, is among the duties of the prison warden or the deputy. The notification of the execution must be given at least 48 hours in advance to allow for the necessary arrangements.
  • Article 44: After the execution of a capital punishment, the criminal enforcement judge must prepare an official record of the proceedings, which must be signed by the prison warden or deputy, the forensic physician or trusted physician, the victim’s heirs or their lawyer or representative (if present), and the local police chief or deputy.

This regulation was enacted pursuant to Article 216 of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code[4] and Article 549 of the 2013 Code of Criminal Procedure[5].

In many Iranian prisons, violations extend beyond domestic laws governing detainee treatment to breaches of international legal standards. For example, Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—which requires the humane treatment of prisoners and respect for their inherent dignity—is routinely violated through the actions of, and under the responsibility of, prison wardens in Iran.For example, in September this year, Babak Shahbazi[6] was executed in Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj on charges of “espionage and intelligence and security cooperation with Israel.”

Allahkaram Azizi[7], the head of Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj, played a central role as the official responsible for coordinating and supervising the implementation of judicial rulings. He was instrumental in preparing the grounds, issuing orders, overseeing the presence of security and medical personnel, and carrying out the execution.

In another case, a prisoner named Amir Neysi[8] died in Ahvaz Central Prison due to a severe infection and lack of adequate medical care in prison.

According to a report by HRANA, he had recently contracted an internal infection, and despite a rising fever and the worsening of his physical condition, prison authorities refused to transfer him to a medical facility outside the prison.

Khosrow Torofi[9], the head of this prison, who is responsible for the supervision and protection of the lives of prisoners, is responsible in part for these violations.

Spreading Justice Information on the Prison Wardens of the Past and Present

One of the core goals behind establishing the Spreading Justice initiative was to show how officials implicated in human rights violations continue to be promoted, protected, or kept in their posts despite the allegations against them.

Recently, however, the Prisons, Security, and Corrective Measures Organization, part of Iran’s Judiciary, has restricted access to the news section of its website for users outside Iran. This has prevented the documentation of key information, including the new workplace assignments of former prison wardens. These updates now appear to be deliberately concealed, obscuring their movement up the chain of command.

Despite this, Spreading Justice continues to complete and update these records through alternative methods. To counter such tactics, our database enables users to download PDF versions of reports and other relevant documents, ensuring that even if similar restrictions are imposed elsewhere, the removal of online content will not prevent access to essential information.

NameCurrent PositionLinkLocation
Omid SalehiHead of Kermanshah Central Prisonhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj56750/Kermanshah
Allah Karam AziziHead of Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karajhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67409/Karaj
Khosrow TorofiHead of Ahvaz Central Prisonhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj32049/Ahvaz
Morteza PiriHead of Zahedan Prisonhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj08341/Zahedan
Hassan Madadi MoghadamHead of Yazd Central Prisonhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj25978/Yazd
Dariush BakhshiHead of Urmia prisonhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj51196/Urmia
Mohammad Haji MazdaraniHead of Great Tehran Penitentiaryhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj93937/Tehran
Hedayat FarzadiHead of Evin prison in Tehranhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj91552/Tehran
Hadi Esmaiel ZadeganHead of  Vakil Abad Prison in Mashhadhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj52619/Mashahd
NamePrevious PositionCurrent PositionLinkLocation
Ashkan KamaliFormer head of Qezel Hesar prison in KarajUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj50106/Unknown
Reza MoazzenFormer head of Arak Central PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj07205/Unknown
Mahmoud TorabiFormer head of Rasht Central PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj00114/Unknown
Seyd Morad NasirianFormer head of Isfahan Central PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj09277/Unknown
Hossein ShalikarFormer Head of Sari PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj26447/Unknown
Gholamreza ZiaeiFormer Head of Evin PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj88930/Unknown
Abbas RamezaniFormer Head of Qazvin PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj13792/Unknown
Hamid MohammadiFormer Head of Evin PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj92037/Unknown
Yaghoub Sarbaz JodaFormer Head of Ardabil Central PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj83453/Unknown
Bahman ShirafkanHead of Nowshahr PrisonUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj18348/Unknown

[1]Prisons and Security and Correctional Measures Organization. (2021). Executive regulation of the Prisons and Security and Correctional Measures Organization [PDF]. Ekhtebar. https://www.ekhtebar.ir/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/آیین%E2%80%8Cنامهاجراییسازمانزندان%E2%80%8Cهاواقداماتتامینیوتربیتیکشور.pdf

[2] Regulation on the Procedure for Execution of Hudud Sentences, Capital Punishment, Amputation, Qisas of Life, Limb and Injury, Diyah, Flogging, Exile, Banishment, Mandatory Residence and Prohibition of Residence in Certain Locations. (2019, June 17). Regulation No. 9000/27863/200 [PDF]. Ekhtebar. https://www.ekhtebar.ir/%D8%A2%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AD%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%8C-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%AD/

[3] “Iran: Islamic Penal Code (Approved April 21, 2013),” Ekhtebar (PDF), https://www.ekhtebar.ir/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/قانونمجازات-92-1.pdf.

[4] “Criminal Procedure Code of Iran, with Amendments 2015,” Ekhtebar (PDF), https://www.ekhtebar.ir/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/قانونآییندادرسیکیفریبااصلاحات-1394-سایتحقوقیاختبار1.pdf.

[5] Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced the execution of Babak Shahbazi, Hrana, 17 September 2025.https://www.hra-news.org/2025/hranews/a-56640

[6] Spreading Justice – Individual Violator Profile: Allahkaram Azizi. https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67409/

[7] Sheiban Prison, Ahvaz: Death of a Prisoner Due to Lack of Medical Care, 18 November 2025.
https://www.hra-news.org/2025/hranews/a-de214296/

[8]Spreading Justice – Individual Violator Profile: Khosrow Torofi. https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj32049/

Engines of Abuse: A Five Part Series III

This report constitutes the third installment in a five-part series published by Human Rights Activists (HRA) through its Spreading Justice project. This publication, uniquely within the series, is produced in collaboration with HRA’s Pasdaran Documentation Project and examines local IRGC commanders. The series, Engines of Abuse, aims to shed light on the roles within the Iranian regime’s legal and security apparatus that enable and sustain serious human rights abuses and violations of international law. The Spreading Justice database currently contains profiles of more than a thousand individuals implicated in such violations. Beyond identifying these individuals, the series also analyzes how and why the positions they hold perpetuate the entrenched cycle of repression and abuse.

Although Iranian law outlines the general duties and organizational structure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the legal texts do not explicitly detail the full range of duties and powers of the Commander of the IRGC. However, by drawing on provisions within the IRGC Statute (1982)1, the IRGC Employment Regulations Act (1983)2, and the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran3, the mandate, operational scope, and practical authority associated with this position can be inferred, and as such are laid out briefly below.

As the highest-ranking IRGC official at the county level, the County IRGC Commander plays a central role in implementing the IRGC security, cultural, social, and developmental missions. This geographic unit—variously referred to in official materials as a county or district constitutes the primary arena in which IRGC policy is translated into practice. The commander serves as the critical link between the Provincial IRGC Command and the operational ranks within local Resistance Districts and Bases, ensuring that IRGC directives are executed and adapted to local conditions.

Within this structure, the County IRGC Commander is also referred to as the Commander of the County Basij Resistance District. He acts as the IRGC’s official representative in the area and operates directly under the supervision of the Provincial IRGC Commander. According to the IRGC Employment Regulations Act, this position must be filled by a special Basij member or a permanent IRGC officer who meets the required standards of ideological commitment, technical competence, and operational experience. He is responsible for tasks across four domains: training, operations, discipline, and administration. In practice, this makes the County IRGC Commander not merely a coordinator but an active executor of IRGC strategy, entrusted with broad authority over all IRGC and Basij activities within the county.

Legal Basis for the County IRGC Commander’s Position

Article 94 of the IRGC Employment Regulations Act (1983)4 establishes that the commander of a Resistance District, equivalent to the County IRGC Commander, is responsible for leading and managing Basij units in training, operational matters, disciplinary enforcement, and administrative oversight. This article provides the legal foundation for the commander’s authority within the IRGC hierarchy.

Articles 35 and 36 of the IRGC Statute (1982)5 further define the Basij’s overarching objectives, including cultivating societal readiness to defend the Islamic Republic, conducting military and ideological training, organizing popular forces, supporting relief and development efforts, and safeguarding the Islamic Revolution.

Together, these provisions delineate the statutory framework that empowers the County IRGC Commander and embeds the role within the administrative, political, and military apparatus of the Islamic Republic.

Duties of the County IRGC Commander 

Drawing from the IRGC’s foundational documents, the commander’s responsibilities fall into several key categories:

1. Training Duties

The commander oversees the military, ideological, and security training of local Basij forces. He is responsible for ensuring training quality, developing skill-building programs, and enhancing the operational readiness of forces, consistent with Article 36 of the IRGC Statute6 and Article 94 of the Employment Regulations Act7.

2. Operational Duties

In routine situations, the commander prepares local forces for security and defense operations. In times of crisis or unrest, he assumes direct command, coordinating with the Provincial IRGC Command and the County Security Council to implement security, suppression, and defense plans.

3. Disciplinary and Administrative Duties

The commander enforces discipline, organizational order, and regulatory compliance within all subordinate units. Under the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces (1979), he is empowered to impose disciplinary measures. He also oversees administrative operations, personnel management, and financial affairs in accordance with IRGC directives.

4. Cultural and Social Duties

Article 2 of the IRGC Statute identifies safeguarding the Islamic Revolution, including through cultural and social interventions, as a core IRGC mission. At the county level, the commander directs Basij cultural programming, ideological campaigns, and public outreach. The commander works with state cultural and educational institutions to counter perceived “cultural threats,” maintain social control, and reinforce regime-aligned narratives.

5. Developmental and Service-Oriented Duties

Clause 6 of Article 36 of the IRGC Statute mandates Basij participation in national development efforts. The commander oversees Basij construction brigades, disaster response efforts, and poverty alleviation programs, coordinating closely with the County Governor’s Office and relevant executive agencies. In practice, these activities, when they are carried out, serve to strengthen the IRGC’s political and social influence at the local level.

Powers of the County IRGC Commander

The commander’s formal authorities, as outlined in IRGC regulations, include:

  • Issuing operational, administrative, and disciplinary orders to all IRGC and Basij units within the county.
  • Selecting or recommending commanders for local Resistance Districts and Bases, subject to provincial approval.
  • Participating in County Security Council meetings as the IRGC’s official representative.
  • Signing all official, financial, and disciplinary correspondence related to the Resistance District.
  • Exercising disciplinary powers 

These authorities establish the County IRGC Commander as a fully empowered local military and security official capable of exercising substantial control over coercive, cultural, and administrative structures.

