November 2025 – Spreading Justice

Engines of Abuse: A Five Part Series II

Posted on November 26, 2025December 4, 2025 by Rez

This report marks the second in a series of five articles published by HRA through its Spreading Justice Project, dedicated to shedding light on the roles within the Iranian regime’s system that enable and sustain serious human rights violations, as well as violations of international law.

The Spreading Justice database currently contains over a thousand profiles of individuals and entities implicated in such abuses. This series aims not only to highlight who these individuals are and how the Spreading Justice project has documented their behavior, but also to examine how and why the positions they occupy perpetuate the entrenched cycle of repression and abuse. The series is published in the hope that a deeper understanding of the system of abuse will support ongoing efforts to hold Iran accountable and will also help shape recommendations for urgent reform.

Understanding the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences in the Iranian Legal System

In Iran’s criminal justice system, the judge responsible for enforcing sentences (known as the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences) plays a key role in implementing judicial rulings and overseeing the treatment of prisoners. This judge becomes involved after a person is convicted and begins serving their sentence, ensuring that the punishment is carried out as directed at sentencing. He also monitors the legal status and rights during imprisonment.

According to the Criminal Procedure Code passed in 2013 (1392)^[1], the enforcement of sentences of the incarcerated prisoners is the responsibility of the Prosecutor, and the “Department for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences,” under his supervision and authority, undertakes this responsibility in jurisdictions designated by the Head of the Judiciary within the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Additionally, the Department for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, or one of its units, can, with the approval of the Head of the Judiciary, be stationed in prisons or correctional institutions. In judicial districts (bakhsh), the enforcement of criminal sentences is the responsibility of the Head of the Court for the Enforcement of Sentences.

The duties of the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences, based on Article 489 of this code^{,^[2]}, are as follows:

(a) Issuing orders for the enforcement of enforceable criminal sentences and supervising the manner of their execution
(b) Supervising prisons in matters related to prisoners
(c) Providing opinions on prisoners eligible for pardon and conditional release in accordance with laws and regulations
(d) Granting leave to convicts based on laws and regulations
(e) Making decisions regarding elderly convicts, individuals with mental illness or serious physical conditions, and other convicted persons in need of special care and attention, such as authorizing their hospitalization in medical centers in accordance with relevant rules and regulations
(f) The performance of any other duties established by laws and regulations concerning the enforcement of punishments, or assigned to the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences or the Prison Supervisor.

It is worth noting that according to Article 494 of the same code^[3], the process of enforcing a sentence begins upon the order of the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences and cannot be halted unless explicitly stipulated by law.

Also, pursuant to Article 495 of the same Regulation, criminal judgments are executed by order and under the supervision of the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences. In cases where, according to the law, the execution of a judgment must be carried out by ministries, governmental institutions and companies, public non-governmental organizations, or other bodies explicitly named by law, the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences, while issuing the enforcement order and providing the necessary instructions, shall supervise the manner of execution and the actions taken by those entities.

Accordingly, the decision to carry out all sentences, including punishments such as execution, flogging, and amputation, is made by this judicial authority. Although the Judge for the Enforcement of Sentences does not determine the type of punishment (as this responsibility lies with the sentencing court), the final implementation of corporal punishments or the death penalty cannot proceed without the judge’s written order. This is in direct contradiction with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights^[4], to which Iran is a state party, and which strongly prohibits cruel and inhuman punishments such as flogging and amputation.

According to HRANA’s Statistics Department, the denial of medical care for prisoners has a documented history. 2,057 cases of denial of medical care have been documented between November 2022 and November 2025.

Most recently, according to HRANA^[5], between September 16 and 25, 2025, three women, including political prisoner Somayeh Rashidi, along with Soudabeh Asadi and Jamile Azizi, died in Qarchak Prison due to a lack of medical care.

