Category: Reports-en

Bloody Friday of Zahedan: A Convergence of National Outrage and Baloch Repression

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)
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Summary

It has been one year since Iranian authorities unleashed a brutal barrage of lethal force on Baloch citizens living in Zaheden. During the nationwide protests of 2022 in Iran sparked by the tragic death in detention of Mahsa (Zhina) Amini, Zahedan witnessed a brutal crackdown on September 30, 2022. As protestors converged at the Great Mosalla of Zahedan after the Friday prayers, the Iranian security forces unleashed a barrage of live ammunition, metal pellets, and tear gas, resulting in significant casualties. This tragedy, now known as the “Bloody Friday of Zahedan,” has come to symbolize the Iranian authorities’ increasing disdain for the sanctity of human life and the broader struggles of the Baloch community in the country.

Baloch Persecution in Iran

The Baloch community in Iran, primarily residing in the country’s southeastern region, including Sistan and Baluchestan, has faced longstanding socio-economic and political marginalization. As a Sunni Muslim minority in a predominantly Shiite nation, the Baloch people have often grappled with ethnic and religious discrimination.

  • Economic Disparities: Sistan and Baluchestan, despite being one of the country’s largest provinces, is also among the most impoverished. Basic amenities like water, electricity, and healthcare remain inaccessible to many. The unemployment rate is significantly higher than the national average. The systemic economic deprivation has fueled grievances and driven a wedge between the Baloch populace and the central government.
  • Political Marginalization: The Balochs have limited representation in Iran’s political system. Policies decided in Tehran often overlook the unique needs and challenges of the Baloch community. The absence of substantial Baloch representation means their voice often goes unheard in policy-making corridors.
  • Religious Discrimination: As Sunni Muslims in the Shia-majority Iran and the Shia regime, the Baloch have faced religious discrimination. This is evident in their limited access to religious education, restrictions on building Sunni mosques, and harassment of Sunni clerics.
  • Cultural Suppression: The Iranian government’s policy towards minorities, including the Baloch, leans towards forced assimilation. Baloch traditions, languages, and customs often face suppression. The state’s educational system rarely offers courses in the Balochi language, thus slowly eroding the community’s linguistic heritage.
  • Human Rights Abuses: Arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings have been reported in the Baloch region. The region’s volatile security situation, partly due to its border with Pakistan and Afghanistan, is often used as a pretext for these violations.

Nationwide Protests in Iran

The death in detention of Mahsa (Zhina) Amini in September 2022, after a traumatic incident with Iran’s “morality” police, catalyzed a series of demonstrations. This 22-year-old’s fate swiftly became emblematic of broader frustrations with the Iranian regime’s repressive policies. Protests titled “Woman, Life, Freedom” or “Mahsa Amini” protests erupted outside Kasra Hospital in Tehran and rapidly swept across all 31 provinces, including Sistan and Baluchestan. While these protests were ignited by Mahsa’s death, their scope widened to challenge the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Zahedan’s Bloody Friday: An In-depth Account

Zahedan, the capital of Sistan and Baluchestan province, became the focal point of global attention on September 30, 2022, an event now seared into collective memory as “Bloody Friday.” Here, national grief over Mahsa Amini’s tragic death converged with regional anger due to the alleged sexual assault of a 15-year-old Baloch girl by a high-ranking police officer, Ebrahim Kouchakzai.

Bloody Friday Unfolds: On September 30, 2022, thousands gathered, their chants echoing a shared sentiment of a desire for justice and change. The vast expanse of the Great Mosalla of Zahedan became a sea of protestors, peacefully raising their concerns.

However, evident by the decision to block exit routes, and their elevated positions above the emerging crowds, security forces had preemptively planned a violent crackdown. As protestors congregated, security forces units took positions on strategic rooftops surrounding the Mosalla, the nearby Makki Mosque, and Police Station number 16 near the Mosalla. As the crowd’s momentum grew, security forces began indiscriminately firing tear gas canisters, live ammunition, and pallets upon the civilian population. 

Protestors, including women, children, and the elderly, were caught in the open barrage. Many tried to flee, but the security forces shot the protesters from the rooftops surrounding the area. Blood stained the grounds of the Mosalla. 

The Aftermath: The brutal crackdown lasted hours, but its impact will be felt for generations. Immediate reports were chaotic, with the numbers of the dead and injured fluctuating. However, reliable sources estimate that approximately 100 individuals were killed including at least 10 juveniles under the age of 18 with hundreds more injured. Some were trampled in the stampede attempting to escape, while others were direct victims of the gunfire.

In the immediate aftermath, Zahedan was in shock. But as the days progressed, the city, and indeed the wider Baloch community, rallied. This tragedy became a symbol, uniting various groups against what they saw as the unchecked brutality of the Iranian regime.

Despite the violence of Bloody Friday, the spirit of the protestors was not broken. In the weeks that followed, Zahedan saw more protests, namely after Friday prayers, signaling an ongoing resistance and a refusal to let the events of September 30 be forgotten.

Legacy of Bloody Friday

Zahedan’s Bloody Friday is more than just an event—it’s now a symbol of resistance against oppression in Iran and globally. The international community expressed horror and condemnation, with human rights organizations demanding a thorough and impartial investigation into the actions of the Iranian security forces. While tragic, the events of that day have solidified a call for change, justice, and an end to systemic and oppressive violence.

September 30th, 2022 saw a brutal display of excessive use of force against civilians that ultimately escalated to the use of lethal force.  It is evident there were no considerations of proportionality taken into account. The security forces’ decision to block exit routes additionally suggests heinous premeditation. 

These actions constitute a clear violation of international human rights law. Iran, as a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is bound by its provisions. Article 6 of the ICCPR stipulates that “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their life.” Furthermore, Article 7 prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. It is well-established by the United Nations and other international bodies that these rights extend to police and other security forces.

In situations where a protest escalates to a point where the use of force may be necessary, security officers are still obligated to respect and preserve human life. Firearms should only be used in self-defence or in defence of others.

In response to the distressing reports of sexual assault and rape allegedly committed by security forces in this city, it is imperative that the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission, in line with its mandate, conducts a swift and thorough investigation into the sexual abuse of women and girls in the context of the protests. This mandate also urges the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights and to take all measures necessary to stop and prevent extrajudicial killings, other forms of arbitrary deprivation of life, enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including against peaceful protesters. 

Conclusion

Zahedan’s Bloody Friday is a stark reminder of the intersection of broader national issues with specific regional grievances. As Iranians across the nation stood up to voice their discontent with the government’s oppressive policies, in Zahedan, the Baloch community, already marginalized, found their struggles magnified. Their calls for justice, both for Mahsa and their native daughter, met with bullets and gas, some lethal. As the world grapples with these events, it underscores the importance of understanding regional dynamics within broader national movements. The people of Zahedan, and by extension, the Baloch community, seek justice for the events of September 30 and an end to decades of systemic neglect and oppression.

The Imperative of Identifying Perpetrators: Ensuring Accountability in the Zahedan Massacre

The acts that transpired on Bloody Friday in Zahedan are not just isolated events; they are emblematic of deeper systemic issues related to governance, control, and the exercise of power. The violence unleashed upon protestors affronts fundamental human rights principles and international laws. Identifying the perpetrators is essential to uphold human rights and protect civil society’s very fabric. Here’s why:

1. Upholding Justice: Justice is a universal principle transcending borders and cultures. For the families of the victims and the injured, knowing who was responsible for the tragedy provides a sense of closure and a belief that their sufferings have been acknowledged. It is a step towards healing, both for individuals and the community at large.

2. Accountability and Deterrence: Holding those responsible accountable sends a clear message to other potential violators: that such acts will not go unpunished. This, in turn, serves as a deterrent, ensuring that such heinous acts are not repeated.

4. Promotion of Human Rights: The global community looks to human rights organizations as watchdogs and protectors of universal rights. Their proactive role in such incidents affirms their commitment to these ideals and strengthens the global human rights framework.

5. Creating Historical Record: A historical record is created by documenting the details and holding individuals accountable. This ensures that future generations know of past mistakes and that history doesn’t repeat itself. More so, while some perpetrators might be able to escape justice and remain safe within the current government, this historical record ensures that in the future, when the opportunity arises, their actions are not forgotten, and justice can be served.

Identifying the Perpetrators 

Several sources and witnesses have begun identifying critical actors involved in the Zahedan massacre. Some of the names mentioned include: (click on each name to read their full profile and involvement in the human rights violations) 

  1. 1. Hossein Modares Khiabani – Governor of Baluchestan at the time
    2. Mohammad Karami – Governor of Sistan and Baluchestan province.
    3. Abozar Mahdi Nakhai – The acting governor of Zahedan and governor of Zahedan county
    4. Ali Shabani – deputy governor of Sistan and Baluchestan and special governor of Iranshahr city at the time
    5. Saheb-Gol Salehi – Governor of Khash County
    6. Salman Borhani – Governor of Bampur County
    7. Mahmoud Saadati – Police Command of Zahedan
    8. Ahmad Taheri – Police Command of Baluchestan at the time
    9. Habib Razdar – Police command of Khash county
    10. Alireza Sayad – Police Command of Bampour
    11. Ali Sarhadi – Sistan and Baluchestan province chief of police deputy for intelligence and public security. According to Haal Vsh this person has personally been present in Police Station 16 near the Makki Mosque on September 30, 2022 when the massacre happened and encouraged the killing of people.
    12. Ahmad Shafahi – Commander of Salman Revolutionary Guard Corps in Sistan and Baluchestan Province
    13. Ahmad Maldar – Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Saravan
    14. Seyed Mohammad Azami – Deputy Operations Commander of Quds Base of IRGC Ground Forces. According to Haal Vsh, Mohammad Azami was personally present in the Makki Mosque on September 30, 2022, when the massacre happened and encouraged the killing of people.
    15. Hamze Dehghan – Chief of Information Protection of Quds Corps in the province. (Haalvsh, 2023).
    16. Morteza Jokar – Deputy Commander of the Provincial Police Force (Haalvsh, 2023).
    17. Hossein Ghanbari – Head of the Second Branch of Shahid Nouri Judicial Complex (Zahedan General Court)
    18. Majid Moalemzadeh Ansari – General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Chabahar at the time
    19. Morteza Piri – The head of Zahedan Prison
    20. Mehdi Shamsabadi – General and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Sistan and Baluchestan
    21. Ali Mostafavinia – Chief Justice of Sistan and Baluchestan
    22. Mohammad Hossein Khosravi – General Directorate of Prisons in Sistan and Baluchestan Province
    23. Abouzar Mohammadpour – The head of the protection and intelligence department of the prisons of Sistan and Baluchestan
    24. Nik-Mohammad Balouch-Zehi – Information and Communications Technology department of Sistan and Baluchestan

This list is not comprehensive. HRA’s Spreading Justice database of Human Rights Perpetrators, together with its partners, remains dedicated to documenting the full list of individuals involved in the use of lethal force against civilians on September 30th, 2022. Should you have any information that may help in identifying those involved please contact: [email protected]

Iran’s New Hijab Bill Stirs Controversy and Concern

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)

Table of Contents

Iran's New Hijab Bill Stirs Controversy and Concern
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Background

Human Rights Activists (HRA) has worked to diligently monitor the escalating human rights issues in Iran over the past 12 months. The commemoration of Mahsa Amini’s tragic passing and the subsequent widespread protests have prompted Iran to intensify its crackdown on activists. This has resulted in the arrests of prominent figures, campaigners, and numerous individuals, including family members of protestors. Furthermore, recent legislative developments in Iran have raised significant alarms, drawing attention not only nationally but also internationally, particularly in light of the recently passed hijab bill. This report aims to delve into the ramifications of such legislation on the daily lives of Iranian citizens, with a particular focus on its impact on women.