The IRGC Statute (1982), the IRGC Employment Regulations Act (1983), and Article 150 of the Constitution collectively situate the IRGC as the “guardian of the Islamic Revolution and its achievements.” Within this mandate, the County IRGC Commander plays a pivotal role. He serves as the primary executor of the IRGC’s mission at the local level, directing Basij forces, shaping security and cultural policy, and overseeing activities that directly affect the daily lives of residents. This authority has profound implications for human rights. During the nationwide protests of 20228, for example, at least sixteen civilians were killed and many more injured or detained in Mahabad by IRGC, Basij, Special Forces (Yegan-e Vijeh), and other security units. Akbar Norouzi9, then serving as the County IRGC Commander and a member of the County Security Council, played a role in the violations perpetrated against the local population.

Throughout the protests, IRGC and Special Forces units deployed across Mahabad’s main squares and residential areas, conducting continuous armed fire against protesters and homes. This sustained military presence demonstrates the decisive role that IRGC command structures, and specifically County IRGC Commanders, play in orchestrating, enabling, and carrying out violent crackdowns on peaceful dissent.

By examining this position, the Spreading Justice series underscores how local IRGC leadership functions as an essential component of Iran’s machinery of repression, contributing directly to systemic patterns of rights violations and impunity.

Table of Former and Current County-level IRGC Commanders

*Note, this table also includes profiles from HRA’s Pasdaran Documentation Project. The Pasdaran Documentation Project maps the structure and documents the activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The database is the first of its kind, offering an overview of the IRGC’s organizational structure, its chain of command, and the historical context of its units and key individuals alongside an analysis of its behavior both inside of Iran and beyond. PDP utilizes a progressive data accumulation approach to document the IRGC. This methodology allows us to incrementally build detailed profiles on IRGC personnel and units. As new information becomes available, researchers update profiles, continuously refining our understanding of the IRGC’s extensive network. While our approach can result in some incomplete profiles, it allows us to cover the breadth of the IRGC’s activities, providing a broad and evolving view of its operations. Learn more here: https://iranpdp.org/about-us/

NameCurrent PositionLocationHRA’s Pasdaran Documentation Project Profile
Abbas-Ali ReihaniCommander of the IRGC and Basij of Bojnourd CountyBojnourd https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692575dd4fe23749d816bfa8
Akbar NowrouziCommander of the IRGC Corps and Basij of Mahabad CountyMahabad https://iranpdp.org/people-information?id=65f788866718f83d4490cb0b
Behrouz HekmatpourCommander of the IRGC Corps and Basij of Dezful CountyDezful https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692d73534fe23749d816c030
Mohammad LoveymiCommander of Khorramshahr IRGC Corps and BasijKhorramshahr https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692d74564fe23749d816c061
Amir GhamarzadehCommander of Mahshahr IRGC Corps and BasijMahshahr https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692d756a4fe23749d816c092
Ruhollah Ghasemi-KheshabCommander of the IRGC of Behbahan CountyBehbahan https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692d76854fe23749d816c0c3
Mohammad Amin Sabbaghian-MoghaddamCommander of the Basij Resistance and IRGC Corps of Firuzabad CountyFiruzabad https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692d78d04fe23749d816c0f4
Sadegh JamaliCommander of Qorveh County IRGC CorpsQorveh N/A
Ruhollah Zamani-NiaCommander of Basij Resistance and IRGC Corps of Bampur CountyBampur N/A
Esmaeil KouhkanCommander of Basij Resistance and IRGC Corps of Lashar CountyLashar N/A
Mohsen DarabiCommander of the IRGC Corps and Basij of Sahneh CountySahneh N/A
Hojjatollah SalariCommander of Hormuz IRGC Corps and BasijHormuz N/A
Ali YaghoubianCommander of Torbat-e Heydariyeh District IRGC CorpsTorbat-e Heydariyeh N/A
Fayaz AllahyariIRGC Commander of Shahriar CountyShahriar https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=66f7d73181dfdde40363a7a0
Gholamreza ShabaniniaCommander of Marvdasht District IRGC CorpsMarvdasht N/A
Seyed Ali-Asghar PourbeheshtCommander of the IRGC Corps and Basij of Kohgiluyeh CountyKohgiluyeh N/A
Sadegh Erfani-MaghamCommander of Dena County IRGC Corps and BasijDenaN/A
Alireza HeidariIRGC Commander of Imam Hassan Mojtaba Qazvin CountyQazvin N/A
Mehrdad BabaeiCommander of the Babol County IRGC Corps and BasijBabolN/A
Mehrdad EbrahimpourIRGC Commander of Nowshahr CountyNowshahr N/A
Mostafa BazvandBabolsar district IRGC Corps and Basij CommanderBabolsar https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=670c05cbf0735539d2b6365a
Yaghoub RashidiIRGC Commander of Oshnavieh CountyOshnavieh N/A
Hossein MalekiIRGC Commander of Kamyaran CountyKamyaran https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=66f76b5fc0b823155963a749
Jalil Naghshi GharebaghIRGC Commander of Piranshahr CountyPiranshahr N/A
Ali Ahmad SafizadehIRGC Commander of Divandarreh CountyDivandarreh N/A
Hamid JanbazCommander of the IRGC Corps and Basij of the Bandar-e Anzali CountyBandar-e Anzali N/A
Mohammad-Ali SetizehCommander of Talesh district IRGC CorpsTaleshN/A
Mohammad MehrzadCommander of Langrud District CorpsLangrud N/A
Iraj GaliniGarmsar IRGC and BasijGarmsarN/A
Abbas Forouzan MehrCommander of the Joveyn County IRGCJoveyn N/A
Seyed Ebrahim SharifiIRGC Commander of Sari CountySari N/A
Mohammad BaramakiCommander of Borujerd District IRGC Corps and BasijBorujerd N/A
Abedin Daghmehchi-FirouzjaeiCommander of the Amol District IRGC CorpsAmol N/A
Mosayyeb MohammadjaniCommander of the IRGC Corps of Astaneh-ye Ashrafiyeh CountyAstaneh-ye Ashrafiyeh N/A
Samad Mohammad AlizadehCommander of the IRGC of Sardasht CountySardasht N/A
Karam NazariCommander of the IRGC of Shahrekord districtShahrekord N/A
Mousa HayaviCommander of the IRGC and Basij in the Hoveyzeh districtHoveyzeh N/A
Mahdi TorofiCommander of the IRGC and Basij of Shush CountyShush N/A
Heydar OlfatiCommander of the IRGC in the Ilam districtIlam https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=66f77c87c0b823155963a7df
Mostafa Emam BakhshCommander of the IRGC in Baft CountyBaft N/A
Ahmad MaldarCommander of Khash County IRGC CorpsKhashhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=66f6c7ce9f7dcde3ff537b26
Bahram MirzaeiCommander of the IRGC Corps and Basij of Paveh CountyPaveh https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6920cfce4fe23749d816bbbc
NamePrevious PositionCurrent PositionWorkplacePasdaran Documentation Project Profile
Majid RanjbariCommander of Parsian County Basij and IRGC CorpsUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6920c9694fe23749d816baf1
Omid NasibiCommander of Marvdasht District County IRGC CorpsRepresentative of Mamsani and Rostam in Fars province in the 12th Assembly of the Islamic CouncilTehranhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6920cb864fe23749d816bb24
Arsalan SoltangholiCommander of the Guards Corps of Eslamabad-e Gharb CountyUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6920cde44fe23749d816bb78
Mohammad PourEsmaeili-FoumaniIRGC Commander of Rezvanshahr CountyDeputy for Cultural and Artistic Affairs of the Qods IRGC of Gilan ProvinceRashthttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6920d1bc4fe23749d816bc05
Faramarz Deilam-KatouliCommander of the Gorgan County IRGC CorpsUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6920d3cb4fe23749d816bc49
Abozar AnvariIRGC Commander of Kermanshah CountyUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6920d5174fe23749d816bc82
Hassan MahdaviCommander of Tonekabon District IRGC CorpsUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692160b44fe23749d816bcb3
Mohammad MahjouriCommander of Arak District IRGC CorpsInspection Deputy of the Ruhollah IRGC in Markazi ProvinceArakhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692161cd4fe23749d816bcde
Hojjat AmirikiaQeshm County IRGC Corps and Basij CommanderUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692163244fe23749d816bd19
Mansour ValieiMarivan city IRGC corps commanderCommander of the 22nd Beit-al-Moqaddas Operational Division of KurdistanSanandajhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692164034fe23749d816bd44
Azim Hasani KahangiIRGC Commander of Izeh CountyUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692166954fe23749d816bd89
Mohammad Nik-FetratCommander of the Rasht District IRGC CorpsExecutive Deputy of the Qods IRGC of Gilan ProvinceRashthttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6724826ceb21a16a0fad241e
Mohammad HaratiCommander of the Iranshahr Revolutionary GuardsUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6921697c4fe23749d816bdd0
Ghahraman EyvazlouCommander of the IRGC and Basij of the Urmia districtCommander of the Basij of Various Social Groups of the Shohada IRGC of West Azerbaijan ProvinceUrmiahttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=69216c7e4fe23749d816be06
Morteza AbdollahiCommander of Semnan Guards CorpsDeputy Commander of the Qaem Al-Mohammad IRGC of Semnan ProvinceSemnan https://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=69216daf4fe23749d816be34
Ali ZarghaniCommander of the Guards Corps of Quchan DistrictUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=69216f604fe23749d816be61
Amir-Abbas AmriIRGC Commander of Baneh CountyUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6921709d4fe23749d816be91
Yousef MaroufiCommander of the Revolutionary Guards in Saqqez CountyDeputy Commander of the Boroujerdi IRGC Garrison in West Azerbaijan ProvinceUrmiahttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=66f78197c0b823155963a842
Ali KhademCommander of Ghaemshahr District CorpsUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692172784fe23749d816beca
Issa AfsariCommander of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij in Larestan districtUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=6921742d4fe23749d816bf00
Faramarz BavandpourCommander of the Javanrud IRGC in Kermanshah provinceUnknownUnknownhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692175e24fe23749d816bf3c
Ali Samareh HosseiniIRGC Commander of Saravan CountyDeputy Coordinator of the Salman IRGC in Sistan and BaluchestanZahedanhttps://iranpdp.org/people-information/?id=692177194fe23749d816bf67
Mohammad GhodratiCommander of the Revolutionary Guards of Roudsar CountyUnknownUnknownN/A
Morteza MirAghaeiCommander of the Basij resistance area of Sanandaj CountyUnknownUnknownN/A

Footnotes

  1. Islamic Republic of Iran, “Statute of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” adopted 6 September 1982, https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595 ↩︎
  2. Islamic Republic of Iran, “Law on the Employment Regulations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Qānun-e Moqarrarāt-e Esteʿdādmi-ye Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī),” adopted 21 Mehr 1370 (13 October 1991), https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/91961  ↩︎
  3. “Iran: Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces,” Shenasname-Law Database, https://shenasname.ir/defa/20714-%D8%A2%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B6%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%DB%8C-D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD ↩︎
  4. Islamic Republic of Iran, “Law on the Employment Regulations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Qānun-e Moqarrarāt-e Esteʿdādmi-ye Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī),” adopted 21 Mehr 1370 (13 October 1991), https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/91961 ↩︎
  5. Islamic Republic of Iran, “Statute of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” adopted 6 September 1982, https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595 ↩︎
  6. Islamic Republic of Iran, “Law on the Employment Regulations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Qānun-e Moqarrarāt-e Esteʿdādmi-ye Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī),” adopted 21 Mehr 1370 (13 October 1991), https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/91961 ↩︎
  7. “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Guardian Council Research Center, https://www.shora-gc.ir/fa/news/4707/قانون-اساسی-جمهوری-اسلامی-ایران  ↩︎
  8. Spreading Justice, “Akbar Norouzi,” Spreading Justice – Human Rights Violators Database, https://spreadingjustice.org/fa/individual-violator/sj08917/ ↩︎
  9. Radio Farda, “IRGC and Special Units Deployed in Mahabad Squares; At Least Three Protesters Killed in Piranshahr and Javanroud,” published 21 November 2022, Radio Farda, https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32139820.html  ↩︎

Engines of Abuse: A Five Part Series II

This report marks the second in a series of five articles published by HRA through its Spreading Justice Project, dedicated to shedding light on the roles within the Iranian regime’s system that enable and sustain serious human rights violations, as well as violations of international law.