Or in another case, HRANA reported that Ashkan Fahim, a political prisoner held in Mahabad Prison, has been denied medical furlough or transfer to medical facilities outside the prison despite suffering from heart disease and severe vision impairment^[6]. According to this report, the Mahabad prison infirmary lacks even the most basic medical facilities. Therefore, based on the decision of the Judge for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences to obstruct medical care for a sick prisoner constitutes a violation of the right to physical and mental health under Article 9 of the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners ^[7], which states that “Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.” It also contravenes the Nelson Mandela Rules^[8], particularly Rules 24, 25(1), and 27, which require prompt, adequate, and clinically independent medical care for all prisoners. This, among other internationally binding obligations.

Spreading Justice Database on Judges for the enforcement of the Sentences

Name	Current Position	Location
Zargar	Judge for the enforcement of the sentences of the Public and Revolutionary Justice Office of Mashhad	Mashhad
Mohammad Mehrdadi	Assistant Prosecutor and Head of Branch 1 of the Enforcement of Judgments Office of Evin Prosecutor’s Office”	Tehran
Esmatollah Jaberi	Assistant Prosecutor for the Enforcement of Criminal Judgments	Tehran

Name	Previous Position	Current Position	Location
Mohammad Nasiri-Pour	Judge of the Evin Prosecutor’s Office for the enforcement of those sentenced to death	Unknown	–
Amir-Hossein Tarian	Assistant Public Prosecutor of the first branch of the enforcement unit of the Evin Prosecutor’s Office (Holy Martyr)	Head and Investigator of the First Investigation Branch of Evin Prosecutor’s Office (Holy Martyr)	Tehran

^[1] “Iran Criminal Procedure Code (Ayin-e Dadresi Keyfari), Print Edition,” Ekhtebar (PDF), accessed 24 August 2025, https ://www .ekhtebar .ir /wp –content /uploads /2014/05/قانون –آئین –دادرسی –کیفری –پرینت .pdf.

^[2] Mizan Online, “Duties of the Criminal enforcement Judge,” published 04 Shahrivar 1402 (≈ 26 August 2023), Mizan Online, https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4731299/%D9%88%D8%B8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B6%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AD%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%B1%DB%8C.

^[3] “Iran Criminal Procedure Code (Ayin-e Dadresi Keyfari), Print Edition,” Ekhtebar (PDF), accessed 24 August 2025, https ://www .ekhtebar .ir /wp –content /uploads /2014/05/قانون –آئین –دادرسی –کیفری –پرینت .pdf.

^[4] “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” OHCHR, adopted 16 December 1966, accessed 24 August 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.

^[5] Hrana, “Qarchak Prison in Varamin: Consecutive Deaths Due to Lack of Medical Care and Treatment Facilities”, 25 September 2025, https://www.hra-news.org/2025/hranews/a-56792/

^[6] HRANA, “Deprivation of medical care for Ashkan Fahim in Mahabad prison,” published 29 July 2025, HRANA, https://www.hra-news.org/2025/hranews/a-55774/

^[7] “International standards on the right to physical and mental health”, UN, https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-health/international-standards-right-physical-and-mental-health

^[8] “The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners”, UN, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf

SJ Investigates: Nima Salehi, The Long Overlooked Ashiyane Co-Founder

Posted on November 24, 2025December 4, 2025 by Rez

Over the past year, HRA’s Spreading Justice project has conducted a detailed investigation into Nima (Alireza) Salehi, identified as a central but long-overlooked actor in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s cyber repression architecture. Operating under the alias Q7X, Salehi co-founded and held a senior leadership role within the Ashiyane Digital Security Team, one of the most influential cyber groups aligned with Iran’s security apparatus.

Unlike Ashiyane’s founder, Behrooz Kamalian, who has been sanctioned by multiple jurisdictions for cyberattacks supporting state repression, Salehi has never faced comparable scrutiny or accountability. Despite his documented involvement in activities enabling surveillance, censorship, intimidation, and violations of numerous human rights, he continues to benefit from unrestricted global mobility, as evidenced by his extensive travel across Europe, the United States, Asia, and Africa.

By publicly exposing Salehi’s record, Spreading Justice urges states and implementing bodies to address this critical blind spot and to take immediate action to prevent individuals and entities that currently or previously facilitated digital repression from operating freely across borders.

WHAT IS ASHIYANE?