In addition to our apprehensions about the enforcement of the Hijab Bill, we have closely observed the disconcerting actions of 2,500 active Basij members and 650 student Basij members over the past year. These individuals have played an alarming role in suppressing civil protests and stifling voices of dissent within universities. Moreover, this report seeks to address the broader context of discrimination against women in Iran, examining how this oppressive environment affects their rights and freedoms. By doing so, we aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the systematic human rights abuses occurring at various levels of society.

Objectives

The primary objective of this report is to conduct a comprehensive human rights assessment of the hijab bill and to document its wide-ranging impact on various facets of Iranian society. Equally important is our objective to unveil the repressive actions of specific Basij members, thereby elucidating the intricate connection between legislative measures and their enforcement through suppressive tactics.

Methodology

In order to maintain the highest level of precision and credibility HRA employed meticulous methodologies. These included an in-depth examination of parliamentary debates, analysis of media reports, interviews with individuals directly impacted, and a thorough review of leaked documents and internal memos. Additionally, we conducted a comprehensive audit of 2,500 active Basij members and the 650 student Basij members to meticulously document their roles in quelling protest and asses their alignment with the  principles outlined in the hijab bill

Data Collection and Sources

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the extensive reach of the hijab law and the actions of  Basij members, HRA engaged in  consultations with a diverse group of sources. This  inclusive approach encompassed government publications, articles, reports issued by international organizations, and first hand testimonies from Iranian citizens. We are committed to transparency, and as such, the annex contains the list in its entirety. It includes the 180 names encompassing members of parliament and institutions that played a role in the approval of the bill. The names of Basij members are held confidentially and have been shared with partners alongside requested action.

Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab

Just shy of the anniversary of the death of Mahsa Zhina Amini, which ignited widespread protests throughout Iran, the Iranian Judiciary has approved a new, more stringent Hijab and Chastity bill. The original bill contained 15 clauses; however, following a rigorous amendment process by the Parliamentary Judiciary Committee, the bill has expanded from 15 articles to 70 and has been rebranded as the ‘Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab.’ Human Rights Activists (HRA) has conducted an in-depth investigation uncovering more than 180 individuals and institutions connected to the endorsement of the bill in some form from its inception to present day. Additionally, through a thorough analysis of the available articles HRA has identified those responsible for the implementation of the bill across society once final approval has been obtained.

Where does the bill stand today?

The recent revisions to Iran’s hijab laws have led to stricter penalties for those who fail to adhere to them. These amendments encompass various aspects of public life, particularly concerning gender segregation. This is notably applicable to institutions such as universities, public offices, parks, and specific sections of hospitals. The bill, which has recently been approved by the  Judicial Committee of the Parliament, now awaits the vote by the Internal Committee to determine its experimental implementation. However, before setting the date for the implementation The Guardian Council; this unelected power council of 12 men, that recently re-elected a 97-year-old cleric, will be deciding the fate of 85 million Iranians. They are tasked with reviewing the bill’s provisions, ensuring their alignment with Islamic Law. Once endorsed, the bill will return to the parliament for the determination of its commencement date. The bill is likely to come into force early October 2023.

The vote by the Internal Committee is occurring because the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran convened an open session where representatives collectively decided to propose the review of the contentious “Chastity and Hijab Bill” within the internal commission, thus removing it from the public discussion arena. This step, guided by Article 85 of the constitution, led to the transfer of the bill’s examination to a dedicated group of representatives.

However, critics raised concerns about the lack of transparency, asserting that the public is being excluded from crucial discussions that significantly impact their lives. A similar approach was used for the highly contentious and draconian internet bill, Iranians are too often kept in the dark about processes containing their vital rights. Consequently, discussions surrounding the bill’s approval will not be broadcasted through mass media platforms, including the radio, television, and newspapers. Among the assembly’s 238 representatives, a majority of 175 voted in favor of this decision, while 49 expressed opposition, and five abstained.

What does the bill seek to achieve?

The issue of mandatory hijab remains a focal point, with conservative elements closely monitoring its development. In recent years, a significant number of Iranian women have vocally expressed their dissent against the imposition of compulsory hijab. Notably, the tragic death of Mahsa Zhina Amini during an arrest by the morality police triggered widespread protests across the nation. Amid the discussion of the proposal, one of its architects officially acknowledged that if debated in the public assembly session, the bill’s “non-approval” was likely due to over 1,600 amendments registered by 59 representatives. Consequently, the bill’s approval within the commission was presented as a prudent solution to address its “urgent” implementation. Earlier, a member of the Assembly’s Legal and Judicial Commission emphasized the urgency of addressing the matter, given the worsening situation, to avert an irreversible crisis that could potentially engulf the nation.

The enforcement of these laws involves a significant technological dimension, with cyberspace playing a pivotal role. The sharing of videos and photos underscores the importance of adhering to hijab regulations. To ensure widespread adherence, the Basij organization has been tasked with educating its members, referred to as Basijis, to instill the principles of encouraging good behavior and discouraging wrongdoing. This preparation empowers them to address situations involving individuals who do not adhere to hijab requirements, both in physical and virtual environments.

In addition to this alarming technological emphasis, an invasive system has been imposed, enabling citizens to denounce cases of women deviating from the mandated veil standards by submitting visual proof. This regressive approach exploits technology to expedite the enforcement of hijab laws, intensifying the severity of control mechanisms.

Scrutiny about the use of AI and other forms of technology is significant. There are serious right to privacy concerns woven into many layers of the bill itself. In scenarios involving the public application of AI, the likelihood of misuse becomes all but inevitable. The utilization of AI technology also raises concerns about its potential to impede the principle of free speech, potentially enabling control over Iranians’ online experiences. This concern is amplified by the absence of well-defined data privacy laws in Iran, potentially granting the Iranian government access to individuals’ private lives.

Evidently, the Iranian government prioritizes censorship and surveillance, demonstrating a willingness to employ extensive measures to monitor citizens, particularly targeting women. The internet stands as a vital sanctuary for many, offering a space where they can openly share and articulate their thoughts. An Iranian journalist conveyed to HRA: “Technology could potentially become a tool of oppression. Surveillance cameras, drones, and AI systems might monitor our every move, further limiting our freedoms.”

The amendments also detail penalties for businesses that fail to comply with these regulations. Article 41 outlines that a third-degree cash penalty or an amount equivalent to three months of profits from the business’s income may be imposed. This includes online activists who may run afoul of the rules. Furthermore, Article 45 pertains to the import, production, distribution, or sale of prohibited clothing items. The penalty outlined here consists of a fourth-degree cash penalty or an amount twice the customary value of the involved property. For repeat violations, the penalty can escalate up to a third-degree cash penalty or four times the customary value of the property.

Gender segregation has taken a central role in the new law, encompassing various aspects. The law advocates for the expansion of women’s universities and campuses. Moreover, hospitals and health centers are directed to uphold Sharia privacy boundaries between male and female employees and establish distinct environments for medical services. A female doctor expressed to HRA her viewpoints on the bill stating, ‘​​Medicine is about healing, without bias. This bill introduces a bias, evaluating us not for our skills but our attire’ and ‘Every day, as I don my white coat, the bill reminds me that I’m judged not for my competence but compliance’  Article 18 further mandates municipalities and village administrators not only to promote hijab awareness but also to enforce gender segregation within parks, reserving a minimum of twenty percent of such areas for women’s use. In coastal cities, these entities are additionally required to construct segregated swimming areas and address environmental health concerns along the shorelines.

Speaking with HRA, a university student remarked ‘​​The recent hijab bill leaves me deeply dismayed and heartbroken. Our prolonged and passionate protests seemed to have fallen on deaf ears. A progressive future I had envisioned for our country feels farther away now.’’

In summary, the recent amendments to Iran’s hijab laws signify more severe penalties for noncompliance, extending to various facets of public life, supported by technological initiatives and specific punitive measures for businesses. These amendments underscore the government’s resolve to enforce stricter adherence to the hijab regulations in both physical and virtual domains.

Public Opinion of Officials

Despite the stringent nature of the bill, there are parliamentary members and other government officials who perceive it as insufficiently robust. For instance, Javad Mojtahed Shabestari, a Member of the Assembly of Experts, emphasized the need to consider the perspectives of clerics and academic elites. He also called for the inclusion of viewpoints from hijab and cultural activists. Ali Moalemi, the Representative of Mazandaran Province in the Assembly of Leadership Experts and Friday Imam of Qaim Shahr, deemed the penalties to be inadequate. He advocated for corporal punishment, specifically whipping, instead of fines. Hasan Norouzi, the Vice Chairman of the Judicial and Legal Committee of the Parliament, opined that, in general, the bill demonstrated a lack of strength and favored individuals who do not adhere to the principles of Hijab.

Conversely, several parliamentary members firmly endorse the bill and are eager for its swift implementation. Mohammad Hossein Farhandi, a parliament member, expressed, “Our concern lies in anticipating the approval and subsequent enactment of this bill.” Mohammad Rashidi, another parliament member, asserted, “We should aim to promote observance of hijab, especially among the youth, by generating content that emphasizes modesty and hijab.” A comprehensive list of such endorsements can be found in the annex to this report.

Entities Responsible for Implementing the Legislation

HRA, through careful examination of the bill, has successfully identified several ministries that will be responsible for carrying out crucial executive functions. These ministries cover various aspects of society, such as Education, Industries and Mines, Interior, Science, Research, and Technology, among others that are listed below. According to Chapter 2, Article 4 of the newly introduced bill, all the aforementioned institutions have a mandate to incorporate Islamic values into their educational efforts, particularly emphasizing the significance of marital commitment and cultivating a culture of modesty and hijab. Collaboration with Islamic Propaganda Organizations is expected in order to develop and implement programs aimed at promoting a ‘family-oriented Islamic Lifestyle’ and fostering the values of modesty and hijab.

With the bill now soon to be enacted, each institution will be required to formulate operational benchmarks and evaluations within a three-month timeframe. These evaluations will then be submitted to the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution for approval. This chapter also delineates specific objectives that each Ministry must adhere to.

For instance, the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology is tasked with integrating the principles of modesty and hijab within the general courses offered by universities. The Ministry is also charged with establishing and expanding dedicated university campuses for women while advancing the concept of a family-centered Islamic lifestyle.

A teacher, in a conversation with HRA said ‘I worry for my students, especially the girls. They’re at an impressionable age, and this bill sends them a message that their choices are secondary.’. He is worried that the morality police’s influence can introduce biases in the place of learning.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Trade is responsible for overseeing clothing production units, especially during the design and manufacturing phases. It is obligatory for them to support the establishment of permanent stores specializing in hijab essentials, with associated discounts on company fees. The Ministry is also mandated to ensure adherence to modesty principles and to arrange training sessions and workshops on family-oriented Islamic lifestyles and the culture of modesty and hijab for guilds seeking licensure.

Evidently, the comprehensive scope of the new bill encompasses various sectors of society. Numerous ministries are compelled to take proactive steps as outlined by the bill, and are deeply involved in promoting its principles within their respective domains of operation.