The Spreading Justice database currently contains over a thousand profiles of individuals and entities implicated in such abuses. This series aims not only to highlight who these individuals are and how the Spreading Justice project has documented their behavior, but also to examine how and why the positions they occupy perpetuate the entrenched cycle of repression and abuse. The series is published in the hope that a deeper understanding of the system of abuse will support ongoing efforts to hold Iran accountable and will also help shape recommendations for urgent reform.

Understanding the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences in the Iranian Legal System

In Iran’s criminal justice system, the judge responsible for enforcing sentences (known as the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences) plays a key role in implementing judicial rulings and overseeing the treatment of prisoners. This judge becomes involved after a person is convicted and begins serving their sentence, ensuring that the punishment is carried out as directed at sentencing. He also monitors the legal status and rights during imprisonment.

According to the Criminal Procedure Code passed in 2013 (1392)[1], the enforcement of sentences of the incarcerated prisoners is the responsibility of the Prosecutor, and the “Department for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences,” under his supervision and authority, undertakes this responsibility in jurisdictions designated by the Head of the Judiciary within the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Additionally, the Department for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, or one of its units, can, with the approval of the Head of the Judiciary, be stationed in prisons or correctional institutions. In judicial districts (bakhsh), the enforcement of criminal sentences is the responsibility of the Head of the Court for the Enforcement of Sentences.

The duties of the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, based on Article 489 of this code,[2], are as follows:

  • (a) Issuing orders for the enforcement of enforceable criminal sentences and supervising the manner of their execution
  • (b) Supervising prisons in matters related to prisoners
  • (c) Providing opinions on prisoners eligible for pardon and conditional release in accordance with laws and regulations
  • (d) Granting leave to convicts based on laws and regulations
  • (e) Making decisions regarding elderly convicts, individuals with mental illness or serious physical conditions, and other convicted persons in need of special care and attention, such as authorizing their hospitalization in medical centers in accordance with relevant rules and regulations
  • (f) The performance of any other duties established by laws and regulations concerning the enforcement of punishments, or assigned to the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences or the Prison Supervisor.

It is worth noting that according to Article 494 of the same code[3], the process of enforcing a sentence begins upon the order of the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences and cannot be halted unless explicitly stipulated by law.

Also, pursuant to Article 495 of the same Regulation, criminal judgments are executed by order and under the supervision of the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences. In cases where, according to the law, the execution of a judgment must be carried out by ministries, governmental institutions and companies, public non-governmental organizations, or other bodies explicitly named by law, the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences, while issuing the enforcement order and providing the necessary instructions, shall supervise the manner of execution and the actions taken by those entities.

Accordingly, the decision to carry out all sentences, including punishments such as execution, flogging, and amputation, is made by this judicial authority. Although the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences does not determine the type of punishment (as this responsibility lies with the sentencing court), the final implementation of corporal punishments or the death penalty cannot proceed without the judge’s written order.  This is in direct contradiction with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[4], to which Iran is a state party, and which strongly prohibits cruel and inhuman punishments such as flogging and amputation.

According to HRANA’s Statistics Department, the denial of medical care for prisoners has a documented history. 2,057 cases of denial of medical care have been documented between November 2022 and November 2025.

Most recently, according to HRANA[5], between September 16 and 25, 2025, three women, including political prisoner Somayeh Rashidi, along with Soudabeh Asadi and Jamile Azizi, died in Qarchak Prison due to a lack of medical care.

Or in another case, HRANA reported that Ashkan Fahim, a political prisoner held in Mahabad Prison, has been denied medical furlough or transfer to medical facilities outside the prison despite suffering from heart disease and severe vision impairment[6]. According to this report, the Mahabad prison infirmary lacks even the most basic medical facilities. Therefore, based on the decision of the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences to obstruct medical care for a sick prisoner constitutes a violation of the right to physical and mental health under Article 9 of the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners [7], which states that “Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.” It also contravenes the Nelson Mandela Rules[8], particularly Rules 24, 25(1), and 27, which require prompt, adequate, and clinically independent medical care for all prisoners. This, among other internationally binding obligations.

Spreading Justice Database on Judges for the enforcement of the Sentences

NameCurrent PositionLocation
ZargarJudge for the enforcement of the sentences of the Public and Revolutionary Justice Office of MashhadMashhad
Mohammad MehrdadiAssistant Prosecutor and Head of Branch 1 of the Enforcement of Judgments Office of Evin Prosecutor’s Office”Tehran  
Esmatollah JaberiAssistant Prosecutor for the Enforcement of Criminal JudgmentsTehran
NamePrevious PositionCurrent PositionLocation
Mohammad Nasiri-PourJudge of the Evin Prosecutor’s Office for the enforcement of those sentenced to deathUnknown
Amir-Hossein TarianAssistant Public Prosecutor of the first branch of the enforcement unit of the Evin Prosecutor’s Office (Holy Martyr)Head and Investigator of the First Investigation Branch of Evin Prosecutor’s Office (Holy Martyr)Tehran

[1] “Iran Criminal Procedure Code (Ayin-e Dadresi Keyfari), Print Edition,” Ekhtebar (PDF), accessed 24 August 2025, https://www.ekhtebar.ir/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/قانونآئیندادرسیکیفریپرینت.pdf.

[2] Mizan Online, “Duties of the Criminal enforcement Judge,” published 04 Shahrivar 1402 (≈ 26 August 2023), Mizan Online, https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4731299/%D9%88%D8%B8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B6%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AD%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%B1%DB%8C.

[3] “Iran Criminal Procedure Code (Ayin-e Dadresi Keyfari), Print Edition,” Ekhtebar (PDF), accessed 24 August 2025, https://www.ekhtebar.ir/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/قانونآئیندادرسیکیفریپرینت.pdf.

[4] “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” OHCHR, adopted 16 December 1966, accessed 24 August 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.

[5] Hrana, “Qarchak Prison in Varamin: Consecutive Deaths Due to Lack of Medical Care and Treatment Facilities”, 25 September 2025, https://www.hra-news.org/2025/hranews/a-56792/

[6] HRANA, “Deprivation of medical care for Ashkan Fahim in Mahabad prison,” published 29 July 2025, HRANA, https://www.hra-news.org/2025/hranews/a-55774/

[7] “International standards on the right to physical and mental health”, UN, https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-health/international-standards-right-physical-and-mental-health

[8] “The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners”, UN, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf


SJ Investigates: Nima Salehi, The Long Overlooked Ashiyane Co-Founder

Over the past year, HRA’s Spreading Justice project has conducted a detailed investigation into Nima (Alireza) Salehi, identified as a central but long-overlooked actor in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s cyber repression architecture. Operating under the alias Q7X, Salehi co-founded and held a senior leadership role within the Ashiyane Digital Security Team, one of the most influential cyber groups aligned with Iran’s security apparatus.

Unlike Ashiyane’s founder, Behrooz Kamalian, who has been sanctioned by multiple jurisdictions for cyberattacks supporting state repression, Salehi has never faced comparable scrutiny or accountability. Despite his documented involvement in activities enabling surveillance, censorship, intimidation, and violations of numerous human rights, he continues to benefit from unrestricted global mobility, as evidenced by his extensive travel across Europe, the United States, Asia, and Africa.

By publicly exposing Salehi’s record, Spreading Justice urges states and implementing bodies to address this critical blind spot and to take immediate action to prevent individuals and entities that currently or previously facilitated digital repression from operating freely across borders.

WHAT IS ASHIYANE?

Ashiyane, meaning “nest” in Persian, is an Iranian hacking and security group founded in 2002 by Behrooz Kamalian. Initially, a small team of skilled hackers, it rapidly expanded into one of the most recognized and influential hacking groups in Iran. The group gained prominence through widespread website defacements, including attacks on foreign government sites, and by identifying vulnerabilities in Iranian websites, positioning itself as active in both black hat and white hat hacking.

Over time, Ashiyane built a broader cyber ecosystem, including a training center, a security company, and hosting services. Its hacking and security courses at Sharif University of Technology, later formalized into their own program, reflect the group’s role in cultivating a generation of Iranian cyber operators. Ashiyane achieved global visibility, ranking second worldwide for website defacements on Zone-H and being named “Best Hacking Team.”

HRA’s research confirms that the group maintained structural links with the IRGC and Iran’s Cyber Police (FATA). These ties shielded Ashiyane from restrictions imposed on other hacking groups. Both Kamalian (known as “Behrooz_Ice”) and Salehi (7XQ) appeared on Iranian state television as senior representatives of the Ashiyane Digital Security Team.

In interviews, including with Deutsche Welle Persian, Kamalian attempted to portray Ashiyane as an independent private group. Yet his own statements reveal deep integration with Iran’s cybersecurity and security infrastructure: Ashiyane collaborated routinely with state institutions, conducted large-scale political hacks later credited as victories of “Iran’s Cyber Army,” and provided training to authorities. Regardless of its formal status, the group functioned as an extension of the Islamic Republic’s security and propaganda apparatus.

Findings from Recorded Future and ARTICLE 19 show that Ashiyane’s cyberattacks, defacements, DDoS operations, and surveillance training were deliberate components of a broader strategy of digital repression, designed to block independent information, silence dissent, and intimidate activists and journalists. These activities directly undermined freedom of expression, privacy, access to information, and freedom of association and peaceful assembly, facilitating downstream abuses such as arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment.