Ashiyane, meaning “nest” in Persian, is an Iranian hacking and security group founded in 2002 by Behrooz Kamalian. Initially, a small team of skilled hackers, it rapidly expanded into one of the most recognized and influential hacking groups in Iran. The group gained prominence through widespread website defacements, including attacks on foreign government sites, and by identifying vulnerabilities in Iranian websites, positioning itself as active in both black hat and white hat hacking.

Over time, Ashiyane built a broader cyber ecosystem, including a training center, a security company, and hosting services. Its hacking and security courses at Sharif University of Technology, later formalized into their own program, reflect the group’s role in cultivating a generation of Iranian cyber operators. Ashiyane achieved global visibility, ranking second worldwide for website defacements on Zone-H and being named “Best Hacking Team.”

HRA’s research confirms that the group maintained structural links with the IRGC and Iran’s Cyber Police (FATA). These ties shielded Ashiyane from restrictions imposed on other hacking groups. Both Kamalian (known as “Behrooz_Ice”) and Salehi (7XQ) appeared on Iranian state television as senior representatives of the Ashiyane Digital Security Team.

In interviews, including with Deutsche Welle Persian, Kamalian attempted to portray Ashiyane as an independent private group. Yet his own statements reveal deep integration with Iran’s cybersecurity and security infrastructure: Ashiyane collaborated routinely with state institutions, conducted large-scale political hacks later credited as victories of “Iran’s Cyber Army,” and provided training to authorities. Regardless of its formal status, the group functioned as an extension of the Islamic Republic’s security and propaganda apparatus.

Findings from Recorded Future and ARTICLE 19 show that Ashiyane’s cyberattacks, defacements, DDoS operations, and surveillance training were deliberate components of a broader strategy of digital repression, designed to block independent information, silence dissent, and intimidate activists and journalists. These activities directly undermined freedom of expression, privacy, access to information, and freedom of association and peaceful assembly, facilitating downstream abuses such as arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment.

A comprehensive analysis published in Insight Turkey reinforces Ashiyane’s foundational role in Iran’s cyber infrastructure. Far from signaling a decline, the group’s eventual closure highlighted how deeply embedded it had been within the state’s cyber apparatus and the broader system of digital repression it enabled.

The UK and EU, in their 2011 designations of Kamalian, captured this clearly: Ashiyane was “responsible for intensive cyber attacks both on domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions,” assisting the regime’s crackdown that involved numerous serious human rights violations.

WHO IS BEHROOZ KAMALIAN?

Behrooz Kamalian, known as “Behrooz_Ice,” is widely recognized as the leading figure behind the Ashiyane Digital Security Team. Rising to notoriety in the mid-2000s through high-profile website defacements, he played a central role in developing Iran’s offensive cyber capabilities. Although he publicly minimized Ashiyane’s size, he acknowledged participating in politically motivated cyberattacks against American, European, and Israeli targets and maintaining cooperation with Iranian governmental and military institutions.

Iranian state-affiliated outlets attributed to him the hacking of hundreds to thousands of foreign websites in various campaigns. Cyber intelligence firms outside Iran consistently identify Kamalian as a pivotal actor in Iran’s hacker ecosystem.

In June 2018, his forum was permanently shut down, and reports surfaced of his potential arrest or the closure of Ashiyane’s office. Kamalian was sanctioned by the European Union on October 10, 2011, for his leading role in cyberattacks aimed at suppressing dissent during the post-election unrest, and was subsequently added to the United Kingdom’s consolidated sanctions list.

WHO IS NIMA (ALIREZA) SALEHI?

Nima Salehi, born November 24, year unknown, also known as Alireza Salehi, is an Iranian hacker and computer engineer who co-founded and served as the deputy leader of the Ashiyane Digital Security Team. A Blogfa post dated August 21, 2011, confirms he has used multiple names for more than a decade. Salehi studied computer security at the Alborz Technical and Engineering Institute.

*A few photos of Nima Salehi from various trips, taken from his public social media pages*

Although he appeared openly in state media alongside Kamalian, Salehi has managed to avoid public scrutiny, sanctions designations, and accountability measures that targeted others in the same network. He remains a key figure who has operated in plain sight, bypassing the consequences faced by his counterparts.