Unmasking Basij Members

Alongside government entities, the Basij has also been given new responsibilities with  the hijab law. The Basij is a paramilitary force of men and women under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). They play a central role in the suppression of protests. In November 2021, for example, the Basij was deployed to the streets of Tehran to crack down on protests against the government’s economic policies. The Basij reportedly used tear gas, batons, and live ammunition to disperse the protesters, and several people were killed. The Basij has been accused of numerous human rights abuses, including torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. It has also been accused of using excessive force against protesters, including women and children.

Given the assertive character of the Basij’s conduct, the authority conferred upon them in the  Hijab bill is deeply disconcerting. The Basij serves as an instrument of the IRGC to uphold law and order, prosecute dissidents, control media censorship, and suppress protests. Without effective oversight, they possess the unchecked capacity to employ excessive force against the populace and persist in receiving commendation from the Iranian government.

The Student Basij

In addition to the Basij, the Human Rights Activists (HRA) also perceives the Student Basij as a highly influential instrument in suppressing democratic movements in Iran. This influence primarily stems from the deeply ingrained ideological indoctrination they receive during their training, which instills unwavering loyalty to the Supreme leaders and prepares them for future roles within the government and security apparatus.

Notably, the Student Basij operates officially under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a formidable entity with considerable power and sway in Iran. This university-based organization was established by the directive of Iran’s founding figure, Ayatollah Khomeini, with its central mission being the defense of the revolutionary principles and the prevailing political system. Over time, the Student Basij has gained notoriety for its involvement in violent clashes with protesters, engaging in espionage activities, and facilitating state-sanctioned repressive actions against student movements. A significant number of its members transition into prominent governmental and security positions after completing their academic tenure.

The aftermath of Mahsa Amini’s tragic death sparked widespread protests within Iranian universities, prompting the active participation of the Student Basij on campuses. Their involvement encompassed physical altercations with demonstrators, collecting student information for security forces, and aiding in the detention of students deemed dissenters. The Student Basij’s history of suppression dates back at least to 1999, marking a long-standing pattern of quelling dissenting voices.

It is important to note that a substantial number of young Iranians have been actively engaged in protesting, often using the act of not wearing hijabs as a symbol of rebellion and defiance. When examining the individuals facing death sentences as a result of these protests, a significant majority fall below the age of 30. Given the substantial involvement of young Iranians in these protests, the role played by the Student Basij becomes increasingly pivotal for the IRGC in intensifying their crackdown on these demonstrations and identifying individuals who do not adhere to new laws and regulations.

Consequences

The consequences of the expanded role of the Basij, both in the context of the hijab law and broader societal control, are deeply troubling. The authority granted to the Basij in enforcing the hijab law exacerbates concerns about unchecked power. The Basij and Student Basij have become crucial for the IRGC in intensifying their crackdown on these demonstrations. This paints a troubling picture of systemic repression and the suppression of freedom of expression in Iran, where the Basij and Student Basij play pivotal roles in maintaining the status quo.

Obligation under International Human Rights Law

Iran, as a signatory to various international human rights treaties, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), holds an obligation to uphold and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. These obligations encompass the right to freedom of expression, religion, privacy, and personal choice. According to Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, every individual holds the right to express themselves freely, which encompasses the freedom to choose their attire. Furthermore, Article 19 safeguards the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The freedom of religion is a deeply personal entitlement, permitting individuals to practice, exhibit, and embrace their chosen faith without intrusion, as long as it doesn’t infringe upon the fundamental rights of others. In the context of the discussion, the act of wearing a hijab, or not, must always be up to the discretion of the woman herself.

The longstanding need for reform

The introduction of Iran’s new hijab law has ignited concern for women’s rights and personal freedoms worldwide. This newly introduced bill extends its reach across all segments of society, mandating educational institutions, workplaces, businesses, and numerous other establishments to enforce its provisions, including the obligation to file regular reports. The bill infringes upon individual rights by imposing dress codes on individuals and has forced every sector of society to involve itself, specifically in the lives of Iranian women. Any legislation pertaining to personal attire should be crafted with a careful balance between cultural considerations and the preservation of individual rights. Moreover, the implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) displays a significantly more invasive method of monitoring hijab adherence. Additionally, this approach fosters an environment characterized by apprehension and seclusion.

The financial burden of non-compliance with hijab regulations falls squarely upon businesses. The all-encompassing nature of this bill ensures that women who opt to voice their dissent are systematically marginalized, rendering them unwelcome in schools, workplaces, and even healthcare facilities.

This situation, particularly as we see it play out before us, underscores the longstanding and critical need for legal reform. Civil society’s active engagement in this reform process is pivotal, giving voice to those affected and advocating for progressive changes.

The new hijab law in Iran compels women to adhere to strict dress codes, infringing upon their personal choices and freedom of expression despite the widespread calls against such enforcements. This legislation not only suppresses women’s agency but also perpetuates a culture of inequality, limiting opportunities for women in education, employment, and public life. HRA firmly believes that everyone has the right to make decisions about their own bodies, clothing, and personal beliefs.

The bill further symbolizes a broader pattern of limited gender equality within the legal framework, reinforcing discriminatory practices against women. By institutionalizing the enforcement of a specific dress code, the law reinforces harmful stereotypes and reinforces societal norms that prioritize control over personal choice. This not only disregards the diverse cultural expressions and beliefs of Iranian women but also sends a detrimental message that their autonomy is secondary to conforming to state-imposed standards.

It is of paramount importance the international community widely condemns the implementation of Iran’s new Hijab bill as its mere existence highlights the regime’s alarmingly intensified position related to the persecution of women in both law and practice.