A comprehensive analysis published in Insight Turkey reinforces Ashiyane’s foundational role in Iran’s cyber infrastructure. Far from signaling a decline, the group’s eventual closure highlighted how deeply embedded it had been within the state’s cyber apparatus and the broader system of digital repression it enabled.

The UK and EU, in their 2011 designations of Kamalian, captured this clearly: Ashiyane was “responsible for intensive cyber attacks both on domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions,” assisting the regime’s crackdown that involved numerous serious human rights violations.

WHO IS BEHROOZ KAMALIAN?

BEHROOZ KAMALIAN

Behrooz Kamalian, known as “Behrooz_Ice,” is widely recognized as the leading figure behind the Ashiyane Digital Security Team. Rising to notoriety in the mid-2000s through high-profile website defacements, he played a central role in developing Iran’s offensive cyber capabilities. Although he publicly minimized Ashiyane’s size, he acknowledged participating in politically motivated cyberattacks against American, European, and Israeli targets and maintaining cooperation with Iranian governmental and military institutions.

Iranian state-affiliated outlets attributed to him the hacking of hundreds to thousands of foreign websites in various campaigns. Cyber intelligence firms outside Iran consistently identify Kamalian as a pivotal actor in Iran’s hacker ecosystem.

In June 2018, his forum was permanently shut down, and reports surfaced of his potential arrest or the closure of Ashiyane’s office. Kamalian was sanctioned by the European Union on October 10, 2011, for his leading role in cyberattacks aimed at suppressing dissent during the post-election unrest, and was subsequently added to the United Kingdom’s consolidated sanctions list.

WHO IS NIMA (ALIREZA) SALEHI?

Nima Salehi, born November 24, year unknown, also known as Alireza Salehi, is an Iranian hacker and computer engineer who co-founded and served as the deputy leader of the Ashiyane Digital Security Team. A Blogfa post dated August 21, 2011, confirms he has used multiple names for more than a decade. Salehi studied computer security at the Alborz Technical and Engineering Institute.

Although he appeared openly in state media alongside Kamalian, Salehi has managed to avoid public scrutiny, sanctions designations, and accountability measures that targeted others in the same network. He remains a key figure who has operated in plain sight, bypassing the consequences faced by his counterparts.

OPEN SOURCE PROFILES AND DIGITAL FOOTPRINT

HRA’s research identifies several active or traceable online profiles associated with Salehi that illustrate his continued visibility and transnational movement. Despite his role in a group tied to state repression, he maintains accessible accounts on at least Instagram, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Telegram.

His personal profiles show extensive international travel. His LinkedIn profile reflects efforts to build a professional identity within international networks, while his Facebook account remains linked to Ashiyane’s broader digital presence. A Telegram channel associated with him, while unverified, aligns with common platforms used within Iran’s cyber ecosystem.

Together, these profiles reinforce a consistent picture: Salehi remains publicly active, connected, and unimpeded, despite his documented involvement in cyber activities that facilitated state repression.

HOW IS SALEHI ASSOCIATED WITH ASHIYANE AND BEHROOZ KAMALIAN?

HRA’s research confirms that Nima Salehi was not a peripheral operator but a central actor in Ashiyane. As co-founder, senior administrator, and Kamalian’s close operational partner, Salehi shaped both the group’s cyber activities and its extensive training programs.

Under the alias 7XQ, his name appears repeatedly in defacement logs and hacker community records linked to Ashiyane’s operations. ARTICLE 19 documents that both Kamalian and Salehi taught “Hacking and Security” courses at Sharif University of Technology and later directed broader training programs, contributing directly to the development of Iran’s cyber capabilities.

Salehi’s public appearances with Kamalian on Iranian state television further confirm his senior role. Despite this visibility, he has managed to avoid the sanctions and accountability measures imposed on other actors in the same network across multiple jurisdictions.

Given his documented role within Ashiyane and his partnership with Kamalian, HRA calls on implementing bodies to take immediate action to ensure that Salehi is no longer able to move freely across borders while benefiting from complete impunity.

TRAVEL HISTORY OF NIMA (AlIREZA) SALEHI AS CONFIRMED BY SPREADING JUSTICE; March 2017 – May 2025 

*Note, a larger pin denotes more frequent travel to the given location

For more information on Salehi, Ashiyane, or the documented association, please contact Spreading Justice directly via the Contact Us form at https://spreadingjustice.org/contact-us/

Endnotes

  1. Spreading Justice, “Ashiyane Digital Security Team,” Spreading Justice – Human Rights Violators Database, https://spreadingjustice.org/group-violator/sj55990/
  2. Poppy Jeffery and Michael Seymour, “Iranian hacker uploads dead baby image onto Bournemouth University servers,” The Independent, 18 March 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/iranian-hacker-uploads-dead-baby-image-onto-bournemouth-university-servers-9199261.html.
  3. ARTICLE 19, The Soft War and Cyber Tactics in Iran, ARTICLE 19 (2017), https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38619/Iran_report_part_2-FINAL.pdf.
  4. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, *Cyber-Terrorism Activities Report No. 4* (Oct. 1, 2013), pp. 24–31, JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09471.5.
  5.  ARTICLE 19. (2017). Tightening the net: Part 2 – The soft war and cyber tactics in Iran (33 pp.). Retrieved from https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38619/Iran_report_part_2-FINAL.pdf
  6. Techrato, “Best hacking groups in Iran and the world,” Techrato, June 9, 2021, https://techrato.com/2021/06/09/best-hacking-groups-in-iran-and-the-world/.
  7. The MEMRI Cyber Jihad Lab, “Assessing the Computer Network Operation (CNO) Capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran – A Study Review” (June 24, 2015), MEMRI, https://www.memri.org/reports/assessing-computer-network-operation-cno-capabilities-islamic-republic-iran-%E2%80%93-study-review-0.
  8. DW Persian, “گروه امنیتی آشیانه یا ارتش سایبری ایران؟”, (17 September 2010) DW, https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/گروه-امنیتی-آشیانه-یا-ارتش-سایبری-ایران/a-6016017.
  9. Insikt Group, “The History of Ashiyane: Iran’s First Security Forum,” Recorded Future (January 16, 2019), https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/ashiyane-forum-history.
  10.  Ersin Çahmutoğlu, *Iran’s Cyber Power* (Ankara: Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara [İRAM], April 2021), 40 pp., https://iramcenter.org/uploads/files/irans-cyber-power_1.pdf.
  11. The MEMRI Cyber Jihad Lab, “Assessing the Computer Network Operation (CNO) Capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran – A Study Review” (June 24, 2015), MEMRI, https://www.memri.org/reports/assessing-computer-network-operation-cno-capabilities-islamic-republic-iran-%E2%80%93-study-review-0.
  12. Gerdab.ir, “هک 1000 سایت توسط گروه آشیانه” (9 شهریور ۱۳۸۹ / 31 August 2010), https://gerdab.ir/fa/news/1956/هک-1000سایت-توسط-گروه-آشیانه.
  13.  خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی ایران (ایرنا), “سایت‌های رژیم صهیونیستی توسط یک گروه ایرانی هک شد” (۲۷ شهریور ۱۳۸۸)، ایرنا، https://www.irna.ir/news/7365500/.
  14.  گرداب، «هک ۱۰۰۰ سایت توسط گروه آشیانه» (۹ شهریور ۱۳۸۹)، گرداب، https://gerdab.ir/fa/news/1956/هک-1000سایت-توسط-گروه-آشیانه.
  15.  بولتن‌نیوز، «بهروز کمالیان؛ از هک ناسا و سایت‌های اسرائیلی تا جذب فالوور برای سلبریتی‌های دوزاری» (۱۶ آبان ۱۳۹۸)، بولتن‌نیوز، https://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/638760/.
  16.  خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی ایران (ایرنا), “سایت‌های رژیم صهیونیستی توسط یک گروه ایرانی هک شد” (۲۷ شهریور ۱۳۸۸)، ایرنا، https://www.irna.ir/news/7365500/.
  17. European Commission, “Behrouz KAMALIAN,” EU Sanctions Tracker, designated under the Iran regime on 10 October 2011, EU financial sanctions (Regulation 2025/689), data.europa.eu, https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/6594.
  18. Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “Assessing The Computer Network Operation (CNO) Capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran – A Study Review” (24 June 2015), MEMRI, https://www.memri.org/reports/assessing-computer-network-operation-cno-capabilities-islamic-republic-iran-%E2%80%93-study-review-0.
  19. “Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 — Annexes (as in force on 31 December 2020),” *Legislation.gov.uk*, accessed 17 August 2025, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2011/359/annexes/2020-01-31.
  20. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/689 of 4 April 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 2025/689 (7 April 2025), accessed 24 August 2025, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500689.
  21. https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/18133348774262759/,
  22. https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/17908216216300778/

Engines of Abuse: A Five-Part Series

Public and Revolutionary Prosecutors of Iran

This report marks the first in a series of five forthcoming articles published by HRA through its Spreading Justice project, dedicated to shedding light on the roles within the Iranian regime that enable and sustain serious human rights violations, as well as violations of international law. The Spreading Justice database currently contains over a thousand profiles of individuals and entities implicated in systematic violations. This series aims not only to highlight who these individuals are and how the Spreading Justice project has documented their behavior, but also to examine how and why the positions they occupy perpetuate the entrenched cycle of repression and abuse. The series is published in the hope that a deeper understanding of the system of abuse will support ongoing efforts to hold Iran accountable and will also help shape recommendations for urgent reform.

Understanding the role of the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor in Iran

The prosecutor serves as the representative of society before the court, with key responsibilities that include issuing indictments and overseeing the enforcement of judicial punishments[1]. He also supervises investigations and exercises administrative oversight over the implementation of judgments, meaning his deep involvement in the many cases marked by fair trial violations is inherent to the role.

Organizational Structure of the Prosecution Office

Prosecutors in Iran are generally classified into three levels based on their position and hierarchy, as follows

  • Prosecutor General

  • Provincial Capital Prosecutor, for example, Ali-Akbar Alishah, see Spreading Justice profile here

  • County Prosecutor, for example, Mehdi Amadeh, see Spreading Justice profile here


Each of these prosecutors is responsible for supervising the actions of their subordinate prosecutors:

  • The Prosecutor of the provincial capital county supervises county prosecutors within that province.
  • The Prosecutor General supervises all prosecutors nationwide

Duties of the Prosecutor

All activities within the prosecutor’s office are carried out under the prosecutor’s supervision. The prosecutor’s judicial responsibilities are organized into several main categories, including:

  1. Handling offenses involving public rights and interests
    Offenses that concern public rights or interests do not require a private complainant. For instance, certain violations tied to public order or decency are pursued by prosecutors without the need for a private complaint, with both administrative and criminal dimensions. In such cases, the prosecutor holds the authority to initiate proceedings and ensure the matter is addressed.

