Kompas – The wave of demonstrations in Iran has become the latest source of debate among international relations scholars. There are two questions that are often raised: first, how to interpret the situation, and whether the United States will intervene as it did in Venezuela.
Political and social instability is not a new phenomenon in Iran. Ameneh Mehvar (2023) from the independent conflict monitoring organization ACLED has well-documented data on anti-government demonstrations in Iran from 2016 to 2022. In various analyses, this wave of demonstrations is often interpreted as a purely domestic issue, whether it be governance failures, political repression, or elite conflicts.
The analysis is not entirely incorrect; however, it should be noted that Iran has been under strong external pressure, particularly from U.S. economic sanctions, which have exacerbated Iran’s economic crisis, narrowed the country’s fiscal space, and ultimately triggered social-political instability.
In addition, Iran’s budget profile also shows a trend of increase in the defense and security sector. Clément Therme (2024) writes that this drastic increase is driven by the need to ensure Iran’s security amid a turbulent regional situation, particularly due to military and intelligence activities by Israel. This increase has subsequently contributed to cuts in government subsidies for several sectors, including energy. Meanwhile, Iran’s domestic energy needs have not shown any decline.
Data from several energy information agencies such as CEIC, BP, and EIA records that in 2005, Iran’s energy supply reached approximately 1.2-1.3 million barrels per day, but the figure gradually increased and by 2024 reached 1.9-2 million barrels per day.
Meanwhile, Iran’s oil exports, which were previously stable at 2 million barrels per day, drastically declined in 2020 and 2021 but have finally stabilized after those two years. This decline cannot be separated from the decision of the US to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and the implementation of the “maximum pressure” policy.
The enforcement of sanctions by the US during that period was relatively strict, including in the shipping, insurance, and financial sectors. In addition, the Covid-19 pandemic also contributed to suppressing global demand and disrupting energy supply chains. Lastly, domestic pressures within Iran itself also increased, preventing production and distribution capacity from being fully optimized.
Typical export trends
Despite the disruptions in supply, there is a distinctive trend in oil exports. Iranian oil exports are almost entirely concentrated in one market, namely China. In 2021, for instance, it was estimated that 70–90 percent of Iranian oil flowed to China, either directly or through covert channels (EIA, 2025; Shokri, 2025). This indicates a structural shift from a relatively diversified market towards dependence on a single major buyer.
Nevertheless, quantitatively, Iran is not the largest oil supplier to China. Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq continue to dominate China’s oil supply. However, Iran’s significance lies in the nature of its supply.
Khan (2026) and Meizlish and Ghasseminejad (2025) describe Iranian oil as a strategic buffer supply for China. This is because Iranian oil can be obtained at discounted prices, is outside the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) regime, and can be mobilized through unconventional mechanisms during global market turmoil. Amid geopolitical volatility and potential global supply disruptions, these characteristics provide strategic value beyond volume figures alone.
Iranian oil distribution to China itself is carried out through various mechanisms to circumvent sanctions. Some of the methods identified by academics include the use of teapots, ship-to-ship transfers or floating storage, relabeling, shadow fleets, intermediary companies, and, of course, non-US dollar payment schemes.
Since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, this network has become increasingly institutionalized and involves Iranian security actors. As a consequence, although its absolute volume is limited, Iranian oil continues to play an important role in maintaining the stability of China’s energy supply.
In this logic, the United States’ pressure on Iran cannot be separated from the systemic rivalry between the United States and China. Sanctions against Iran are not merely instruments to suppress Iran’s development as a regional power or efforts to ensure regional security, particularly for Israel. However, the United States’ pressure is also aimed at limiting China’s maneuvering space in securing cheap and flexible energy supplies. Iran, therefore, is essentially caught in the intersection of regional conflicts in the Middle East and great power competition.
Consequence
The next question is, what consequences may arise from this situation? Is it true that Iran will easily become a victim of US intervention? Reflecting on data from external interventions, including military interventions, covert operations or intelligence interventions, as well as political and economic or financial interventions, an interesting pattern emerges.
Globally, the United States more frequently employs indirect interventions, such as political proxies, economic pressure, and covert operations. However, the Middle East is an exception. In this region, coercive approaches and the use of military force are more commonly undertaken by the United States. In the data records, Iran occupies a unique position. This country is most often the target of interventions, but it is not the primary target of open military interventions.
There are at least three reasons why military intervention in Iran is likely to be dangerous. First, the costs of escalation are too high. In general, O’Rouke’s (2018) study states that military intervention is unpopular because the costs, both financial and reputational, are too high compared to closed-door options. Second, the regional risks are too great, and the implications for global energy markets too serious. This relates to the significance of the Iranian-controlled Strait of Hormuz as a crucial chokepoint in global oil distribution.
In addition, findings from the intervention dataset also indicate that humanitarian reasons, considering that this is the most frequently propagated rationale at present, are the least commonly used justification. Conversely, the reasons more often employed for intervention are the need to ensure collective security, or, in other words, the occurrence of military attacks against U.S. allied partners in the region.
From the explanation, the instability in Iran cannot be separated from structured and prolonged external pressures. Not only related to Israel, these pressures are also intertwined with a more vulnerable global geopolitical struggle that has broader and longer structural consequences. As long as Iran continues to play a strategic role in the stability of China’s energy supply, US pressures are likely to persist.
Given that the current intensity of US pressure is already relatively high, leaving little room for non-military coercive options, countries should exercise restraint and reduce provocations. Furthermore, Iran could also play a crucial role in the global oil supply, as such disruptions would increase the burden on other countries dependent on oil distribution through the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, such weaponsization measures would not necessarily disturb the US.
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