OPEN SOURCE PROFILES AND DIGITAL FOOTPRINT

HRA’s research identifies several active or traceable online profiles associated with Salehi that illustrate his continued visibility and transnational movement. Despite his role in a group tied to state repression, he maintains accessible accounts on at least Instagram, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Telegram.

His personal profiles show extensive international travel. His LinkedIn profile reflects efforts to build a professional identity within international networks, while his Facebook account remains linked to Ashiyane’s broader digital presence. A Telegram channel associated with him, while unverified, aligns with common platforms used within Iran’s cyber ecosystem.

Together, these profiles reinforce a consistent picture: Salehi remains publicly active, connected, and unimpeded, despite his documented involvement in cyber activities that facilitated state repression.

HOW IS SALEHI ASSOCIATED WITH ASHIYANE AND BEHROOZ KAMALIAN?

HRA’s research confirms that Nima Salehi was not a peripheral operator but a central actor in Ashiyane. As co-founder, senior administrator, and Kamalian’s close operational partner, Salehi shaped both the group’s cyber activities and its extensive training programs.

Under the alias 7XQ, his name appears repeatedly in defacement logs and hacker community records linked to Ashiyane’s operations. ARTICLE 19 documents that both Kamalian and Salehi taught “Hacking and Security” courses at Sharif University of Technology and later directed broader training programs, contributing directly to the development of Iran’s cyber capabilities.

Salehi’s public appearances with Kamalian on Iranian state television further confirm his senior role. Despite this visibility, he has managed to avoid the sanctions and accountability measures imposed on other actors in the same network across multiple jurisdictions.

Given his documented role within Ashiyane and his partnership with Kamalian, HRA calls on implementing bodies to take immediate action to ensure that Salehi is no longer able to move freely across borders while benefiting from complete impunity.

TRAVEL HISTORY OF NIMA (AlIREZA) SALEHI AS CONFIRMED BY SPREADING JUSTICE; March 2017 – May 2025

*Note, a larger pin denotes more frequent travel to the given location

For more information on Salehi, Ashiyane, or the documented association, please contact Spreading Justice directly via the Contact Us form at https://spreadingjustice.org/contact-us/