  2. Handling complaints of pardonable (private) offenses at the victim’s request
    These offenses are pursued only if the victim files a complaint. Once the complaint is submitted, the prosecutor is obligated to take action and address the matter.[2]

  3. Issuing Indictments
    A core responsibility of the prosecutor is to prepare and issue an indictment. In Iran’s mixed system, the prosecutor directs the investigation, while the investigating judge conducts interrogations and oversees evidence gathering. Once the investigating judge submits the report confirming that the investigation is complete and the accused has been informed of the charges, the prosecutor drafts the indictment and submits it to the court to initiate the trial.[3]

Oversight of Punishment Enforcement

According to the regulations on the implementation of punishments such as hadd penalties, capital punishment, limb amputation, qisas (retribution in kind) for life and limb, injury compensation (diyat), flogging, exile, banishment, compulsory residence, and prohibiting residence in particular areas[4]:

  • According to Article 31[5], punishments involving capital punishment, stoning, qisas for limb, and limb amputation are carried out under the continuous and direct supervision of the prosecutor.
    According to Article 15[6], in cases where a sentence has been issued for public execution at a designated location, if the court has not specified the area, the place of execution is determined by the proposal of the criminal sentence enforcement judge and the approval of the prosecutor.

Case Study: Isfahan House

A striking example of the Prosecutor’s conduct can be seen in the actions of the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan County, Seyed Mohammad Mousavian[7]. Acting in his official capacity, Mousavian issued the indictment against the defendants in the Isfahan House case[8] following the nationwide protests of 2022. This indictment ultimately led to the executions of Saleh Mirhashemi, Majid Kazemi, and Saeed Yaghoubi.

The executions were carried out despite the release of an audio file[9] in which Majid Kazemi made clear that he had been tortured, threatened, and subjected to sexual abuse during interrogation. These coerced confessions, extracted in flagrant violation of both Iranian law and international human rights standards, became the foundation for the indictment and subsequent death sentences.

By relying on statements obtained through torture, the prosecutor not only failed in his duty to uphold justice but also actively contravened one of his most fundamental legal obligations: to ensure that indictments are not based on evidence obtained under coercion. This conduct represents not simply a lapse in judgment but a profound violation of law, contributing directly to the wrongful and arbitrary deprivation of life. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident, but rather part of a broader and routine pattern in the Iranian judiciary.

Spreading Justice Information on Public and Revolutionary Prosecutors of the Past and Present

NameCurrent PositionLinkLocation
Jalal AfaghiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Ardabil Countyhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj19847/Ardabil
Ali-Akbar AlishahGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Sarihttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj41692/Sari
Mahmoud EspanlouGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Golestan Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67398/Gorgan
Behrouz AbbasiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Zanjan Countyhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj80807/Zanjan
Abdolvahab BakhshandehGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of the Capital of Ilam Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj60705/Ilam
Babak Mahboub AliluGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of East Azerbaijan Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj66354/Tabriz
Mahdi BakhshiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Kerman Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj59765/Kerman
Seyed Mohammad MousavianGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj42878/Isfahan
Hasan MadadiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Alborz Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj03152/Karaj
Mehdi AmadehGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office of Dezfulhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj29158/Dezful
Alireza RezapourGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Saqqezhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj77936/Saqqez
Seyed-Ali Malek-HosseiniKohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Provincial General and Revolutionary Prosecutor – Yasuj Cityhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj70841/Yasuj
Iraj Jahantigh FardGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Zabolhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj54053/Zabol
Moslem AlmasiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Dorud Countyhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj24392/Dorud
Mehdi MohammadiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Shahriar Countyhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj84171/Shahriar
Hossein MajidiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of West Azerbaijan – Urmiahttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj69585/Urmia
Jafar SedighiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Sabzevarhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj39390/Sabzevar
Mohammad JabbariGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Kurdistan Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67273/Sanandaj
Mehdi ShamsabadiGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Sistan and Baluchestanhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj96508/Zahedan
Mohammad Movahedi AzadAttorney General of the countryhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj38604/Tehran
Sadegh Jafari ChegeniGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Center of Khuzestan Province, Ahvaz Countyhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj97277/Ahvaz
NamePrevious PositionCurrent PositionLinkLocation
Ebrahim AnsariFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Lahijan CountyDeputy for Judicial Affairs of the Head of the General and Revolutionary Courts of Rasht County  https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj76989/Rasht
Seyed Mahdi FalahmiriGeneral and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Gilan provinceJudicial Deputy of the Gilan Province Judiciaryhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj05101/Rasht

Mehrab Pourakbar
General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Mahabad
Unknown
https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj51073/
Unknown
Hassan Khanjani MovagharFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Hamedan ProvinceUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj94718/Unknown
Akbar SobhaniFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Bandar Anzali CityUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj70283/Unknown
Esmail MolakarimiFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Babol CityUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj50244/Unknown
Mohammad Reza EbrahimiFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Nowshahr CityUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj49953/Unknown
Yar Mohammad Resalati KhahFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Izeh CityHead of the Justice Department of Ramshir County  https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj82195/Ramshir
Rabiullah GhorbaniFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Markazi provinceChief Justice of the Public and Revolutionary Courts of Tehran Province  https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj04363/Tehran
Hossein RajabiFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Qazvin ProvinceUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj27198/Unknown
Ali HassanpourFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Bushehr provinceAssistant Prosecutor of the Supreme Court’s Prosecutor’s Office  https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj04196/Tehran
Alireza Ahmadi ManeshFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Hormozgan ProvinceHead of the Appeals Court of Mazandaran Provincehttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj04655/Sari
Mohammad-Hossein DoroudiFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Khorasan Razavi ProvinceUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj94338/Unknown
Mahdi MohammadiFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Amol city in Mazandaran provinceUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj52571/Unknown
Mojtaba MahmoodiFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Piranshahr city in West Azerbaijan provinceUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj63140/Unknown
Asghar NoeiFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Naghadeh city in West AzerbaijanUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj75888/Unknown
Seyed-Mostafa BahreiniFormer General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Fars ProvinceUnknownhttps://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj86679/Unknown

[1] IRIB News, “Who Is the Prosecutor and What Are Their Duties?,” IRIB News Agency, published 30 November 2020, https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/2938776/دادستانکیستوچهوظایفیدارد.

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] Ekhtebar, “Regulation on the Implementation of Hadd Punishments, Death Penalty, Amputation, Qisas for Life and Limb, Bodily Injuries, Blood Money (Diyat), Flogging, Exile, Banishment, Mandatory Residence, and Prohibition from Residence in Certain Places,” published June 20, 2019, Ekhtebar, https://www.ekhtebar.ir/%D8%A2%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AD%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%8C-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%AD/.

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Spreading Justice, “Seyed Mohammad Mousavian (Violator ID: sj42878),” Spreading Justice – Human Rights Violators Database, last updated 20 June 2025, https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj42878/.

[8] Hrana, “Saleh Mirhashemi, Majid Kazemi and Saeed Yaghoubi Executed” published May 19, 2023. https://www.en-hrana.org/saleh-mirhashemi-majid-kazemi-and-saeed-yaghoubi-executed/.

[9] Hrana, “HRANA’s report on the ambiguous case of the defendants of the Isfahan House / Documents from the case” published May 14, 2023.
https://www.hra-news.org/2023/hranews/a-41118/.

Iran Prepares for a Presidential Election. Guardian Council Vets Six Candidates with Questionable Records

Iran Prepares for a Presidential Election. Guardian Council Vets Six Candidates with Questionable Records

In the wake of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s death last month, Iran is gearing up for a presidential election. 

Historical Lack of Free and Fair Elections in Iran Dating Back Decades

Iranian elections have a dark past, consistently marked by a lack of free, fair, and transparent processes. In 2010, the highly disputed re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad led to widespread allegations of vote-rigging and fraud, sparking the largest protests since the 1979 revolution. The Green Movement, as it came to be known, saw millions of Iranians take to the streets demanding democracy and more. The government responded with a violent crackdown, resulting in numerous arrests, injuries, and deaths–some of those arrested remain detained today. 

The 2021 election saw the lowest voter turnout in history, highlighting growing public disillusionment. Despite this, the ruling elite persist in claiming legitimacy, even as each election sees diminishing public participation. This lack of engagement underscores the deepening disconnect between the ruling elite and the general populace. 

Six Candidates Cleared for Upcoming Iranian Presidential Election 

As the upcoming election approaches, six candidates have been approved. The approval process for presidential candidates in Iran is overseen by the Guardian Council, a powerful body comprising six Islamic jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists approved by the Parliament. This council rigorously vets each applicant, assessing their qualifications, political and religious beliefs, and backgrounds—not on true merit. As a result, numerous candidates are often disqualified, leaving only a select few approved to run in the election.

Iran has had a significant history in manipulating the elections. The 2009 presidential election in Iran was marred by significant controversy and accusations of fraud. After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was announced as the winner with nearly 63% of the vote, widespread protests erupted, driven by opposition candidates who claimed vote manipulation. These protests, part of the Iranian Green Movement, persisted into 2010. The government’s violent suppression of these protests, resulting in deaths and arrests, further fueled beliefs of a rigged election. Prominent opposition figures such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, his wife Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi, leaders of the 2009 Green Movement, have been under house arrest since February 2011. Despite international outcry their situation remains unchanged, with severe restrictions on their communication and movement. Mehdi Karroubi, vocal in his criticism of the Iranian government’s actions, including its handling of incidents like the downing of a Ukrainian passenger plane, has faced worsening health conditions under house arrest. His attempts to hold the Iranian leadership accountable have led to increased restrictions on his freedoms. The continued detention of these opposition figures without trial has been condemned internationally, with entities such as the UN calling for their immediate release.

In the 2021 presidential election, controversy arose even before voting began, with the Guardian Council disqualifying many popular candidates, seen as a move to ensure the victory of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi. This election saw the lowest turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic, at around 49%, with a significant portion of protest votes. International observers and human rights organizations dismissed the election as neither free nor fair, labeling it a “show election.” Voter turnout in Iran’s presidential elections has been on a declining trend over the past two decades, reflecting growing public disillusionment with the electoral process. Notably, turnout was around 85% in 2009, despite controversies, likely due to a highly polarized environment. It saw a slight decline to around 72% in 2013, remained stable at about 73% in 2017, and drastically fell to a record low of approximately 49% in 2021. This decline has been attributed to widespread skepticism about electoral integrity and the pre-selection of candidates by the Guardian Council. Statistics on voter turnout are usually provided by the Iranian government, which is often accused of reporting higher participation figures than the reality.

This rigorous and  vetting process lacking any transparency narrows the pool of candidates presented to voters, limiting genuine political competition and reducing the electorate’s ability to choose from a diverse range of political views. The skewed candidate selection process undermines the claim of a democratic nature to the elections, reinforcing the status quo of the ruling elite and perpetuating the brutal suppression of human rights across the country.