ANNEX OF NAMES and ENTITIES

  1. Full Name: Ali Babai Karnami- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament (Babolsar)- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  2. Full Name: Abdolsamad Khorramabadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Deputy Supervisor of the Attorney General’s Office- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Judiciary- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  3. Full Name: Hossein Shariatmadari- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: The Supreme Leader’s representative at Keyhan Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  4. Full Name: Abbas Ali-Abadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Industry, Mining and Trade- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  5. Full Name: Abbas Moghtadaei- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  6. Full Name: Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Chief Justice of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Judiciary- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  7. Full Name: Abdol-Hossein Khosrow Panah- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Chairman and Secretary of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  8. Full Name: Abdolkarim Jomeiri- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  9. Full Name: Abolfazl Amoui- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  10. Full Name: Sayyid Ebrahim Raisolsadati- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: President- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government
  11. Full Name: Ahamd Vahidi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Interior Minister- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  12. Full Name: Ahmad Hossein Fallahi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  13. Full Name: Ahmad Rastineh- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Spokesperson of the Cultural Commission of the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  14. Full Name: Ahmad Salek- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Combatant Clergy Association- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: None- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  15. Full Name: Ali Babai- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  16. Full Name: Seyed-Ahmad Alamolhoda- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Representative of the supreme leader in khorasan province, and the Friday Imam of Mashhad- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  17. Full Name: Ali Bahadori Jahromi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Spokesman and Secretary of the Government Board- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  18. Full Name: Ali Keshvari- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Social Sciences Department of Imam Sadegh Research Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  19. Full Name: Ali Khazrian- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  20. Full Name: Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Head of the Parliament of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  21. Full Name: Ali Moalemi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Representative of Mazandaran Province in the Assembly of Leadership Experts and Friday Imam of Qaim Shahr- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  22. Full Name: Ali-Akbar Mehrabian- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Energy- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  23. Full Name: Ali-Morad Heydari- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the faculty of the Department of Criminal Law and Criminology- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  24. Full Name: Mousa Ghazanfar-Abadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: MP in 11th Islamic Consultative Assembly- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  25. Full Name: Alireza Abedi Sar Asia- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the academic staff of the Department of Fiqh and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  26. Full Name: Alireza Arafi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Director of seminaries across the country- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  27. Full Name: Alireza Monadi Sefidan- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  28. Full Name: Kazem Sedighi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Chief of headquarter for enjoining good and forbidding wrong- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  29. Full Name: Alireza Pakfetrat- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  30. Full Name: Amin Hossein Rahimi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Justice of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  31. Full Name: Amir Hossein Bankipour- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Parliament Member Representing Isfahan- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  32. Full Name: Amir Hossein Yazdanpanah- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Head of the news department of the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  33. Full Name: Bahram Eynollahi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Health and Medical Education of the Islamic Republic of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  34. Full Name: Behrouz Mohebi Najm-Abadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Representative of Sabzevar people in the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  35. Full Name: Behzad Khalili- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Director of Beh-Ayandeh Policy Research and Strategic Studies Think Tank- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: None- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  36. Full Name: Behzad pourseyed- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Legal deputy of the judiciary- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Judiciary- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  37. Full Name: Seyed-Yousef Tabatabaei Nejad- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Assembly of Experts, and Isfahan Friday Imam- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  38. Full Name: Bijan Nobaveh-Vatan- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Deputy Chairman of the Cultural Commission of the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  39. Full Name: Davood Manzour- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Head of the country’s program and budget organization- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  40. Full Name: Eghbal Shakeri- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  41. Full Name: Ehsan Arkani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  42. Full Name: Ensiyeh Khazali- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Vice President for Women and Family Affairs of the President of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  43. Full Name: Farajollah Hedayat-Nia- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the scientific faculty of the Research Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: None- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  44. Full Name: Fatemeh Ghasempour- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Parliament Member Representing Tehran and Ray- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  45. Full Name: Fatemeh Mohammad-beigi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Representative of the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  46. Full Name: Fatemeh Rahmani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  47. Full Name: Gholam-Hossein Rezvani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  48. Full Name: Gholam-Reza Montazeri- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  49. Full Name: Habibollah Sayyari- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Coordinating Deputy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the former Commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  50. Full Name: Hadi Beigi Nejad- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  51. Full Name: Hadi Saheb Qarani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Director General of Islamic Propaganda of Khorasan Razavi Province- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  52. Full Name: Hasan Norouzi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Vice Chairman of the Judicial and Legal Committee of the Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  53. Full Name: Hojjatollah Firouzi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  54. Full Name: Hossein Amir-Abdollahian- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  55. Full Name: Hossein Bostan (Najafi)- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the faculty of the research institute of the Seminary and University- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: None- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  56. Full Name: Seyed Mohammad Mehdi Hosseini Hamedani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Supreme Leader Representative in Alborz Province- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  57. Full Name: Hossein Jalali- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  58. Full Name: Hossein Mirzaei- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  59. Full Name: Hossein Salami- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Guards Corps- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  60. Full Name: Hossein-Ali Haji-Deligani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Parliament Member (Member of Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly)- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  61. Full Name: Jafar Rasti- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  62. Full Name: Jalil Mohebi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Expert of Majlis Research Center- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  63. Full Name: Jalil Rahimi Jahan-Abadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Parliament Member- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  64. Full Name: Javad Karimi-Ghodousi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  65. Full Name: Javad Mojtahed Shabestari- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Assembly of Experts- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  66. Full Name: Javad Naeini- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  67. Full Name: Javad Nikbin- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Parliament’s Cultural Commission- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  68. Full Name: Javad Oji- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Oil- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  69. Full Name: Kioumars Hashemi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Sports and Youth- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  70. Full Name: Kobra Khazali- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Representative of Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch – Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  71. Full Name: Majid Dehghan- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the faculty of Women’s Studies Research Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  72. Full Name: Mansour Arami- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  73. Full Name: Mansour Shokrollahi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  74. Full Name: Mehdi Bagheri- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  75. Full Name: Mehdi Bayati- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Chaste Life Working Group of the Council of Public Culture- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  76. Full Name: Mehdi Jamshidi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the academic board of the Research Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  77. Full Name: Mehdi Saadati- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  78. Full Name: Mehrdad Bazrpash- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Roads and Urban Development- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  79. Full Name: Mehrdad Veiskarami- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  80. Full Name: Mohammad Ali Nikbakht- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Agriculture- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  81. Full Name: Mohammad Elahi Khorasani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Manager of the strategic analysis project for the organization of the state of hijab- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: None- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  82. Full Name: Mohammad Hassan Vakili- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: High-level professor of Holy Mashhad Seminary- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  83. Full Name: Mohammad Hossein Farhandi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  84. Full Name: Mohammad Hossein Tahei Akardi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Secretary of the Headquarters of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  85. Full Name: Mohammad Javad Nezafat- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Supreme Council of Khorasan Seminary- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  86. Full Name: Mohammad Mahdi Esmaeili- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  87. Full Name: Mohammad Mokhber- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: First Vice President of Islamic Republic- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  88. Full Name: Mohammad Morvarid- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Teaching at the Seminary- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  89. Full Name: Mohammad Mosadegh Kahnamouyi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: First Deputy of the Judiciary- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Judiciary- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Involved in conceptualizing and drafting the initial plan
  90. Full Name: Mohammad Rashidi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  91. Full Name: Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  92. Full Name: Mohammad Saeid Ahadian- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Advisor to the Speaker of the Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  93. Full Name: Mohammad Taghi Naghd Ali- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Legal and Judicial Committee of the Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  94. Full Name: Mohammad-Ali Zolfigol- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Science, Research and Technology- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  95. Full Name: Mohammad-Kazem Movahedi Azad- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: The Attorney General of the country – Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Judiciary- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Involved in conceptualizing and drafting the initial plan
  96. Full Name: Mohammad-Saleh Jokar- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  97. Full Name: Mohammadreza Ahmadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  98. Full Name: Mohsen Abbasi-Valadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the scientific faculty of the Research Institute of Science and Culture- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: None- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  99. Full Name: Mohsen Pirhadi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Presidium of the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  100. Full Name: Mojtaba Tavangar- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  101. Full Name: Mojtaba Zolnouri- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  102. Full Name: Monovar Shayestekhoo- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Director of Narjes Seminary and Cultural Activist- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  103. Full Name: Morteza Aghatehrnai- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Chairman of the Cultural Committee of the Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  104. Full Name: Parvin Salehi Mobarake- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  105. Full Name: Razieh Khodaivi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Promoter of Hijab and Modesty- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: None- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  106. Full Name: Reza Daneshvar Sani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the faculty of Razavi University of Islamic Sciences- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  107. Full Name: Reza Gholami- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the faculty of Bagher Alolum University- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  108. Full Name: Reza Morad Sahrai- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Education- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  109. Full Name: Issa Zarepour- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Information and Communications Technology of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  110. Full Name: Seyed Esmaeil Khatib- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Ministry of Intelligence- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  111. Full Name: Ruhollah Motefakerzadeh- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  112. Full Name: Saeid Montazer almahdi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: FARAJA’s Spokesperson- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  113. Full Name: Salman Eshaghi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  114. Full Name: Seyed Abolhassan Mahdavi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Temporary Friday Imam of Isfahan- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  115. Full Name: Seyed Ali Mousavi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Head of Promoting and Islamic Studies of Bagher Alolum Research Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  116. Full Name: Seyed Ali Yazdikhah- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  117. Full Name: Seyed Ehsan Khandouzi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  118. Full Name: Seyed-Ezatollah Zarghami- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts and Tourism- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  119. Full Name: Seyed Jalil Mirmohammad Meybodi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  120. Full Name: Seyed Mohammad Hossein Hashemian- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Board of Directors of Bagher Alolum University and Secretary of the Specialized Council of the Seminary of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution and Islamic Research Center of Qom Majlis- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  121. Full Name: Seyed Mohammad Hosseini- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Deputy of Parliament Affairs- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  122. Full Name: Ahmad-Reza Radan- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Commander-in-Chief of Iran Police (Faraja) – Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  123. Full Name: Seyed Mohammad Mohsen Doai- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Professor at the Seminary and University- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  124. Full Name: Seyed Mohammad Saeidi Golpayegani- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Qom Friday Imam- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  125. Full Name: Seyed Mohammad-Reza Mirtaj-Aldini- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  126. Full Name: Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Head of Special Clerical Court, Prosecutor-General of Iran- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Judiciary- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Involved in conceptualizing and drafting the initial plan
  127. Full Name: Seyed Morteza Hosseini- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  128. Full Name: Seyed Mostafa Mirsalim- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  129. Full Name: Seyed Reza Taghavi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Parliament’s Cultural Commission- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  130. Full Name: Mohammad Reza Jan Nesari- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Deputy Governor of Isfahan – Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  131. Full Name: Seyed Solat Mortazavi Babaheidari- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Minister of Cooperation, Labor and Social Welfare- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Endorsed or approved this plan in government (executive branch)
  132. Full Name: Ahmad Beheshti- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of the Assembly of Experts- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  133. Full Name: Shiva Ghasemipour- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Parliament Member Representing Marivan- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Deemed this bill to be weak and advocated for its fortification
  134. Full Name: Somayeh Rafie- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  135. Full Name: Zohre Elahian- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Member of Parliament- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  136. Full Name: Zohre Sadat Lajevardi- Entity Classification: Individual- Role or Position in Power Structure: Representative of the Islamic Council- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Media promoter for this bill
  137. Full Name: Administrative and employment organization of the country- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  138. Full Name: The Headquarters to Revive Enjoying Good and Forbidding Evil- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Involved in conceptualizing and drafting the initial plan
  139. Full Name: Central bank- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  140. Full Name: Chamber of Guilds of Iran- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  141. Full Name: Coordination and leadership headquarters for the implementation of the decree on modesty and hijab of the Ministry of Interior- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  142. Full Name: Cultural Commission of the Islamic Council- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  143. Full Name: Intelligence Organization of the Police Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  144. Full Name: Islamic Azad university- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  145. Full Name: Islamic Consultative Assembly- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  146. Full Name: Islamic Council of Cities- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  147. Full Name: Islamic council of Village- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  148. Full Name: Islamic Development Organization- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  149. Full Name: Judiciary- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  150. Full Name: Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Legislature- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Support this plan in parliament
  151. Full Name: The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  152. Full Name: Ministry of Commerce- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  153. Full Name: Ministry of Communications and Information Technology- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  154. Full Name: Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Tourism and Handicrafts- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  155. Full Name: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  156. Full Name: Ministry of Economy and Finance- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  157. Full Name: Ministry of Education- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  158. Full Name: Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  159. Full Name: Ministry of Health and Medical Education- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  160. Full Name: Ministry of intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  161. Full Name: Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  162. Full Name: Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  163. Full Name: Ministry of Interior- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  164. Full Name: Ministry of Roads and City Planning- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  165. Full Name: Ministry of Science, Research and Technology- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  166. Full Name: Ministry of Sport and Youth- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  167. Full Name: Municipalities- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  168. Full Name: Police Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  169. Full Name: Presidential Office of Women and Family Affairs- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  170. Full Name: Program and budget organization of the country- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  171. Full Name: Scientific, technology and knowledge-based economy deputy of the presidency- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  172. Full Name: Secretariat of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  173. Full Name: Seminaries Management Center- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  174. Full Name: The country’s welfare organization- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  175. Full Name: The Judicial and Legal Commission of the Islamic Council- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Judiciary- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  176. Full Name: The Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed (Basij)- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  177. Full Name: The Organization for the Regulation of Universal Audio and Video Media in Virtual Space (Satra)- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Supreme Leader- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  178. Full Name: Trade unions- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  179. Full Name: Working group for organizing fashion and clothing- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill
  180. Full Name: Village administrators- Entity Classification: Institute- Government Branch or Hierarchical Structure: Executive branch- Key Contribution to Bill Approval: Entities required to implement this bill

For media inquiries please contact, Skylar Thompson at [email protected]

HRA calls for urgent action in response to humiliating and disproportionate sentences against Iranian women

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Iranian women tell HRA they will continue the fight despite the government’s futile attempts to silence

Last week, despite months of strong condemnation against Iran’s treatment of women and girls, Second Brigadier General Saeed Montazeral-Mahdi released a statement declaring the return of the morality police to the Iranian streets, introducing the “Challenge with Hijab” project. The timing of this announcement is notable as it closely coincides with the one-year anniversary of Mahsa Jina Amini’s arrest and death. On September 13, 2022, Mahsa Jina Amini was arrested for allegedly not wearing the hijab “correctly”. She was held in police custody for several hours, severely beaten, and later transported to the hospital, where she died three days later. This tragic event sparked mass protests across the country for months. According to the sergeant, the morality police are tasked with preserving social norms and maintaining peace within Iranian society. He also warned that individuals who disobey the police orders will face legal action.

 In less than a week, several women have already received humiliating sentences. It appears that the regime is focused on shaming women while continuing to crack down on mandatory hijab laws, likely hoping to minimize political consequences abroad. The Iranian Court has started handing down alternative punishments, so far this has included fines, psychological evaluations, cleaning, and barring women from health and education services as opposed to jail sentences.

In recent weeks The Iranian Courts have taken a more severe stance on women who do not comply with wearing the hijab in public. A judicial official claimed that a civil activist who chose not to wear a hijab in public sought to “humiliate women and undermine their efforts to create social change.” Another official accused her of engaging in sexual promiscuity and referred to her as being affected by the “no-hijab infectious disease.” The Courts have resorted to labeling such actions as signs of mental illness and have mandated mandatory psychological evaluation for those who do not wear the hijab. This misuse of psychiatry in Iranian courts has drawn protests from four psychology associations. They argue against such practices and question the ethics of using mental health as a tool for enforcing religious laws.

For instance, Azadeh Samadi, an actress, was sentenced to attend psychological meetings every two weeks, with the claim that it is due to her mental and behavioral state. Similarly, another actress, Afsana Baygan, has received a ban from using the internet, has to write a summary of a book, and has also received mandatory psychological meetings. Additionally, a nurse in Tehran was sentenced to perform free cleaning services in a government building for 270 hours after allegedly being caught by city surveillance cameras violating the mandatory hijab law. In a worrying trend, the use of surveillance cameras as evidence in the Iranian Court systems is becoming increasingly prevalent. Another woman was sentenced to wash dead bodies for a month, as she was allegedly caught on a security camera not wearing a veil while driving. She argued that it fell off while driving, additionally, her appeal was recently rejected by the Court of Appeal. 

 Furthermore, the head of the Judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje’I, has called for Special Judges to preside over mandatory hijab cases. He reiterated that hijab removal is against Sharia and the law, and he has asked the heads of general courts to appoint these special judges. 