Endnotes

Spreading Justice, “Ashiyane Digital Security Team,” Spreading Justice – Human Rights Violators Database, https://spreadingjustice.org/group-violator/sj55990/
Poppy Jeffery and Michael Seymour, “Iranian hacker uploads dead baby image onto Bournemouth University servers,” The Independent, 18 March 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/iranian-hacker-uploads-dead-baby-image-onto-bournemouth-university-servers-9199261.html.
ARTICLE 19, The Soft War and Cyber Tactics in Iran, ARTICLE 19 (2017), https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38619/Iran_report_part_2-FINAL.pdf.
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, *Cyber-Terrorism Activities Report No. 4* (Oct. 1, 2013), pp. 24–31, JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09471.5.
ARTICLE 19. (2017). Tightening the net: Part 2 – The soft war and cyber tactics in Iran (33 pp.). Retrieved from https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38619/Iran_report_part_2-FINAL.pdf
Techrato, “Best hacking groups in Iran and the world,” Techrato, June 9, 2021, https://techrato.com/2021/06/09/best-hacking-groups-in-iran-and-the-world/.
The MEMRI Cyber Jihad Lab, “Assessing the Computer Network Operation (CNO) Capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran – A Study Review” (June 24, 2015), MEMRI, https://www.memri.org/reports/assessing-computer-network-operation-cno-capabilities-islamic-republic-iran-%E2%80%93-study-review-0.
DW Persian, “گروه امنیتی آشیانه یا ارتش سایبری ایران؟”, (17 September 2010) DW, https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/گروه-امنیتی-آشیانه-یا-ارتش-سایبری-ایران/a-6016017.
Insikt Group, “The History of Ashiyane: Iran’s First Security Forum,” Recorded Future (January 16, 2019), https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/ashiyane-forum-history.
Ersin Çahmutoğlu, *Iran’s Cyber Power* (Ankara: Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara [İRAM], April 2021), 40 pp., https://iramcenter.org/uploads/files/irans-cyber-power_1.pdf.
The MEMRI Cyber Jihad Lab, “Assessing the Computer Network Operation (CNO) Capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran – A Study Review” (June 24, 2015), MEMRI, https://www.memri.org/reports/assessing-computer-network-operation-cno-capabilities-islamic-republic-iran-%E2%80%93-study-review-0.
Gerdab.ir, “هک 1000 سایت توسط گروه آشیانه” (9 شهریور ۱۳۸۹ / 31 August 2010), https://gerdab.ir/fa/news/1956/هک-1000سایت-توسط-گروه-آشیانه.
خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی ایران (ایرنا), “سایت‌های رژیم صهیونیستی توسط یک گروه ایرانی هک شد” (۲۷ شهریور ۱۳۸۸)، ایرنا، https://www.irna.ir/news/7365500/.
گرداب، «هک ۱۰۰۰ سایت توسط گروه آشیانه» (۹ شهریور ۱۳۸۹)، گرداب، https://gerdab.ir/fa/news/1956/هک-1000سایت-توسط-گروه-آشیانه.
بولتن‌نیوز، «بهروز کمالیان؛ از هک ناسا و سایت‌های اسرائیلی تا جذب فالوور برای سلبریتی‌های دوزاری» (۱۶ آبان ۱۳۹۸)، بولتن‌نیوز، https://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/638760/.
خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی ایران (ایرنا), “سایت‌های رژیم صهیونیستی توسط یک گروه ایرانی هک شد” (۲۷ شهریور ۱۳۸۸)، ایرنا، https://www.irna.ir/news/7365500/.
European Commission, “Behrouz KAMALIAN,” EU Sanctions Tracker, designated under the Iran regime on 10 October 2011, EU financial sanctions (Regulation 2025/689), data.europa.eu, https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/6594.
Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “Assessing The Computer Network Operation (CNO) Capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran – A Study Review” (24 June 2015), MEMRI, https://www.memri.org/reports/assessing-computer-network-operation-cno-capabilities-islamic-republic-iran-%E2%80%93-study-review-0.
“Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 — Annexes (as in force on 31 December 2020),” *Legislation.gov.uk*, accessed 17 August 2025, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2011/359/annexes/2020-01-31.
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/689 of 4 April 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 2025/689 (7 April 2025), accessed 24 August 2025, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500689.
https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/18133348774262759/,
https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/17908216216300778/

Engines of Abuse: A Five-Part Series

Posted on November 19, 2025December 4, 2025 by Rez

Public and Revolutionary Prosecutors of Iran

This report marks the first in a series of five forthcoming articles published by HRA through its Spreading Justice project, dedicated to shedding light on the roles within the Iranian regime that enable and sustain serious human rights violations, as well as violations of international law. The Spreading Justice database currently contains over a thousand profiles of individuals and entities implicated in systematic violations. This series aims not only to highlight who these individuals are and how the Spreading Justice project has documented their behavior, but also to examine how and why the positions they occupy perpetuate the entrenched cycle of repression and abuse. The series is published in the hope that a deeper understanding of the system of abuse will support ongoing efforts to hold Iran accountable and will also help shape recommendations for urgent reform.

Understanding the role of the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor in Iran

The prosecutor serves as the representative of society before the court, with key responsibilities that include issuing indictments and overseeing the enforcement of judicial punishments^[1]. He also supervises investigations and exercises administrative oversight over the implementation of judgments, meaning his deep involvement in the many cases marked by fair trial violations is inherent to the role.