The upcoming election is a stark example of this process. The Guardian Council has officially announced the list of approved candidates. The final slate of candidates includes:

Masoud Pezeshkian: b.1954 (70), Mahabad. Former Minister of Health. He had previously ran for the presidency in 2013 but withdrew and in 2021 was disqualified by the Guardian Council for the election. Pezeshkian has a demonstrated history of involvement in restricting access to the highest attainable standard of health while additionally being implicated in unethical practices involving condoning the violation of women’s rights. 

Mostafa Pourmohammadi: b.1959 (65), Qom. Former Minister of Interior and Justice, and Revolutionary Prosecutor notorious for his involvement in the mass executions of the 1980s. He was a member of the “Death Squad” in 1988, notorious for the mass executions of political prisoners that summer.  Since 2021, he has been the President of the Center for IslamicRevolution Documents. More details

Saeed Jalili: b. 1965(59), Mashhad. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (2007-2013). Member of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, has a history of systematic repression of political activists and notable complicity in the brutal crackdowns on peaceful protests. Notably, Saeed Jalili was the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council when the house arrest decision of the aforementioned Green Movement leaders was carried out in 2010.  More details

Alireza Zakani: b. 1965 (59), Rey. The current mayor of Tehran and former head of the Basij Student Organization, he was involved in the events of July 9, 1999, and the attack on Tehran University dormitory. Alireza Zakani has a long history of persecuting minorities and political opponents. He was previously disqualified from the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections. During Zakani’s tenure, a group called the HijabBans was established to oversee women’s dress codes in Tehran’s metro. Zakani has been sanctioned by the UK for his involvement in serious human rights violations. More details

Seyed Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi: b. 1971 (53), ​​Fariman, Khorasan Razavi Province. Former Deputy Speaker of Parliament (2020-2021) Current Vice President of Iran and head of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs and Member of the Islamic Revolution Stability Front since 2019. Hashemi has been a staunch supporter of the so-called Hijab bill as well as the ‘Protection of Users’ Rights and Basic Applications in Cyberspace’ which seeks to restrict free access to the internet among other things.  More details

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf: b. 1961 (63), Torghabeh, Khorasan Razavi Province.  Former Commander Of the IRGC Air Force (1997-2000). Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, has long maintained leading involvement in the illegal crackdown on peaceful protestors including their arbitrary detentions and torture. Ghalibaf himself has spoken publicly about his involvement in and support in such actions. In addition, Ghalibaf is a staunch supporter of the so-called Hijab bill. More details

The elections, rather than serving as a tool for the people to express their will, act as a mechanism for the ruling authorities to present outward legitimacy. This can be seen notably in the candidacy of individuals who played leading roles in the arrest of protestors in 2010 following disputed elections. 

It is noteworthy that several other prominent figures applied but were not approved by the Guardian Council to run in the upcoming election. This list includes:

Eshaq Jahangiri: Former First Vice President

Mehrdad Bazrpash: Current Minister of Roads and Urban Development

Sowlat Mortazavi: Current Minister of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare

Mahmoud Ahmadi Bighash: Former IRGC commander

Mostafa Kavakebian: Former representative of Tehran in the Parliament. More details

Sayyid Shamseddin Hosseini: Former Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance

Abdolnaser Hemmati: Former Governor of the Central Bank

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: Former President

Mohammad Mehdi Esmaeili: Current Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance. More details

Vahid Haghanian: Former Executive Deputy of the Office of the Supreme Leader

Ali Larijani: Former Speaker of the Parliament. More details

Elias Naderan: Former MP

Hasan Sobhani: Former MP

Hasan Kamran: Former MP

Ahmad Akbari: Former MP

Ghasem Jasemi: Former MP

Hamideh Zarabadi: Former MP

Mohammad Nazemi Ardakani: Former Minister 

The current configuration severely limits any potential for significant political change from within the system, effectively making the elections a mere formality. The process ensures competing interests do not become a true threat to the ruling elite. Moreover, the Guardian Council’s role extends to overseeing the presidential elections themselves, further ensuring that the elected president will align with the broader interests of the ruling elite, thereby maintaining the status quo.

This system reveals a façade of democracy, where the true power dynamics operate on a level that is far removed from the democratic ideals professed to the public. The system not only undermines the democratic essence of elections but also perpetuates a cycle of power that is self-serving for those at the helm.

 

 

 

Iranian Prisons are Places of Relentless Suffering

Incarcerated Individuals tell HRA: “Abuse of power is rampant. We are left at their mercy”

Iran’s prisons are harrowing places where abuse and neglect are rampant. The following report is based on testimonies from former and current incarcerated individuals in Iran. Conversations between individuals and HRA reveal severe and systemic issues that fly in the face of Iran’s international human rights obligations as well as universally agreed upon minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners. 

In Iran, the management, administration and regulations of the prisons falls under the jurisdiction of the Prisons Organisation which operates directly under the supervision of the Head of the Judiciary. The Head of the Judiciary appoints the head of the Prisons Organization who is responsible for the implementation of corrective measures, rehabilitation programs, and ensuring the rights and welfare of prisoners. This investigation was prompted by a notable void in reporting on prison conditions, which is likely attributed to the restricted nature of such reporting and the considerable challenge faced by third-party monitors in accessing penal facilities directly. The administration of prisons is tightly integrated with the judicial system’s broader goals and policies, and they have notably been known for their lack of transparency.

Conditions described by current and formerly incarcerated individuals in Iranian prisons such as EvinRajaei ShahrVakil AbadGhezel HesarQarchak, and Adel Abad reveal significant breaches of international human rights law. In addition to clear violations of international human rights law, the testimonies detail blatant disregard for upholding the Mandela Rules.The Nelson Mandela Rules, while not legally binding, are considered “soft law” and represent essential principles

In 2015 The UN General Assembly adopted the Mandela Rules as the universally agreed minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners and several UN Member States have since incorporated the provisions of the rules into their domestic legal frameworks. Iran’s lack of overall adherence to these principles can be seen as a failure to uphold the universally agreed upon minimum standards. 

The Mandela Rules on the Standard Minimum Treatment of Prisoners 

Testimonies collected by HRA indicate grossly inadequate healthcare within prisons, with limited access to medical professionals and neglect of serious health conditions. This situation is a clear violation of the right to health as stipulated in the Mandela Rules.

Accommodation and Hygiene: 

“Adel Abad was a place of relentless suffering. The rooms were semi-dark and poorly ventilated, making it hard to breathe. Temperature extremes were common, with freezing winters and scorching summers.”

Mandela Rule 12 requires that prison accommodations provide adequate living space, ventilation, and lighting. 

Mandela Rule 13 stipulates the need for sanitary facilities that are hygienic and accessible. 

Mandela Rule 15 emphasizes the provision of adequate clothing and bedding.

The detailed testimonies collected by HRA highlight the violation of basic accommodation standards. Poor ventilation, inadequate lighting, and extreme temperatures directly contravene the Mandela Rules, creating inhumane living conditions that fail to respect the dignity of prisoners.

While engaging with HRA, Zahra, a political prisoner who spent 5 years in Evin Prison said “The cells were dimly lit and poorly ventilated, making the air thick and oppressive. Summers were unbearable, and winters were freezing.” Another individual detailed a similar situation describing “semi-dark and poorly ventilated [rooms], making it hard to breathe.” They continued, “Temperature extremes were common, with freezing winters and scorching summers.”

Food and Water

“Since the merger of the prisoner populations from Rajaei Shahr and Ghezel Hesar (Qezalhasar), the dynamics here have drastically changed. The overcrowding has worsened, and food shortages have become more severe.” 

Mandela Rule 22 ensures prisoners receive nutritious and sufficient food and drinking water.

Throughout HRA’s conversations, incarcerated individuals  consistently report inadequate and poor-quality food, with those unable to afford additional supplies from prison stores suffering from malnutrition. This testimony reveals stark violations of the Mandela Rules’ requirement for nutritious and sufficient food.

Ali, a 28 year old male incarcerated at Rajaei Shahr Prison four years told HRA, “The food was inedible, and many relied on the expensive prison store to supplement their diet.” Another individual currently incarcerated at Ghezel Hesar Prison said “The food is insufficient and often spoiled, forcing those with money to buy from the expensive prison store.”

The dire situation in these prisons, as described by the incarcerated individuals, underscores a critical failure to meet the basic nutritional needs mandated by Mandela Rule 22. The overcrowding exacerbated by the merger of incarcerated individuals populations from Rajaei Shahr and Ghezel Hesar has only intensified food shortages, leaving many inmates malnourished and dependent on expensive prison stores for survival. This blatant disregard for providing adequate and nutritious food highlights a profound violation of human rights within Iran’s prison system.

Healthcare

“The denial of these essential services is a clear reflection of the system’s failures.”

Mandela Rule 24 mandates that prisoners have access to the same standard of healthcare available in the community, without discrimination.

Testimonies indicate grossly inadequate healthcare, with limited access to medical professionals and neglect of serious health conditions. This situation is a clear violation of the right to health as stipulated in the Mandela Rules.

In Evin Prison one individual described that “Healthcare was minimal, with only an inexperienced nurse available and a doctor visiting infrequently.” Another serving time at Vakil Abad Prison from 2019-2023 disclosed to HRA  “Medical services were grossly inadequate, with many serious conditions ignored.” Another individual informed HRA that the existence of medical care “was a farce”. 

The denial of essential healthcare services within Iranian prisons is a damning indictment of the system’s failures to uphold basic human rights. Mandela Rule 24 unequivocally mandates that prisoners have access to healthcare equivalent to that

available in the wider community, without discrimination. These testimonies reveal a systemic failure to provide the necessary medical care, further underscoring the urgent need for reform within Iran’s prison system.

International Human Rights Law 

International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): The Right to Humane Treatment

Article 10 of the ICCPR states that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

Indeed the degrading treatment described in great detail in conversation with almost all individuals including the pervasive violence reported violates Article 10 of the ICCPR, which emphasizes the humane treatment of all prisoners.

Nasrin, who is serving time since 2021 in Qarchak (Shahre-Rey) Prison, recounted to HRA “The humiliating behavior of some guards, who conduct nude body searches and degrade us in front of others, only adds to the misery.” Mehdi, a 40 year old male serving time at Ghezel Hesar Prison, in dialogue with HRA informed that : “The prison is a hotspot for violence, with easy access to weapons like large handmade knives that many of us carry for protection.”

Individuals described brutal violence. One stated that “Physical abuse by guards was common, and there were frequent hunger strikes in protest.” Another, age 60, incarcerated since 2006, stated “Some guards exploit these conditions, demanding bribes for basic necessities or the promise of safety.”

Physical abuse by guards and the exploitation of prisoners for bribes constitute inhuman and degrading treatment, falling under the purview of torture. The reports of frequent abuse and the calculated neglect by authorities indicate systemic issues within the prison system.