The reinstatement of Iran’s morality police is deeply concerning and raises alarm about the potential harsh consequences for girls and women in the country. One woman expressed to HRA that the government’s re-introduction “amounts to a provocation against women.” This move indicates further regression in terms of gender rights and individual freedoms. They have become the targets of a well-organized and systematic campaign that seeks to inflict humiliation, degradation, and establish control over every facet of their lives. The morality police’s notorious history of enforcing strict religious codes has been associated with increased surveillance and restrictions on freedom of expression. Such measures can disproportionately affect girls and women, curbing their autonomy and limiting their opportunities for education, work, and participation in public life. As a result, the revival of the morality police only exacerbates gender inequality and infringes upon the basic rights and dignity of women in Iran. The use of Iran’s domestic judicial system to justify such sentences only highlights the severe need for judicial reform. 

In conversation with HRA about the ongoing situation, one woman stated: “We are compelled to engage in a struggle that has been thrust upon us, but we, as Iranian women, have shown that we are not afraid of any fight until we attain our rights.” The ongoing situation, namely the sentencing of women to humiliating and disproportionate sentences in an apparent attempt to save face internationally, must be widely condemned. Inaction is not an option. Iranian women will not stand idly by. As one woman put it:

 “The struggle for gender equality is as old as time. We, as women, have demonstrated through our unwavering belief in reaching our goals, that we are not afraid of this battle. The re-introduction of the Guidance Patrols on the streets is nothing more than a futile attempt by the government that failed to silence us last year. We will continue this fight.”

The dignity, rights, and future of millions of women are at stake. Unjust, disproportionate sentences against women and girls should be immediately reviewed and overturned. Iran must immediately heed the months-long calls by activists and the international community and respect the rights of women and girls in law and in practice.

——————

For further inquiries please contact Skylar Thompson, the Director of Global Advocacy and Accountability at Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) at [email protected]

At least 4,800 executions in last 10 years, 2,196 drug-related

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According to HRA, at least 4,800 executions in last 10 years, 2,196 drug-related

As of May 2023, Iran has been executing an average of 10 people per week. From 2013 to 2023, HRANA has identified a total of 4,829 executions, out of which 2,196 were drug-related. The majority of those executed were men. Iran has also executed 41 juvenile offenders including one for a drug-related offense. It’s important to note that Iran is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which strictly emphasizes that the death penalty should only be used for the “most serious crimes,” and any deviation from this principle would be considered a violation of the Right to Life.

In 2017, the Iranian government accepted amendments to the country’s Drug Law, introducing 46 new articles. These amendments primarily raised the minimum possession amount for both natural and synthetic drugs before the death penalty could be imposed. As a result, individuals found with lesser amounts could face fines or imprisonment instead. This amendment, at first sight, significantly reduced the number of executions related to drug offenses. In previous years, drug charges accounted for a significant portion, ranging from 40% to 60%, of all executions. However, from 2018 to 2020, this percentage never exceeded 10%. There are a number of competing analyses surrounding this drop. Unfortunately, this positive trend was short-lived, as drug-related offenses constituted 49.20% of all executions in 2021. Despite international outcry and purported efforts to curb drug-related executions, the number of executions continues to rise, often leading to protests from the families of the prisoners.

It is crucial to acknowledge that Iran’s domestic judicial system is plagued with numerous due process violations. These violations include coerced forced confessions, torture, inhumane treatment, and a lack of adequate legal representation to name a mere few. Frequently, judges and prosecutors involved in grave right to life violations act with absolute impunity. 

It is evident that any death sentence imposed for drug-related offenses represents a clear violation of the right to life. Skylar Thompson, Director of Global Advocacy and Accountability at HRA says, “The persistence of such executions, particularly when trials are marred by due process violations, is deeply concerning. Iran should immediately establish a moratorium on all executions, with a view to abolishing the death penalty in all circumstances.”

Alarming Surge in Executions in Iran: At Least 45 Executions in Seven Days

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)

Over the past week, at least 45 prisoners, including two women, have been executed in various Iranian prisons for drug-related crimes and murder, marking a growing trend of execution in the country. HRANA has compiled a statistical analysis of the details of the executions during this period.

According to HRANA, the news agency of Human Rights Activists, there has been a noticeable increase in the execution of prisoners in Iranian prisons over the past week.

Based on the reports compiled by HRANA, the death sentences were carried out in several prisons, including Rajai Shahr (Karaj), Ghezel Hesar (Karaj), Urmia, Ardabil, Dastgerd (Isfahan), Vakilabad (Mashhad), Neishabur, Torbat-e-Jam, Rasht, Yazd, Birjand, Qazvin, Minab, Bandar Abbas, Zahedan, Khorramabad, and Iranshahr.

Out of the 45 executed prisoners, 29 were convicted of drug-related charges, while at least 15 were executed for murder.
At least 19 death-row prisoners were also transferred to solitary confinement in Salmas, Urmia, Khorin, Ghezel Hesar (Karaj), Yazd, Bandar Abbas, Birjand, and Zahedan, which could be a prelude to their execution. HRANA is investigating their fate, and the statistics presented in this report could increase.

As of the time of writing, most of these executions have not been announced by official sources or media inside Iran.

The issuance and execution of death sentences violate the right to live and have been heavily criticized by international organizations, with Iran ranking first globally in execution rate per capita.

In 2022, the Department of Statistics and Publication of Human Rights Activists in Iran registered 457 reports on the execution of 565 people and death sentences for 92 people, six of whom were sentenced to be hanged in public. Of these 565 executions, two death sentences were carried out in public, and five were juvenile offenders who were under 18 years old at the time of committing the alleged crime.

At least 192 people, including 8 women, have been executed in Iran from January 1 to May 5. The majority of these executions were for drug-related offenses and murder. Moreover, 71 death sentences were issued, and 27 other sentences were confirmed by the Supreme Court.

The breakdown of charges for these executions is as follows: 122 individuals were executed for drug-related offenses, 59 for murder, 6 for undisclosed charges, 1 for adultery, 1 for ideological charges, 1 for corruption, 1 for Moharebeh (political security), and 1 for non-political Moharebeh.

Skylar Thompson, the head of Global Advocacy and Accountability of Human Rights Activists, stated that “the surging rate of executions in Iran illustrates an utter disregard for human life. Under no circumstance does the ongoing use of the death penalty, for drug-related offenses in particular, amount to what is permittable under international law. Iranian authorities have an absolute obligation to uphold international human rights standards and instead, there is ongoing impunity for grave violations of the right to life–and more. The international community must not delay in sounding the alarm, they should call for a stay of executions for those currently facing execution and a moratorium on the death penalty, at a minimum, for crimes not amounting to “most serious” under international law.”

MAHSA AMINI – THE SEISMIC TRAGEDY THAT IS TRIGGERING A TSUNAMI THAT SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)
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MAHSA AMINI – THE SEISMIC TRAGEDY THAT IS TRIGGERING A TSUNAMI THAT SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED

By: Brian Currin

For: Spreading Justice initiative of Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA-SJ)

Table of Contents

I Introduction

II BACKGROUND & DEVELOPMENTS

As a point of departure, it is critical to note that the current situation, sparked, in chief, by the events that will be expounded on below, are dynamic, and information is constantly being updated and revised. Below is the information as best and widely reported as at early December 2022.

As per credible reports by the Human Rights Activists News Agency (‘HRANA’) – on the 13th of September 2022, Mahsa (Jhina) Amini was arrested at Taleghani Subway station of Tehran by an Iranian law enforcement group known as the Morality Police (whose main mandate is ‘enforcing Iran’s Islamic code of conduct’). Mahsa’s crime was, ‘improper Hijab’. Shortly after her arrest, she had to be transferred to hospital with concussions. She then went into a coma, succumbing to her injuries and dying in hospital, on the 16th of September of 2022. Eyewitnesses have stated they saw the Morality Police physically and brutally beat Mahsa; unsurprisingly the Morality Police rejected this version of events and incredulously claimed she had died of a heart attack while being under their custody. The evidence on Mahsa’s body contradicts this claim

As reported by media, this triggered the first wave of what are widely considered the most historical protests since the 1979 Revolutionary War. This is significant as many of our previous individual human rights’ abuse profiles had an aspect of stifling the right to protest; however, never at the scale and awareness of the protests which have followed the death of Mahsa. HRANA reports that:

‘The widespread protests sparked at the time Mahsa Amini was announced dead in front of Kasra Hospital on Argentina Street in Tehran, and then quickly spread to the streets despite the intimidating presence of Iran’s security forces. The protests intensified after Mahsa’s burial in a Saqqez cemetery. To the extent that after eighty-two days of nationwide protests between September 17, 2022, to December 7, 2022, they have spread to Iran’s all 31 provinces, 160 cities, and 143 major universities.’

‘The protests did not stay limited to Mahsa’s death, it rather, quickly targeted the Iranian government’s political and ideological foundations. These protests were violently quashed by the anti-riot police and Iran’s militia force (Basij). teargas, pellets, and live ammunition were used in           the repression of protestors. This widespread crackdown has led to the death of dozens of people and the wounding of hundreds of protestors.’

This initial 20-day protest has been characterised as being unique by the HRANA. Some of most pertinent distinguishing features are said to be:

  • While many of Iran’s protests end up in violation of human rights’, their spark is usually economic or environmental in nature. However, this protest was triggered directly by a human rights’ violation; the murder of Mahsa by state officials.
  • Mahsa was from an amalgamation of minority groups that are the subject of discrimination in Iran. She was Kurd and Sunni… yet this did not stop Iranians of all faiths and heritage from joining in the protests.
  • Iranians of all classes joined the protests.
  • Youth, with an estimated average age of 15 years, have played a pivotal role in the protests.
  • In terms of length, the protests are some of the most sustained.
  • The demands of the protesters have been unwavering on women’s rights – this suggests, contrary to how the state sees itself, a progressive, non-conservative society that yearns for the equality of human beings.
  • Iranian protests have a history of bloodshed and torture as security forces have no qualms with spilling blood indiscriminately, while arresting and beating unarmed protesters; a trend we have seen many a times in the previous profiles. This has led to many Iranians choosing to stay away in fear of their lives. However, during these protests there have been many instances of protestors showing solidarity, coming together to prevent people from being taken into custody or by standing in front of the police, equipped with full anti-riot gear.
  • In terms of internet solidarity, the Mahsa Amini hashtag is the first in the history of Twitter to record more than 384 million tweets.

All in all, the above points to unparalleled upheaval since the war. Iranians have decided that the killing of Mahsa signifies crossing the Rubicon – no more will they allow themselves to be defined by, and subsequently tortured by, the state and its apparatus.

Since the initial 82 day protests which saw a reported 481 identified civilian Iranians lose their lives (plus an indeterminate number of unidentified Iranians), and despite significant efforts from the Iranian authorities to stifle the protests, Iranians, to this day, are refusing to relent. Some of the subsequent developments are:

  • Almost half of the Internet service providers in Iran have seen a 50% drop in sales due to disruptions, censorship, and Internet shutdowns by the government during protests.
  • Iranian security forces are targeting protestors with shotgun fire to their faces, breasts, and genitals, according to interviews with medics across the country. One physician from the central Isfahan province said he believed the authorities were targeting men and women in different ways

‘I treated a woman in her early 20s, who was shot in her genitals by two pellets. Ten other pellets were lodged in her inner thigh. These 10 pellets were easily removed, but those two pellets were a challenge, because they were wedged in between her urethra and vaginal opening,” the physician said. “There was a serious risk of vaginal infection, so I asked her to go to a trusted gynaecologist. She said she was protesting when a group of about 10 security agents circled around and shot her in her genitals and thighs.’