Organizational Structure of the Prosecution Office

Prosecutors in Iran are generally classified into three levels based on their position and hierarchy, as follows

Prosecutor General
Provincial Capital Prosecutor, for example, Ali-Akbar Alishah, see Spreading Justice profile here
County Prosecutor, for example, Mehdi Amadeh, see Spreading Justice profile here

Each of these prosecutors is responsible for supervising the actions of their subordinate prosecutors:

The Prosecutor of the provincial capital county supervises county prosecutors within that province.
The Prosecutor General supervises all prosecutors nationwide

Duties of the Prosecutor

All activities within the prosecutor’s office are carried out under the prosecutor’s supervision. The prosecutor’s judicial responsibilities are organized into several main categories, including:

Handling offenses involving public rights and interests
Offenses that concern public rights or interests do not require a private complainant. For instance, certain violations tied to public order or decency are pursued by prosecutors without the need for a private complaint, with both administrative and criminal dimensions. In such cases, the prosecutor holds the authority to initiate proceedings and ensure the matter is addressed.
Handling complaints of pardonable (private) offenses at the victim’s request
These offenses are pursued only if the victim files a complaint. Once the complaint is submitted, the prosecutor is obligated to take action and address the matter.^[2]
Issuing Indictments
A core responsibility of the prosecutor is to prepare and issue an indictment. In Iran’s mixed system, the prosecutor directs the investigation, while the investigating judge conducts interrogations and oversees evidence gathering. Once the investigating judge submits the report confirming that the investigation is complete and the accused has been informed of the charges, the prosecutor drafts the indictment and submits it to the court to initiate the trial.^[3]

Oversight of Punishment Enforcement

According to the regulations on the implementation of punishments such as hadd penalties, capital punishment, limb amputation, qisas (retribution in kind) for life and limb, injury compensation (diyat), flogging, exile, banishment, compulsory residence, and prohibiting residence in particular areas^[4]:

According to Article 31^[5], punishments involving capital punishment, stoning, qisas for limb, and limb amputation are carried out under the continuous and direct supervision of the prosecutor.
According to Article 15^[6], in cases where a sentence has been issued for public execution at a designated location, if the court has not specified the area, the place of execution is determined by the proposal of the criminal sentence enforcement judge and the approval of the prosecutor.

Case Study: Isfahan House

A striking example of the Prosecutor’s conduct can be seen in the actions of the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan County, Seyed Mohammad Mousavian^[7]. Acting in his official capacity, Mousavian issued the indictment against the defendants in the Isfahan House case^[8] following the nationwide protests of 2022. This indictment ultimately led to the executions of Saleh Mirhashemi, Majid Kazemi, and Saeed Yaghoubi.

The executions were carried out despite the release of an audio file^[9] in which Majid Kazemi made clear that he had been tortured, threatened, and subjected to sexual abuse during interrogation. These coerced confessions, extracted in flagrant violation of both Iranian law and international human rights standards, became the foundation for the indictment and subsequent death sentences.

By relying on statements obtained through torture, the prosecutor not only failed in his duty to uphold justice but also actively contravened one of his most fundamental legal obligations: to ensure that indictments are not based on evidence obtained under coercion. This conduct represents not simply a lapse in judgment but a profound violation of law, contributing directly to the wrongful and arbitrary deprivation of life. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident, but rather part of a broader and routine pattern in the Iranian judiciary.

Spreading Justice Information on Public and Revolutionary Prosecutors of the Past and Present

Name	Current Position	Link	Location
Jalal Afaghi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Ardabil County	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj19847/	Ardabil
Ali-Akbar Alishah	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Sari	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj41692/	Sari
Mahmoud Espanlou	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Golestan Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67398/	Gorgan
Behrouz Abbasi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Zanjan County	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj80807/	Zanjan
Abdolvahab Bakhshandeh	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of the Capital of Ilam Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj60705/	Ilam
Babak Mahboub Alilu	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of East Azerbaijan Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj66354/	Tabriz
Mahdi Bakhshi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Kerman Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj59765/	Kerman
Seyed Mohammad Mousavian	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj42878/	Isfahan
Hasan Madadi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Alborz Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj03152/	Karaj
Mehdi Amadeh	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office of Dezful	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj29158/	Dezful
Alireza Rezapour	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Saqqez	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj77936/	Saqqez
Seyed-Ali Malek-Hosseini	Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Provincial General and Revolutionary Prosecutor – Yasuj City	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj70841/	Yasuj
Iraj Jahantigh Fard	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Zabol	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj54053/	Zabol
Moslem Almasi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Dorud County	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj24392/	Dorud
Mehdi Mohammadi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Shahriar County	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj84171/	Shahriar
Hossein Majidi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of West Azerbaijan – Urmia	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj69585/	Urmia
Jafar Sedighi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Sabzevar	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj39390/	Sabzevar
Mohammad Jabbari	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Kurdistan Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj67273/	Sanandaj
Mehdi Shamsabadi	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Sistan and Baluchestan	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj96508/	Zahedan
Mohammad Movahedi Azad	Attorney General of the country	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj38604/	Tehran
Sadegh Jafari Chegeni	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Center of Khuzestan Province, Ahvaz County	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj97277/	Ahvaz