Conclusion

The systemic issues within Iranian prisons highlight a severe failure to adhere to international human rights obligations and principles. The harrowing testimonies from both current and former incarcerated individuals expose a grim reality of widespread abuse and severe neglect. Healthcare in these prisons is grossly inadequate, with limited access to medical professionals and widespread neglect of serious health conditions. Combined with appalling hygiene standards, subpar food and water provisions, and violence and degrading treatment by guards, it is evident that Iranian prisons fall alarmingly short of international standards and principles.

Iran must urgently address these violations to align itself with international standards and obligations, ensuring the humane treatment and dignity of all incarcerated individuals. 

HRA urges the international community, including international human rights organizations, governments, and the United Nations, to take immediate action regarding the stark realities revealed by these testimonies. It is imperative that in all dialogue concerted efforts be made to pressure Iran to adhere to international human rights standards, ensure the humane treatment of incarcerated individuals, and allow independent monitoring of prison conditions. 

*For a more in depth look at the unlawful conditions of Prisons mentioned in this article, please visit www.spreadingjustice.org and search the name of the Prison in the top right hand search bar.

*For a brief overview see below related Individuals involved in rights violations associated with unlawful prison conditions subdivided by Prison and General Associations: 

Shiraz Central Prison (AKA Adel Abad Prison): 

  1. ISHAGH EBRAHIMI: Director-General of Fars Province Prisons Since Sep 2019
  2. RUHOLLAH REZAEI DANA: the director of Shiraz Central Prison Since June 2020
  3. ALI MOZAFFARI: Chief Justice of Qom Province Since August 2019 

Evin Prison:

  1. ALI ASHRAF RASHIDI-AGHDAM: Deputy of Health and Correction and Education of Tehran Prisons General Administration Since August 2015
  2. GHOLAMREZA ZIAEI: Head of Evin Prison From July 2019 to June 2020
  3.  ALI CHAHARMAHALI: Head of Evin Prison from August 2016 to July 2019
  4. HAMID MOHAMMADI: Director of Evin prison from June 2020 to September 2021
  5. HASSAN GHOBADI:  Head of Evin Prison Security At least from March 2012
  6. SEYED-HOSSEIN MORTAZAVI-ZANJANI: Warden of Evin Prison From 1986 to 1988 
  7. MOHAMMAD MOGHISEH: Judge of the Evin Prison from 1989 to 1991 

Ghezel Hesar Prison

  1. ASHKAN KAMALI: Head of Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj Since August 2020
  2. HAMID MOHAMMADI: Director of Ghezel Hesar Prison From  2019, to June 2020
  3. MOHAMMAD MOGHISEH: Assistant judge of Ghezel Hesar Prison in 1985   1986 – 1988 Head and Judge of Rajaei-Shahr Prison in Karaj 

Rajaei-Shahr Prison (AKA Gohardasht Prison): 

  1. ALLAH KARAM AZIZI: The head of Rajaei-Shahr Prison From July 2019 to  August  2023
  2. GHOLAMREZA ZIAEI: Head of Rajai-Shahr Prison in Karaj From October 2017 to July 2019
  3. HAMID MOHAMMADI: Prior to his appointment as the director of Ghezel Hesar Prison, he was the director of Rajai-Shahr Prison in Karaj
  4.  ALI HAJI-KAZEMThe warden of Rajaei-Shahr Prison
  5. HAMID NOURY: Prison guard and assistant prosecutor of Rajaei-Shahr Prison Until 1991
  6. HASSAN GHOBADI:  Deputy health of Rajaei-Shahr Prison at least from January 2019
  7. SEYED-HOSSEIN MORTAZAVI-ZANJANI: Warden of Rajae-Shahr Prison From 1983 to 1986
  8. MOHAMMAD MOGHISEHHead and Judge of Rajaei-Shahr Prison From 1986  to 1988

Tehran Province Women’s Penitentiary (AKA Qarchak Prison in Varamin) 

  1. SOGHRA KHODADADI: Head of the Women’s Ward of Qarchak Prison Since December 2020

Mashhad Central Prison (AKA Vakil Abad Prison): 

  1. ALI ABDI: Head of Vakil Abad Prison From September 2019 to December 2021. And since December 2021 he is the deputy of Judiciary and Execution of Judgments of the General Administration of Khorasan Razavi Prisons Organization
  2. HADI ESMAIEL ZADEGAN: Acting and then Director of Vakil Abad Prison Since November 2021

General:
1. SEYED HESHMATOLLAH HAIATOLGHEIB:

  • Dorud city prison chief
  • Police Deputy of the General Directorate of Prisons in Lorestan Province
  • Deputy General Directorate of Prisons in Markazi Province
  • Deputy of the General Directorate of Prisons in Isfahan Province
  • Head of the Isfahan Central Prison (while maintaining the organizational position of deputy director general of prisons in Isfahan province)
  • Deputy of the General Directorate of Prisons in Isfahan Province
  • Head of the General Directorate of Prisons in Isfahan Province
  • 2011-2015: Director-General of Yazd Province Prisons
  • 2015- 2019: Director-General of Fars Province Prisons
  • July 2019 to August 2021 and again February 2022: Director-General of Tehran Province Prisons
  1. ALI CHAHARMAHALI:
  • Vice President of Health, Correctional and Education of Prisons in Tehran Province
  • 11 August 2016- 28 July 2019: Head of Evin Prison
  • 28 July 2019-16 February 2022: Head of Great Tehran Penitentiary
  • 16 February 2022-now: Director-General of Alborz Province Prisons
  1.  IRAJ FATTAHI: 
  • 2016- January 2023: Head of Karaj Central Penitentiary
  • January 2023: Vice President of Health, Correctional and Education Department of Prisons of Alborz Province
  1. ALI HAJI-KAZEM: 
  • Former head of Karaj Central Penitentiary
  • June 2005: the warden of Rajaei-Shahr prison
  • From February 2022: Special advisor to Alborz governor on prisons
  1. MOHAMMAD MAHDI HAJ-MOHAMMADI
  • 2019 – June 2020 Deputy Justice of Tehran Province
  • June 2020 – November 2021 Head of the State Prison and Security and Corrective Measures Organization
  • From July 2023: Head of the Judiciary Office of Special Inspection and Citizen Rights.
  1. MOHAMMAD-JAVAD ARDESHIR LARIJANI
  • June 2005 – January 2020 Secretary of the High Council for Human Rights of Judicial system of Islamic Republic
  1. GHOLAM-ALI MOHAMMADI
  • July 2005 – September 2020 Deputy Chief Justice of Tehran Province
  • September 2020 – November 2021 Deputy Head of the Judiciary chief office
  • Since November 2021: Head of the State Prison and Security and Corrective Measures Organization

Criminalized Identity: Highlighting LGBTQ+ Rights Abuses in Iran


IranianLGBTQ+ individuals face systematic persecution that is both state-sponsored and pervasive. Legal frameworks and government policies explicitly endorse violence and discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community. HRA, through extensive research via its Spreading Justice initiative, has identified the state institutions and individuals involved in human rights violations against these sexual and gender minorities. The research draws on detailed case studies and insights from members of the community advocating for change both within and beyond the borders of Iran.

State-Sponsored Homophobia: Institutional and Legislative Enablers

The Iranian government’s perpetuation of discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals is overt and multifaceted. Dating back decades, there are seemingly endless examples of the widespread, State-sponsored discrimination faced by LGBTQ+ individuals in Iran.

The following are a mere few:

The notorious, “Modesty and Hijab Bill,” though not fully ratified, has already been used by State broadcasters to actively promote homophobia. Article 8 paragraph 2 of this bill compels the Broadcasting Organization of Iran to produce content that counters homosexuality, effectively legislating hate and reinforcing societal prejudices against LGBTQ+ individuals. The bill also explicitly tasks the Broadcasting Organization of Iran with promoting content that vilifies homosexuality, contributing to the spread of hatred against homosexuals, sanctioned by state media. Despite awaiting confirmation by the Guardian Council, the police force has practically enforced the hijab law in numerous cities, further institutionalizing discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community under the guise of upholding modesty and moral values. One example of spreading hatred against the LGBTQ+ community is, guest speakers on talk shows spreading false narratives. For example on Jaryan talk show, the Guest speaker questions the boundaries of freedom of expression in Europe, stating that while they can insult prophets, according to him, speaking against homosexuality leads to consequences.

In addition, The Research Center of the Parliament –which is a part of the Islamic Council Research is responsible for conducting study and research projects to provide advisory opinions to the representatives, commissions, and presidium of the Islamic Council— has produced reports that suggested temporary marriage as a remedy to homosexuality, in essence legitimizing State interference in personal identities. In 2014 a report titled Temporary Marriage and Its Effect on Adjusting Illicit Sexual Relations stated “Out of 141,552 middle school students across the country, 24,889 were identified as homosexuals.” The report went on to advocate for temporary marriage as a corrective measure, reinforcing harmful stereotypes.

Forced Conformity

In Iran, the judiciary plays a critical role in enforcing discriminatory laws against the LGBTQ+ community, particularly impacting transgender individuals. A stark example of this is Judge Abbas Ghaderi, head of Branch 45 of the Special Judicial Complex for Family Matters in Tehran. Ghaderi is notorious for his harsh requirements for transgender individuals who seek the legal recognition of their gender. Under his jurisdiction, transgender individuals are compelled to undergo extensive and invasive surgeries to legally change their gender markers on identification documents.

 

The extensive nature of Ghaderi’s behavior can be explored in more depth via his profile on the Spreading Justice database.

Iran has a gender binary legal framework and the law mandates that individuals select either male or female and undergo corresponding gender-confirming surgeries for legal recognition. The mandated surgeries are physically demanding, carry significant medical risks, and entail high financial costs that many cannot afford.  Requiring these surgeries as a condition for legal recognition imposes an unjust burden on transgender individuals, making their right to identity contingent upon their willingness and ability to undergo medical procedures. Moreover, those who refuse or are unable to choose a binary gender and undergo the prescribed surgeries face severe consequences. They are often denied access to basic services and rights, such as employment and education. This denial extends to various aspects of public life, effectively marginalizing them and limiting their ability to participate fully and freely in society.

In addition to these surgical requirements, transgender citizens must navigate a lengthy and arbitrary legal process to obtain identification documents that reflect their gender identity, often resulting in the removal of reproductive organs such as the uterus, ovaries, and testicles. These heavy and irreversible surgeries, coupled with the high costs and low quality of medical care available, further exacerbate the challenges faced by transgender Iranians. HRA has documented instances where local judges, like Judge Ghaderi, apply these requirements inconsistently, adding to the confusion and discrimination.

LGBTQ+ voices from inside the country

The situation for LGBTQ+ individuals in Iran is dire, marked by systemic discrimination, abuse, and persecution. Accounts from community members reveal the depth of their suffering and the pervasive fear that governs their lives.

“Being interrogated was a nightmare. They made fun of me, taunted me, and treated me like a criminal. Even soldiers who were supposed to be impartial joined in the abuse. When I was finally taken to prison, I was so humiliated that I wanted to disappear,” one individual recounted. This testimony highlights the hostile and dehumanizing treatment faced during interrogations.