  • Protests have been slightly quelled as government fights back the cries of freedom and equality – however various organisation of protests, including social media users, continuously report protests of various sizes across many of Iran’s cities and provinces. As recently as December 5, the Critical Threats Project (‘CTP’) reported that ‘at least 29 anti-regime protests took place in 18 cities across 16 provinces.’ These numbers have been fluctuating daily.
  • There have been conflicting messages on whether the regime will abolish the morality police. The regime will likely maintain and continue enforcing its mandatory hijab law regardless of whether it abolishes the morality police.
  • Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei ordered the relevant authorities to identify, arrest, and prosecute protesters organizing and promoting the countrywide strikes ‘quickly and decisively.’ Ejei accused protesters of coercing and manipulating the owners of businesses and shops to strike.
  • On the 8th of December, in what was Iran’s first judicial execution since the protests started, a 23-year old protester by the name of Mohsen Shekari, was hanged after being convicted for blocking a Tehran Street and wounding a paramilitary on September 25, after a legal process that rights groups denounced as a show trial. His official indictment cited ‘Moharebeh’ as his official crime – a wide discretionary crime of ‘waging war against God’ that has been covered throughout many of the profiles (and will be looked at further when the Iranian penal Code is discussed).

III INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING STATES[1]

In an exercise situating the current state of affairs vis-à-vis protests in Iran, a formal look into international law follows by looking at various relevant international laws and their sources.
Customary International Law

There are two main requirements for the existence of customary international law; settled practice of states (usus) and the acceptance of an obligation to be legally bound (opinio juris). While the two are separate concepts, they do largely overlap and thus principles surrounding them cannot be isolated into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive elements.

Usus (settled practice of states)

The practice must be general and widespread. Evidence of state practice is found in a variety of areas, including, but not limited to treaties, decisions of national courts, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, policy statements by government officials, opinions of national law advisers, reports of the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) and comments by states on these reports, and resolutions of international organizations; the political organs of the United Nations in particular. A state’s practice can be sourced from many places.

Where states actively demonstrate their support for a particular rule, no problem of proof arises. Indeed, some states provide easy access to their practice by publishing official reports on this subject. However, in many cases, there will be no clear evidence of this kind. In these circumstances, it may be possible to infer consent or acquiescence to a practice from the inaction of states. The ILC says only ‘deliberate abstention from acting’ may count as state practice. From the above, it is clear, even if not intuitive, that practice is inferred not only from conduct, but from absence of conduct. This suggests that where international norms exist, i.e. non-trade in people/no slavery, it is from the deliberate opposite conduct to the norm, that practice is inferred. This would make sense for a country like North Korea that distances itself from the UN and its organs that its practice is to not form part of the international community. In a more legalistic and doctrinal manner (but perhaps more instinctive), the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has, through its jurisprudence, insisted that constant and uniform usage or widespread acceptance of a rule constitutes a proper prerequisite for usus e.g. as said in the Asylum Case . Note that the widespread acceptance is not to be read as universal acceptance. Therefore, a country cannot escape being bound by a rule of customary law (usus) merely because it can point to a few states that are exceptions to the customary rule. For settled international custom, a state cannot plead the so called ‘persistent objector’ defence. It can probably be argued, successfully too, that if a state can point to their continuous objection to a particular practice, then it cannot be part of their practice; however this defence would only work at the point in time where the rule is still in the process of being developed. Once a practice is settled international custom, there is no ‘opt out’ clause. This point has been the subject of debate in the context of jus cogens conduct and international law, where for example, some states refused to accept South Africa’s persistent objection to treating apartheid as a violation of international customary law.  This is best explained on the ground that the prohibition on apartheid is a peremptory norm, a norm of jus cogens, to which the normal rules relating to the persistent objection do not apply.

Opinio Juris

A settled practice (usus) on its own is insufficient to create a customary rule. In addition, there must be a sense of legal obligation, a feeling on the part of the states that they are bound by the rule in question – that the general practice is accepted as law. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases between West Germany on one hand, and the Netherlands together with Denmark on the other, the ICJ stated:

            ‘Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or carried in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered         obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it… The states concerned must             therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.[2]

As with all subjective matters, evidence of opinio juris is difficult to prove. Difficult as it may be the evidence may be found in the same materials that are used for investigating state practice. A grouping of likeminded jurists and scholars of international law argue that a concrete example of the search for opinio juris is where there is a consistent and widespread (not necessarily unanimous) adoption of an annual resolution, which resolution may well constitute settled practice (i.e. usus) regarding a rule contained in the resolution. The resolution itself, however, cannot establish a rule of customary international law unless it can be shown, whether by reference to the content of the resolution or by some other forms of conduct, that the states adopting the resolution believe the rule in question to be one of customary international law. As with settled practice, the question of the silent states – those states that do not express an opinion to the legal status of a rule – arises. In these instances, silence can, in certain circumstances, be taken to imply the acceptance of a rule. This inference, however, can only be made when those states were able to react, and the circumstances called for some reaction.

Less technical is that a key feature of law is its universal applicability, not its universal acquiescence in the form of subjects opting in or out. It is this very option of opting out that make some commentators argue vehemently against international law being ‘law’ at all, for, as the argument goes, a law is binding and can never bow down to the intention of a subject to be bound by it. While the argument might not hold when it comes to treaties, I think it holds ground when it comes to international custom. Plural we may be; we all live in one world, with one human race.

My view, when it comes to the binding nature of international law not having to require opinio juris, is supported by one of the sources of customary international law i.e. Security Council resolutions. While the Security Council is not a legislative body (Security Council will be discussed), its resolutions are binding. Although the point of departure was combating terrorism, many of the Security Council’s resolutions have had the effect of creating international custom in relation to human rights. ‘Beginning with its adoption of resolution 1456 (2003), the Security Council has also consistently and repeatedly affirmed that states must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism, comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law… .’ This means that states can only counter terrorism effectively if they meet obligations under international law, with human rights being singled out. While the resolution can be read in full, the basic thinking is that if a state cannot respect the human rights of its own citizens – what chance do foreign citizens have? More formally and recently, in its resolution 2178 (2014), the Council stated that failure to comply with these and other international obligations (respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms etc.) including under the Charter of the United Nations, fosters a sense of impunity and is one of the factors contributing to increased radicalization. I would thus argue that ‘international obligations’ can be directly substituted with, among others, ‘international customary law’ as it would cause an absurdity for a country not to have any international obligations vis-à-vis human rights, simply because they do not feel bound by it.

UN Charter and Treaties

The focus in this section of the article is not on treaties in general, but as they relate to human rights.

As a point of departure, it is helpful to locate human rights in its post-world war II development. In 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France established an international military tribunal to try Nazi leaders for crimes against the peace, and war crimes; the Nuremberg trial. Trying similar charges, was the subsequent Tokyo trial.

[1] See Dugard’s International Law for references of below

[2] North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (n 36).

The Nuremberg trial had a major impact on international law. It inspired criminal accountability for those responsible for war crimes and the systematic and large-scale violation of human rights and contributed substantially to the development of international humanitarian law. It was also the genesis of crimes against humanity and genocide jurisprudence. From a human rights perspective, the main significance of the Nuremberg precedent is that national leaders and government officials are no longer able to claim immunity before international courts from protection for egregious human rights violations by invoking the protection of municipal law or superior orders. What is of particular importance to note as we delve deeper into the relevant areas of the relevant treaties, is that neither Nazi Germany nor Japan were signatories to any international treaty (they did not exist at the time) – yet the officials were tried.

The United Nations’ (UN) commitment to human right was made clear in the preamble to the charter which reaffirms ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the person, in the equal rights of men and women.’ Iran is a member state of the United Nations, joining it in 1945 as one of the original 50 founding members. Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran is an active member of the UN. The UN has actively partnered with Iran since 1950, opening in Tehran in 1950, one of the very first UN Information Centres worldwide. One wonders why and how the disconnect even exists. The Charter itself, when laying out the purpose of the United Nations, in Article 1(3) alludes clearly to the importance of human rights by stating that:

‘To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an            economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and         encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;

Promote respect for human rights… without distinction as to… sex. Yet nearly 80 years later, the events described in the beginning of this article are as though the Charter never existed; or if it did, Iran, a founding member, has never heard of it. An escape for many countries has been Article 2(7) which states that:

‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to        intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state             or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present             Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures        under Chapter Vll.’

Chapter VII will be expounded on later, but in the second half of the 20th century, when Apartheid was doubling down on its brutality and decolonization, Article 2(7) essentially forced states to choose between the supremacy of domestic jurisdiction on one hand, and human rights on the other. The ICJ, in its Namibia Opinion[1] of as far back as 1971, dispelled any doubts on the above balancing act – it held that member states could not use Article 2(7) to sidestep, circumvent or blatantly contravene the legal obligations that were imposed on member states by the human rights charter.

There are several international instruments that deal with human rights. Two are specifically regarded as the cornerstone international covenants; namely The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), along with The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’). Other international instruments are; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘ICERD’), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW’), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’), Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (‘CMW’), International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (‘CED’) and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’). Unfortunately, Iran is signatory only to the ICCPR – a treaty Iran acceded to and ratified on June 24, 1975.  This means Iran is fully, and voluntarily bound by this instrument.

ICCPR

The ICCPR can be divided into various parts. Part I is Article 1 and deals with self-determination. It provides for all peoples a right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Part II (Articles 2 – 5) obliges parties to legislate where necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant, to provide an effective legal remedy for any violation of those rights and importantly, entrenches the equality of all groups, while prohibiting all forms of discrimination. Important for the conduct regarding Mahsa and the subsequent squashing of protests are Article 2(1) which states:

      ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,           without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other            opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’

The list is intentionally not exhaustive and clearly sets out sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination.

[1] Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 1971 ICJ Reports 16.

Article 2(2) states:

      ‘Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to    the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its   constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or      other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.’

This means Iran has an obligation, not only to not violate the rights, but to create, within their domestic legal framework, legislation that recognises and protects all the rights provided for in the Covenant, ‘notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’

Part III (Articles 6 – 27) then set out the actual rights provided for in detail. Importantly these rights apply to everyone (men and women), without any discrimination, and the state has an obligation to both protect these rights and provide remedies for when violated. More specifically and important for our analysis; Articles 6 – 8 deal with the right to life. Torture or any cruel and degraded treatment is prohibited:

           

Article 6

  1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
  2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the             Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only             be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.
  3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and             Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
  4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.
  5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
  6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.

Article 7 provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation;

Articles 9 -11 deal with the security and liberty of the person. Articles 14 – 16 deal with fair trial and procedural fairness guarantees; Articles 12, 13, 17 – 24 deal with individual liberty, in the form of the freedoms of movement, thought, conscience and religion, speech, association and assembly, family rights, the right to a nationality, and the right to privacy. I set out the relevant ones in full.

Its appropriate for present purposes to quote verbatim from Articles 18, 19, 21 and 22.

            Article 18:

  1. 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or             belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
  2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
  3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
  4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

            Article 19

  1. 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
  2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
  3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

      (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health         or morals.

            Article 21

      The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the     exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law, and which are   necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights    and freedoms of others.

            Article 22

  1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
  2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals       or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the        imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.
  3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the     Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the         law       in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

Part IV (Articles 28 – 45) are more operational and speak to the establishment of a human rights committee; Part V (Articles 46 -47) situates the Covenant amongst the United Nations machinery and finally, Part VI (Articles 48 – 53) deals with the technicalities and procedures of the Covenant itself, such as ratifying or amending etc.