Name	Previous Position	Current Position	Link	Location
Ebrahim Ansari	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Lahijan County	Deputy for Judicial Affairs of the Head of the General and Revolutionary Courts of Rasht County	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj76989/	Rasht
Seyed Mahdi Falahmiri	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Gilan province	Judicial Deputy of the Gilan Province Judiciary	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj05101/	Rasht
Mehrab Pourakbar	General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Mahabad	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj51073/	Unknown
Hassan Khanjani Movaghar	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Hamedan Province	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj94718/	Unknown
Akbar Sobhani	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Bandar Anzali City	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj70283/	Unknown
Esmail Molakarimi	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Babol City	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj50244/	Unknown
Mohammad Reza Ebrahimi	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Nowshahr City	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj49953/	Unknown
Yar Mohammad Resalati Khah	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Izeh City	Head of the Justice Department of Ramshir County	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj82195/	Ramshir
Rabiullah Ghorbani	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Markazi province	Chief Justice of the Public and Revolutionary Courts of Tehran Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj04363/	Tehran
Hossein Rajabi	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Qazvin Province	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj27198/	Unknown
Ali Hassanpour	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Bushehr province	Assistant Prosecutor of the Supreme Court’s Prosecutor’s Office	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj04196/	Tehran
Alireza Ahmadi Manesh	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Hormozgan Province	Head of the Appeals Court of Mazandaran Province	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj04655/	Sari
Mohammad-Hossein Doroudi	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Khorasan Razavi Province	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj94338/	Unknown
Mahdi Mohammadi	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Amol city in Mazandaran province	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj52571/	Unknown
Mojtaba Mahmoodi	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Piranshahr city in West Azerbaijan province	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj63140/	Unknown
Asghar Noei	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Naghadeh city in West Azerbaijan	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj75888/	Unknown
Seyed-Mostafa Bahreini	Former General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Fars Province	Unknown	https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj86679/	Unknown

^[1] IRIB News, “Who Is the Prosecutor and What Are Their Duties?,” IRIB News Agency, published 30 November 2020, https ://www .iribnews .ir /fa /news /2938776/دادستان –کیست –و –چه –وظایفی –دارد.

^[2] Ibid

^[3] Ibid

^[4] Ekhtebar, “Regulation on the Implementation of Hadd Punishments, Death Penalty, Amputation, Qisas for Life and Limb, Bodily Injuries, Blood Money (Diyat), Flogging, Exile, Banishment, Mandatory Residence, and Prohibition from Residence in Certain Places,” published June 20, 2019, Ekhtebar, https://www.ekhtebar.ir/%D8%A2%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AD%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%8C-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%AD/.

^[5]Ibid

^[6]Ibid

^[7] Spreading Justice, “Seyed Mohammad Mousavian (Violator ID: sj42878),” Spreading Justice – Human Rights Violators Database, last updated 20 June 2025, https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj42878/.

^[8] Hrana, “Saleh Mirhashemi, Majid Kazemi and Saeed Yaghoubi Executed” published May 19, 2023. https://www.en-hrana.org/saleh-mirhashemi-majid-kazemi-and-saeed-yaghoubi-executed/.

^[9] Hrana, “HRANA’s report on the ambiguous case of the defendants of the Isfahan House / Documents from the case” published May 14, 2023.
https://www.hra-news.org/2023/hranews/a-41118/.