The Iranian regime’s propaganda machinery further exacerbates the plight of LGBTQ+ individuals. “The regime actively fuels animosity against us. They even burn our flag in government marches and use derogatory language to perpetuate negative stereotypes about us. They exploit existing societal taboos to bolster their campaign of humiliation and oppression. This rhetoric reinforces deeply ingrained prejudices and strengthens the stigma surrounding our community,” shared another member. Such actions by the government serve to legitimize and intensify public hostility and discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community.

Living in constant fear, many LGBTQ+ individuals face profound personal and social risks. “My greatest fear is that coming out could cost me my freedom or my future. Arrests, job loss, or social ostracism are very real risks, even if I’m fortunate to have a supportive family. My fear is for those who have no such support,” explained a third individual. This fear is not unfounded, as Iran’s legal and social environment is extremely hostile towards LGBTQ+ individuals, often leading to severe consequences such as imprisonment, loss of employment, and social exclusion.

Military Service

In the realm of military service, discrimination persists with the “Nervous and Mental” classification in the medical exemption regulations. This classification, used to exempt transgender and homosexual individuals from mandatory military service, not only stigmatizes but also carries severe long-term repercussions. The label of a mental disorder is then recorded in their medical and military records, casting a long shadow over their lives, and impacting their ability to secure employment and access social services.

The military exemption, known as the “red card,” creates additional barriers to obtaining licenses or employment in public offices, reflecting a broader pattern of state-sanctioned discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals in Iran. This systematic marginalization,  reinforced by both legal mandates and societal attitudes, impedes the full participation of LGBTQ+ individuals in society.

Although there have been some changes since the enactment of the Examination and Medical Exemption Regulation for Conscription in 2014, which shifted the review of exemptions for transgender and homosexual individuals to specific sections, colloquially known as the “Nervous and Mental” section, the stigma attached to these exemptions persists. Despite the World Health Organization’s reclassification of being transgender from mental and behavioral disorders and the removal of homosexuality from the list of mental disorders in 1990, the implications of these exemptions remain problematic in Iran, especially considering the criminalization of same-sex relations. This has led to increased caution and strictness in issuing exemptions, which some manage to obtain only after extended efforts, often limited to an exemption from combat rather than a complete waiver from military service.

Systematic Exclusion from Professional and Social Arenas

The exclusion from additional professional and social arenas is another facet of discrimination faced by LGBTQ+ individuals in Iran. Notable figures such as Mohammad Heidari, former head of City Theater, and Seyed Sadegh Mousavi, head of the Evaluation and Supervision Council of the General Directorate of Performing Arts, have played significant roles in excluding transgender individuals from the arts. The case of Saman Arastoo, a well-known actor who faced systematic exclusion from theater productions following his gender confirmation surgery, illustrates the professional and personal costs of such discrimination.

·       Invisible Removal from the Work Environment

Some transgender individuals are deprived of continuing their careers in their specialized fields after coming out. Saman Arastoo, who was a recognized actor in cinema and theater, found himself ousted from the job market shortly after his gender confirmation. In 2020, in an interview with Ensaf News, addressing his removal from a theater production in 2008, Arastoo detailed that Mohammad Heidari, the head of City Theater, and Seyed Sadegh Mousavi Mousavi, from the Evaluation and Supervision Council, decided to remove him from the main character role after a lengthy review process. Arastoo stated, “Many students have been in my classes or participated in my self-awareness workshops. They are transgender and have studied at the University of Arts, and they are never given any work. I always tell the kids to make sure to do two or three art projects, whether in theater or cinema, before undergoing surgery so that they face fewer problems after the operation.”

·       Marginalization from the Social Sphere

The marginalization extends beyond professional spheres into social settings. Alireza Nadali, the spokesperson for the Islamic Council of Tehran City, has publicly criticized the presence of transgender citizens in Daneshjoo Park, suggesting that their presence in public spaces should be regulated and not be allowed in cultural spots of the city. This type of rhetoric contributes to the stigmatization and marginalization of transgender individuals, limiting their ability to participate in public life.

·       The Plight of Homeless Transgender Individuals

Economic and social challenges are further compounded for transgender individuals facing homelessness, a situation exacerbated by widespread family rejection owing to societal taboos and systemic barriers. In 2019, the Daneshgah News Agency highlighted the refusal of shelters to accommodate transgender individuals, citing a case where the Tehran Municipality was questioned for allowing a transgender individual to stay in a women’s shelter. In response to growing pressures, Ahmad Ahmadi Sadr from the Social Services and Participation Organization of Tehran announced plans in 2023 to establish specialized shelters. However, these promises were quickly retracted, underscoring a lack of genuine commitment to addressing the needs of transgender individuals facing homelessness.

Vulnerability to Violence

The vulnerability of LGBTQ+ individuals to violence is pronounced, with minimal protection or recourse available through legal channels. Incidents of violence, such as the assault on a 23-year-old transgender woman in Sanandaj by her brother, often go unaddressed by authorities, leaving victims without support or justice. The lack of a safe environment, even for welfare workers, places these individuals at greater risk, highlighting the systemic neglect and discrimination they face daily.

These examples starkly illustrate the multifaceted discrimination and exclusion faced by LGBTQ+ individuals in Iran, spanning professional, social, and personal spheres. The systemic nature of this exclusion, supported by both governmental policy and societal attitudes, necessitates urgent reforms to protect the rights and dignity of the LGBTQ+ community in Iran.

Security Measures Against LGBTQ+ Members

The plight of LGBTQ+ individuals in Iran extends into their treatment under security measures and legal actions. During the nationwide protests in 2022/23 Rahaa Ajoudani, a transgender citizen living in Tehran, was arrested and faced severe judicial consequences. She was sentenced to two and a half years in prison and banned from leaving the country, although her sentence was later converted to a fine due to “living conditions as a transgender woman and the lack of a proper facility for detention.” This adjustment speaks volumes about the unsuitable conditions in detention facilities, which were further highlighted by leaked surveillance footage showing inadequate facilities and oversight in the specific prison ward where she was held.

Furthermore, the morality police and law enforcement agencies have historically targeted transgender individuals based on their appearance. Recent allegations have included accusations of promoting immorality, leading to arrests and detentions. For instance, in Gonbad-e Kavus in April 2023, a citizen was detained on such charges. Additionally, State-affiliated media have been involved in propagating stigmatizing narratives, including releasing videos of “forced confessions” from five transgender individuals, casting further doubt on the fairness and transparency of legal proceedings against the LGBTQ+ community. The ultimate fate of these individuals remains unknown, underscoring the ongoing risks and uncertainties faced by the community.

Conversion Therapies

Conversion therapies, which are widely discredited by global health authorities, are still promoted and practiced, often under the guise of religious and psychological “treatment.” Dr. Davood Najafi Tavana, for instance, advertises conversion therapies on his website, offering medication, hypnotism, and aversion therapy as methods to change an individual’s sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual. Similarly, the Mehr news agency and the ISNA news agency have published claims supporting the efficacy of conversion therapy, despite widespread international condemnation of such practices. These actions are indicative of a broader societal and governmental stance that views homosexuality and diverse gender identities as disorders that need to be “cured” or “corrected,” further alienating and endangering the LGBTQ+ population.

The Organization of Psychology and Counseling, as the overseeing body for psychologists, does not take any action regarding the unscientific claims made by practitioners of conversion therapy. This is despite the fact that these so-called therapies have long-lasting or irreparable effects on individuals’ mental health, particularly adolescents. Among the responsibilities of this organization are issuing licenses and permits for members of the organization (psychologists and counselors) and monitoring the quality of their professional work.

Hate Speech

Hate speech against the LGBTQ+ community is rampant among high-ranking officials and media outlets in Iran. Historical and ongoing rhetoric from figures such as Ebrahim Raisi underscores the institutional disdain and disregard for LGBTQ+ rights. In a notable instance during a visit to Uganda in 2023, President Raisi criticized Western countries for promoting homosexuality, linking it to broader geopolitical conflicts and cultural wars. He stated, “Western countries are pressuring independent countries by attacking the family foundation, promoting the ugly phenomenon of homosexuality, spreading extremism and terrorism, and using human rights as a tool.” He further stated “This [homosexuality] is one of the dirtiest things that has happened in human history”, he even goes as far as saying homosexuality is created to “extinct humans”. His statements, alongside those of Vahid Yamin Pour, Secretary of the Supreme Council for Youth, who praised Uganda’s harsh anti-homosexuality laws, reflect a deep-seated animosity towards LGBTQ+ rights, both domestically and internationally.

The Urgent Need for Accountability and Reform

Iran’s legal framework and practices concerning homosexuality and in particular forced gender reaffirming surgery contravene several fundamental principles of international human rights law. These include the rights to life, privacy, freedom from torture and cruel treatment, bodily autonomy, and the principle of nondiscrimination.

The criminalization of homosexuality and importantly the imposition of the death penalty for consensual same-sex activities are severe violations of the right to life, as protected under Article 6 of the ICCPR. The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has consistently maintained, as noted in the general comment, that the death penalty should only be applied to the “most serious crimes,” a category that does not encompass consensual sexual relations. Furthermore, such criminalization on this ground constitutes an arbitrary interference with privacy.

Compulsory gender reaffirming surgeries infringe upon the right to health, which encompasses the right to make autonomous decisions regarding one’s body. This practice directly contravenes international human rights standards that protect individuals from non-consensual medical treatments and uphold their right to personal health decisions. The forced imposition of gender reaffirming surgeries on transgender individuals in this way amounts to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.

Finally, discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is prohibited by international human rights law. Iran’s laws target LGBTQ+ individuals, leading to systematic discrimination that violates their inherent dignity and equality.

The international community must support LGBTQ+ activists and pressure Iran to change its laws to meet international human rights standards and uphold its obligations. There must also be accountability for all past and ongoing violations.

By systematically identifying and discussing the roles of specific perpetrators and institutions, HRA seeks to underscore the accountability necessary for addressing human rights violations against LGBTQ+ individuals (as a persecuted group) in Iran.

In Iran, essential reforms must include decriminalizing homosexuality, abolishing the death penalty for consensual same-sex activities, and halting forced gender-reaffirming surgeries.

These changes are crucial to ensure that Iran respects and protects the fundamental human rights of all individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

As the international community continues to watch, these efforts must be supported and amplified to foster real and lasting change.

List of perpetrators mentioned in the Report  

Ebrahim Raisi: President of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Abbas Ghaderi: Former Head of the 45th branch of the Special Judicial Complex for non-litigious matters at the Public and Revolutionary Courts of Tehran

Alireza Nadali: Member and spokesperson of the Tehran Islamic Council

Ahmad Ahmadi-Sadr: CEO of the Welfare, Services, and Social Partnerships Organization of Tehran Municipality