The Articles set out in full above are of the greatest importance when analysing the conduct of Iranian officials during this period.

Soft Law

These are the so called ‘imprecise standards’, generated by declarations adopted by diplomatic conferences or resolutions of international organisations, that are intended to serve as guidelines to states in their conduct, but which lack the status of ‘law’. One such example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’). Although admittedly not binding, it provides an important framework that the UN General assembly, Security Council (remembering that Security Council resolutions are binding on all states) and the Human Rights Commission often refer to when they interpret and apply the human rights clauses of the Charter.

The UDHR is not a treaty, but a recommendatory resolution of the UN General Assembly. Some argue that it now forms part of International Customary Law. In 1968, at an international conference on human rights in Iran (Ironically), the Tehran (ironically) proclamation stated that:

‘The UDHR states a common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the        inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an       obligation for the members of the international community.’

While others oppose this as too far reaching for all countries of the world, it is widely accepted that the UDHRs basic principles such as non-discrimination, rights to a fair trial, and the prohibitions on torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment etc., undoubtably belong to the corpus of international customary law even though they may not always be observed.

IV IRANIAN MUNICIPAL LAW

The impugned Iranian law is the infamous Islamic Penal Code (‘IPC’) of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Section 1 deals with ‘The Punishments and Security and Correction Measures’. The punishments provided for in this law include five types: 1- Hudud 2- Qisas 3- Diyat 4- Ta’zirat 5- Deterrent punishments. Worrying are:

Article 13 – Hadd is the punishment which its type and amount and quality is prescribed by Shari’a. Hadd punishment is implemented by stoning, whipping, lashing etc., usually to death.

Article 14 –Qisas [retaliation or eye-for-an-eye] is the punishment to which the criminal shall be sentenced and is equal to his/her crime.

Article 16 –Ta’zir is the chastisement or punishment which its type and amount is not determined by Shari’a but left to discretion of the judge, such as imprisonment, fine and lashes; the number of lashes must be less than the number stipulated for Hadd punishment.

Section 2 deals with moharebeh and corruption on earth. Selected examples of these punishments are in article 190, Hadd punishment for moharebeh and corruption on earth is one of the following four punishments:

(a) The death penalty (with a Hadd method of death)

(b) Hanging on gallows

(c) Amputation of right hand and then left foot.

(d) Banishment.

Article 195 – Crucifixion of a mohareb and a corrupt on earth shall be executed as follows:

(a) Method of tying shall not kill him/her.

(b) S/he shall not remain crucified for more than three days, but if they die within three days, s/he can be taken down [from the cross].

(c) If s/he remains alive after three days [s/he] shall not be killed.

Article 196 -Amputation of the right hand and left foot of a mohareb and a corrupt on earth shall be executed by the same method as for the Hadd punishment for theft.

These come directly from the IPC.

V IRANIAN CONTRAVENTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

International Customary Law crimes

There are five crystallised International Customary Law crimes, namely; Piracy, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity (‘CAH’), Genocide and Torture.

The CAT defines torture as:

‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.’

The probable beating received by Mahsa at the hands of the morality police fits squarely in the definition of torture.

Systematic persecution of a group of people, in this instance a woman and religious minority, is an example of enumerated offenses under CAH for which a government officials could be responsible and held criminally liable.

International treaty crimes

              Over and above the detailed report of the first 82 days of nationwide protests provided by the HRA-SJ, a database of human rights violators in Iran, has also reported the weapons being used to suppress the nationwide protests in Iran. Shell casings found at scenes, along with brutal physical evidence found on the protesting victims themselves show evidence of violent weapons being used on protesters The weapons range from paintball guns to handguns and shotguns, to automatic and semi-automatic rifles such as the Kalashnikova (AK47) and Heckler & Koch G3.

The AK-47 is an assault rifle that operates with gas and is chambered for 7.62 x 39mm cartridge. The effective firing range for an AK-47 is between 300 to 400m and its maximum range is 2000m. The standard magazine capacities of this weapon are 30 or 75 rounds drum. The Heckler & Koch G3 has caliber of 7.62 and 51mm bullets. Its effective firing range is 200 to 400m and its standard magazine capacity is 30 as well as up to 100 round drum magazines. These are not tools used to disperse even the rowdiest of crowds. These are effective killing machines that have been used in wars, with the AK-47 playing a role even in the Iran Revolution. The weapons are reported to have been aimed at protesters faces and upper torso, evidence of an intention to kill and/or maim.

The use of these weapons has been attributed to the FARAJA forces. FARAJA at the time of protests was under the ultimate authority of Hossein Ashtari, the Chief Commander of Law Enforcement and Chief of Police. Ahmad-Reza Radan has been appointed to this position since January 7th 2023. Since Iran is signatory only to the ICCPR, the conduct of FARAJA in general, and Ashtari, will be tested against this instrument. However, as explained, this instrument, as one of only two cornerstone instruments on human rights, is more than adequate.

Right to life

As of the end of February 2023, it is reported that at least 528 civilians including minors have died. All 528 of these are in violation of Article 6 of the ICCPR as none of these killings have been by way of the death penalty (an exception to the right to life). These have been extra judicial killings and Iranians at the highest level of governance need to be held accountable.

Torture

The beatings of Mahsa and other protesters, the excessive use of force through assault rifles, the shooting of women genitals – all of these are examples of torture as described above. The conduct provided for in the HRANA report fits the definition of torture and thus Article 7 has also been breached.

Right to liberty

As of the end of February 2023, it is reported that 19,763 people have been arrested, including minors. This is an extraordinarily high number. While I do not have the benefit of a breakdown of the instances that have led to these arrest, their sheer volume, plus the fact that they are linked with a time of protesting for the fundamental rights of women, suggests strongly that Article 9 of the ICCPR i.e. ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty…’ has been grossly violated.  

Dignity of detainees

Although I am not armed with specific, disaggregated information, taking into account the fact that Mahsa was beaten as a (arbitrary) detainee of the Morality Police, further exacerbating that fact with Iran’s well documented fraught treatment of detainees and prisoners, it is highly probable that Article 10 of the ICCPR has also been violated.

Freedoms of Speech, Belief, Assembly and Associated Right to Protest

The above are a ‘bucket’ of inter-dependent rights, as discussed in detail in earlier reviews. The mass suppression of the #Mahsa/#WomanLifeFreedom protests, as described by the UNHRA, is a continuing violation of Articles 18, 19, 21 and 22 above.

The importance of this bucket of ‘freedoms’ rights cannot be understated. I am of the strong view that the genesis of all gross human rights violations begins by not respecting these freedoms. It is the intolerance of one’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; it is the interference with one’s right to hold opinions, the right to freedom to express oneself; it is the refusal of people’s right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others – that leads to all other rights, including life, being violated.

The “Highlights from the recent protests” section of the First 82 days report details a number of violations against various Iranian citizens. In these, the number of international law violations are innumerable. Dealing with them individually would be the exact approach this article argues against – all those instances are proof of systematic violations, and possible remedies for such widespread, systematic violations, by state apparatus at all levels, is discussed below.

VI ANALYSIS

I say the streets of Iran are speaking, and they are loud. The international community must answer the voices.

‘The international community must act!’ This is a phrase I have used repeatedly in the specific legal reviews I have done. However, what does ‘acting’ look like? What forms of action are permitted in international law? Who is the international community?

As a form of solidarity and more importantly, pressure on own governments, individual citizens of the world are legitimate role players. However, the ultimate role players – owing to having powers allocated by prescribed international law – more concretely, states, in their own capacity, and as member states of the UN, along with the political organs of the UN.

Individual citizens of other countries

Although the solidarity and pressure by the peoples of the world can be useful. With the proliferation of social media, joining online campaigns through twitter and other platforms helps bring light and attention to the situation of Iran, as evidenced by the record over 300 million tweets carrying Mahsa Amini’s hashtag. It is easy and free to follow Iranian activists’ social media accounts, and to share information and posts on protests. Donating and or supporting human rights organizations makes it possible for organisations such as Human Rights Activists of Iran to be on the ground collecting information, sharing information, providing legal opinions and generally being outlets for those oppressed. Another form of solidarity is writing to one’s government or parliament asking them to support Iranian women’s rights publicly. It is this public pressure that will hold your country accountable in front of its peers, even at international bodies such the UN. Organising and/or joining local protests is also a powerful form of demonstration and applying of pressure. Mass peaceful protests have occurred in Berlin, Paris, Washington, London and other cities around the world.

States

The regimes violent suppression against Iranian civilians invited travel bans and sanctions on important government officials from nations like the UK, US, Canada, and Germany. Similarly, Iran has been hit with a slew of targeted sanctions by the EU.

Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA), accompanied by 161 international and regional human rights organizations and women’s rights defenders, announced their solidarity with the protesters in Iran by publishing a statement. Before that, HRA and 12 other human rights organizations issued another statement calling for the international community’s intervention to counter the oppression of women and protesters by the Iranian government. Also, HRA, with 19 human rights organizations, in a letter addressed to the President of the United States, Joe Biden, asked him to fulfill his promise to confront authoritarian and repression in Iran.

These efforts have resulted in historical sanctions against human rights perpetrators, since the start of protests more than 185 individuals and entities have been sanctioned across 4 jurisdictions. 

United Nations

More forcefully, I argue for international intervention through the properly designated international bodies. I must not be seen to be arguing for regime change, instead, I am arguing for the protection of Iranian lives and freedoms through holding Iran accountable to its obligations under international law. Mahsa’s death is tragic. Even more tragic is that it is not the first time, and neither, as history has shown, will it be the last time. As I write, Iran has already carried out four death penalties aimed at intimidating protesters. These death penalties were carried out in rushed court cases that lasted a few hours at most, which indicates that due process could not have been followed. Execution followed soon thereafter; clearly grossly unfair trials and unlawful executions.

General Assembly

The General Assembly (‘UNGA’) is the plenary body of the United Nations, with one of its responsibilities being the maintenance of international peace and security. As argued previously and supported by a Security Council resolution, peace cannot exist if human rights are not protected and advanced. Peace and human rights are inextricably linked. The UNGA is authorised to discuss and to adopt resolutions on any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security or any questions falling within the scope of the UN Charter. Although Resolutions of the UNGA are recommendations in nature, they can have considerable political weight. Surely, resolutions pertaining to Iran need to be taken by the UNGA and supported widely as ‘important decisions’, such as action against a fellow member state, need two-thirds majority to be adopted.

Security Council

The Security Council is the executive body of the United Nations, and it has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It has 5 permanent member states that have veto power, along with 10 alternating members who don’t have veto power. Importantly, the Security Council is empowered to take decisions binding on all member states of the United Nations. In my estimation, the situation in Iran is at the level that needs binding decision-making by the Security Council

Chapter VI (of the UN Charter) empowers the Security Council to address disputes that in its judgment do not threaten international peace, but that, if continued, are likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security.

International law scholars claim an argument exist on whether the Security Council may adopt a resolution which designates a situation as a threat to peace if it only involves a serious violation of human rights within a particular territory. One side argues that it cannot as there needs to be some external element which affects a neighbouring state or has the potential of provoking armed conflict between states; while others maintain that a serious violation of human rights within a single state permits a determination of threat to peace

The former, I argue, are wrong. To claim that there is peace when thousands of people of one state are persecuted continuously, and have their human rights violated grossly, yet claim that peace has been threatened when two forces of 100 soldiers in total throws sticks and stones on each other over a border (as with India and Pakistan recently) is to be purely academic and out of touch with realities.

ECOSOC Removal of Iran from CSW

On December 14 2022, Iran was removed from the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) for the reminder of its 2022-2026 term for the oppression of women and girls and the actions of Islamic Republic since September 2022. In this historic event the resolution was put to a vote by UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), where it received 29 votes in favour, 8 against, and 16 countries abstained.

Establishment of Fact-Finding Mission (FFM)

Resolution S35/1 on the deteriorating situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted on 24 November 2022, an independent fact-finding Mission has been established. Mandate of this mission is stated as follows by the United Nations human Rights Council:

With the adoption of resolution S35/1 of 24 November 2022, the Human Rights Council provided the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran with the following mandate:

To thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children;

To establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violations.

To collect, consolidate and analyse evidence of such violations and preserve evidence, including in view of cooperation in any legal proceedings.

To engage with all relevant stakeholders, including the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, relevant United Nations entities, human rights organizations and civil society.

The Human Rights Council requested the Fact-Finding Mission to present an oral update to the Human Rights Council during an interactive dialogue at its fifty-third session (June/July 2023) and to present to the Council a comprehensive report on its findings during an interactive dialogue at its fifty-fifth session (March 2024).

VII CONCLUSION

Taken together, the ‘highlights from the recent protests’ from the first 82 days report, plus the monthly profiles and legal reviews for Spreading Justice (HRA-SJ), are all proof of systematic persecution of Iranians.  The atrocities of Iran are systematic and entrenched. It is clear that the State of Iran is guilty of crimes against humanity!

Only a whole-scale change can assist the crying voices of Iran; and it must start right at the top. Iranians of all classes, of all religions, of all creeds have come out in a unified voice for the first time since the Iranian Revolution. 

The law of Iran, as seen in the IPC, makes it legal to carry out acts that undermine international law and human rights. The IPC itself is an instrument of gross human rights violation.

Brian Currin
December 2022

Annual Analytical and Statistical Report on Human Rights in Iran for the year 2022

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)

Department of Statistics and Publications of Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA)— 2022, has been an eventful year in Iran, with at least 3046 protests being held across all provinces of Iran, and at least 22655 individuals arrested in violation of their right to freedom of expression. More so in an extremely alarming rate the executions carried out in 2022 compared to the previous year, increased by 88%, and the number of death sentences issued has also increased by 8%.

This annual report on human rights violations in Iran is the result of collection, analysis, and documentation of 13342 reports concerning human rights, gathered from 267 news sources during 2022. The report is divided into sections based on the categories of human rights areas of concern such as women rights, ethnic rights, religious rights, death penalty, etc. In each section charts, graphs, and illustrations in addition to analysis discusses the human rights concerns and emerging trends compared to the previous year.

This report is the result of the work of courageous human rights activists in Iran who pay a very high cost for striving to enact their humanitarian beliefs. However, for obvious reasons (i.e. existing governmental limitations, bans on the free exchange of information and government interference with the existence of human rights organizations in the country), this report by no means is free of errors and cannot solely reflect the actual status of human rights in Iran. Having said that, it should be emphasized that this report is considered one of the most accurate, comprehensive, and authentic reports on human rights conditions in Iran. It serves as an informative resource for human rights activists and organizations working on Iran who seek to better understand the challenges and opportunities that they may face.

Click on the Image Above to download the PDF version of the Full report
View The Full Report

A Comprehensive Report of the First 82 days of Nationwide Protests in Iran

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)

HRANA – Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old young woman, was arrested by the morality police for the crime of improper hijab. Her arrest and death in detention fueled nationwide protests in Iran. Protesters came to the streets with the central slogan “Women, Life, Freedom” in protest against the performance, laws, and structure of the regime. The following 486-page report is dedicated to the statistical review, analysis, and summary of the first eighty-two days of the ongoing protests (September 17 to December 7, 2022). In this report, in addition to the geographic analysis and the presentation of maps and charts, the identity of 481 deceased, including 68 children and teenagers, an estimated of 18,242 arrested along with the identity of 3,670 arrested citizens, 605 students and 61 journalists or activists in the field of information is compiled. In addition, the report includes a complete collection of 1988 verified video reports by date and topic. The report examines protests across 1115 documented gatherings in all 31 provinces of the country, including 160 cities and 143 universities.

Summary

Mahsa (Zhina) Amini, a young 22-year-old woman from Saqqez, Kurdistan was visiting Tehran, when she was taken into custody on Tuesday, September 13, 2022, by the Morality Police officers at the Haqqani metro station in Tehran. The reason for her arrest: not properly observing the strict Islamic dress code. Mahsa/Zhina was taken to the infamous detention center of Moral Security Police known as Vozara.
Shortly after Mahsa’s arrest, she went into a coma with level three concussion, and her partially alive body was transferred to the intensive care unit of Kasra Hospital. Given the track record of the police and Guidance Patrols in mistreating the arrestees and similar previous incidents, with the believe that Mahsa was beaten during the arrest people were outraged.
Unpersuasive explanations given by the Central Command of the Islamic Republic Police Force (FARAJA) in defense of its actions regarding the death of Mahsa, the past performance of the police force, along with widespread dissatisfaction with the existence of a body called the Moral Security Police, fueled widespread protests in Iran.
The widespread protests sparked at the time Mahsa Amini was announced dead in front of Kasra Hospital on Argentina Street in Tehran, and then quickly spread to the streets despite the intimidating presence of Iran’s security forces. The protests intensified after Mahsa’s burial in a Saqqez cemetery. To the extent that after eighty-two days of nationwide protests between September 17, 2022, to December 7, 2022, they have spread to Iran’s all 31 provinces, 160 cities, and 143 major universities.
The protests did not stay limited to Mahsa’s death, it rather, quickly targeted the Iranian government’s political and ideological foundations. These protests were violently quashed by the anti-riot police and Iran’s militia force (Basij). teargas, pellets, and live ammunition were used in the repression of protestors. This widespread crackdown has led to the death of dozens of people and the wounding of hundreds of protestors.
Despite sever communication restrictions imposed by the Islamic Republic, this report attempts to give a clearer picture of the first 82 days of the protests between September 17, to December 7, 2022. It’s worth mentioning at the time of this report the protests are still ongoing in various forms.

View the Full Report

For further inquiries please contact Skylar Thompson, Senior Advocacy Coordinator Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) at [email protected]

HRAs Spreading Justice urges governments to deny active members of Student Basij entry visas abroad. 

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)

The Spreading Justice initiative (SJ) of Human Rights Activists (HRA) has received ample evidence and information on the involvement of University Student Basij Forces in the crackdown of protesters during the ongoing protests in Iran, especially at the universities. These involvements include physical confrontation with protesting students, gathering protesting student information and providing them to security forces, and doing so aiding the arrests of students. 

However Student Basij members, despite their vital role in the crackdowns are left under the radar and often do not pay any cost for their involvement with the suppression of student movements. Many of the Student Basij members travel, study, or immigrate abroad with full impunity. 

The Student Basij was formed by the direct order of the founder of Islamic Republic, Khomeini, on 23 November 1988. This institution was formed in universities with the aim of “the defense of Islam, the revolution, and the values of the ruling system, to link the Hawza and the university”, “explaining, promoting, and realizing the orders of the former and current supreme leaders of Islamic Republic, namely Ruhollah Khomeini and Seyed Ali Khamenei”, and “Identifying and training of loyal, committed, and aligned forces with the characteristics of the Islamic Revolution for the perpetuation of the Islamic Revolution”. Ever since, Student Basij has had offices in universities across the country where students have been voluntarily recruited.

Student Basij is organizationally affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Ground Forces (NEZSA). The commander of the national student Basij is appointed by the IRGC commander, and the provincial commanders of Student Basij are appointed by the provincial IRGC commanders. 

The Student Basij have a history of involvement in the suppression of student movements in the universities at least since 1999, and their role in crackdowns on university movements and activists has increased ever since. The Student Basij has a history of violent confrontations, spying on students, and paving the way for the entry of intelligence-security forces to repress student movements. 

Student Basij members receive ideological training and are highly loyal to the supreme leader, Khamenei. Often, their role within the system does not end with their studies. Due to their loyalty and training, they are of great value for the government and often they move on to assume governmental and security positions within the system following their studies. 

We believe that Student Basij and its affiliations should not enjoy international impunity for three main reasons. 

  1. Student Basij plays a vital role in combating democratic seeking movements of Iranian people, especially the student movement. 
  2. Student Basij members are the governments ideological reserve for assuming important roles within the system in the future 
  3. Student Basij is officially under the command of IRGC

Having said that, we realized the Student Basij members are more likely to consider immigrating or studying abroad. Therefore we have started collecting evidence and data on the active members of Student Basij, and have called on people to share any information regarding the members of this organization with Spreading Justice. 

We have compiled the collected data and information, including names of current and former active Student Basij members, especially those that are actively serving the ruling ideology and confronting student movements. We have made the decision to not share this information publicly given its complexity, rather we aim to share with universities and immigration offices globally, and further urge governments to deny active members of Student Basij entry visas. 

For media inquiries please contact HRA Senior Advocacy Coordinator Skylar Thompson at [email protected]

HRA urges Tippmann Sports LLC to Condemn the Iranian government’s use of its equipment in the repression of protests

Posted on by Human Rights Activists (in Iran) Human Rights Activists (in Iran)

HRA urges Tippmann Sports LLC to Condemn the Iranian government’s use of its equipment in the repression of protests

ATTN: Tippmann Sports
4230 Lake Ave
Fort Wayne, IN 46815
United states

Human Rights Activists (HRA), a U.S. based non-governmental organization that monitors and reports on human rights violations inside Iran. HRA writes to inform Tippmann Sports LLC that  based on the information we have received and other existing evidence, its manufactured paintball equipment (specifically the Model 98 Paintball Gun) has been widely used by the security forces in the repression of unarmed protestors in Iran.

In the last month, the Iranian people have come to the streets to demand their human and democratic rights. In return, the security forces of the Islamic Republic have violently suppressed unarmed protestors. Hundreds have been killed, many more injured, and tens of thousands have been arbitrarily arrested. HRA has reported serious violations of human rights by the security forces of the Islamic Republic, including by FARAJA special units, against unarmed protestors. The acts documented by HRA and others include the killing, including by indiscriminate shooting, injuring, and arbitrary arrest of civilians, including minors. 

Iran is under severe economic sanctions by the United States and other democracy-supporting countries. While we are not aware, nor do we claim any malice on the part of Tippmann Sports LLC, and further, have found no evidence that supports claims that the Iranian government has obtained this weapon directly from the manufacturer, it saddens us to see that your equipment, which is designed for games and sports, has been deployed in such a fashion. 

HRA urges Tippmann Sports LLC to publicly and strongly condemn the Iranian government’s use of its equipment in the repression of protests, and with this position, stand by the people who are fighting for democracy and human rights in their country. In addition, we request that it considers implementing measures in its future contractual sales that would prevent the sale of this equipment to repressive regimes, namely the Islamic Republic. 

Keyvan Rafiee
Director
Human Rights Activists (in Iran)